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 Introduction: the United States and 
the United Nations System 
Though still far from ideal, the post war international arena appears to becoming increasingly 
democratic and transparent compared with the previous secret diplomacy among the great powers 
practiced at the expense of small countries. Due to the national sovereignty principle of the United 
Nations (UN) System, the voices of the small states have recently become louder and louder, thus 
enabling these countries greater significance than before. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that 
international politics, fundamentally speaking, is still deeply influenced by the great powers. From 
the “European concert” to the “Permanent 5 states unanimity,” the history and presence of 
international practice has again and again proven that international relations and outcomes have been 
permeated with the dominance of the great powers. One manifestation of these two tendencies in 
international politics is the relationship between states and international organizations.  
As one of the superpowers in the bipolar world and then the only superpower, sometimes called 
the hyper-power, after the end of the Cold War, the United States is never be too far from the center 
of international politics. Therefore, every time when we mention the hegemonic state in the world, 
“Pax Britannica” and recently “Pax Americana” are the key words that frequently appear in the 
literature. Looking back to the days of British preponderance in the nineteenth century and American 
dominance after World War II, we simply see that a single power, with predominant superiority of 
economic and military resources, implemented a plan for international order based on its interests 
and vision of the world.  
 
1. The US and the Creation of the UN 
Even though the United States experienced difficulty in creating a favorable institution due to 
the lack of domestic political support caused by the deep-rooted isolationism after World War One 
for instance, the United States still grasped the great opportunity brought by the Second World War. 
Thereafter, whatever the economy, politics, military or ideology, the United States occupied the 
leading position throughout the world.  Added in part from the war effect and a series of postwar 
plans for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, its national power reached to a level beyond 
everyone’s imagination. Since the end of World War II, under such circumstances, especially after 
the break-through of isolationism, the United States has been in the vanguard and the champion in 
establishing the bulk of contemporary international institutions based upon the principle of economic 
and political liberalism and multilateral arrangements. 
Concretely speaking, the United States exerted its power to establish a new set of international 
organizations (IO), which have been called the “United Nations System.” 1  Among these 
organizations the international liberal economic order, characterized by multilateralism, 
nondiscrimination, the minimization of impediments to the movement of goods and factors (with the 
exception of labor) and the control of such movements by privately owned rather than publicly 
owned entities, should be called the most representative and successful one.2 Also, according to 
scholars of the international political economy, the economic regime was also counted as the first of 
its kind.3 Therefore, it goes without saying that the United States was and is an indispensable force 
for the creation and operation of the United Nations System. Also, among these organizations, the 
Bretton Woods system could be counted as a symbol of the establishment of the United States 
economic hegemony that included a new series of international economic organizations that became 
the foundation of the postwar American-led system. Under the framework of this system, the IMF, 
the World Bank and GATT could be counted as the specific instruments used to actualize the 
hegemonic goal. In addition, as elaborate on later in the thesis, the US, not merely in the economic 
realm, but also in the security and cultural fields, extensively demonstrates its great influence in 
determining the outcome of multilateral negotiations. On the other hand, however, the United States 
has never concealed its suspicion of the function, accountability and effect of the international 
institutions during the past decades.  
 
2. US National Interests and the UN 
                                                        
1 The United Nations System has developed to be very complicated with a large scale. Please refer to the UN Official 
Website, at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html.  
2 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The third World Against Global Liberalism, University of California Press, 
1985, p. 61. 
3 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 
89-95. 
As mentioned above, those institutions indeed reflected American interests and American values. 
On the other side of this issue is the fact that an important aspect of the postwar international system 
was the influence played by international organizations that reflected America’s power, history, style, 
and economic interests. Compared with the brute force used in power politics that cause high cost 
and reluctant compliance, international organizations are useful instruments for a hegemonic state 
because they help to veil domination.4 They help the US to spread burdens, manage risks, and 
spread its values and ideology. At the same time, the legitimacy provided by international 
organizations could be another useful instrument of policy for a hegemonic state that enjoys de facto, 
but not de jure, control. They could also universalize the interest of the US at a time when it needs to 
reassure others about the way it would use its dominant position in the global system.5 
A second aspect that has contributed to US support for international organizations is the 
American spirit and historical experience. Even though the exercise of power politics undeniably 
dominates other applications in the practice of international politics, there was still a strong desire to 
fundamentally alter the way in which the international system has functioned. Specifically speaking, 
the balance of power approach brought about World War I, as well as the isolationism and economic 
nationalism that failed to preserve the expected peace for America. Therefore, it’s both natural and 
reasonable for the policymakers in Washington to be more active in the international arena, and 
international organizations have been found to be much more attractive approach than power 
politics. 
The end of the Cold War witnessed a booming, though very brief, period in which Washington 
relied upon the influence of the UN in constructing a new world order. This reliance was ended very 
quickly by the bloodshed in Somalia.6 Since then, the United States has seemed to be more 
ambivalent and more skeptical towards the utility of international institutions in the post-Cold War 
era. On a number of prominent occasions in recent years, Washington has either opted out of 
multilateral arrangements or insisted on acting alone to address global problems.7 This ambivalence 
and lack of commitment towards international institutions has been manifested in many cases, 
                                                        
4 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The third World Against Global Liberalism, p. 62. 
5  Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), US Hegemony and International 
Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 10. 
6 Ian Johnstone, “US-UN Relations after the Cold War: As We Know It?” European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 821. 
7 “Task Force Report,” see http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/programs/sns/taskforce/papers/SNS03b.pdf. 
ranging from Washington’s defiance of multilateral consultations conducted in the United Nations to 
its rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well as the Kyoto Protocol. The 
terrorist attack on September 11th has only offered new ammunition to those “neo-conservatism” 
thinkers in the Bush administration who have long advocated America’s absolute security and 
freedom of state behavior to minimize as much as possible any constraints by international 
institutions on its sovereignty. Since the attack, neo-conservatives have been the driving intellectual 
force behind US policymaking in Iraq and the greater Middle East.8 The dispute and confrontation 
over the Iraq War is just the latest and highest profile case reflecting the tension between the United 
States and international institutions. 
 Though this thinking has had the greatest effect on the decision-making of the US government, 
from the beginning it has provoked opposition from a number of liberal scholars. Some liberalists 
maintain that as an individual state, even for the most powerful state in the international community, 
the US should assume the responsibility of spreading the democratic political system and the liberal 
economic system to the rest of the world through the authoritative UN System so as to enhance 
world peace and prosperity even though sometimes this enterprise might collide with the national 
interest of the US.9 Against this backdrop, some observers have argued that the US is determined to 
pursue its hegemonic strategy at the expense of international institutions. The assumption embedded 
in this argument seems to indicate that the relationship between the United States, a hegemonic 
power, and international institutions is confrontational in nature and unable to be reconciled. Under 
such circumstances, a Japanese scholar, Mogami Toshiki, also mentioned two main kinds of 
explanations describing the ambiguous relationship between the United States and the United 
Nations, namely, the UN under the US or the UN VS the US; sometimes, probably, the US under the 
UN.10 To what degree are these arguments dependable? What kind of interaction exists between the 
US and international institutions? What kind of relationship exists between US power evolution and 
                                                        
8 Soeren Kern, “Who is Running US Foreign Policy”, at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/685.asp. 
9 It has been abstracted from the speech delivered by Ms. Gillian Martin Sorensen and afterwards discussions with 
her. Ms Sorensen has had a long career working with and for the UN. Since l993, she served as Special Adviser for 
Public Policy for Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then as Assistant Secretary General, head of the Office of 
External Relations for Secretary General Kofi Annan. She was responsible for outreach to civil society including 
NGO’s and worked closely with diplomats, academics, parliamentarians, religious leaders and others committed to 
peace, justice, development and human rights. She is an experienced public speaker and often represented the World 
Organization in this country and abroad. 
10 最上敏樹, 『国連とアメリカ』, 東京: 岩波書店, 2005.3. 
the outcomes of its practice in international organizations? 
 
3. Will the US Still Dominate the UN? 
A few years ago, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once wondered, “is Washington’s will to 
lead diminishing even as many around world look to it for leadership? Is it no longer convinced of 
the myriad benefits to be had from multilateral cooperation?”11 These two questions are still 
relevant and even more important today when the United States is still indispensable to a world in 
which we have to work together to create an increasing number of global public goods.12 Therefore, 
the discussion about the US concerning its diplomatic and domestic policy towards the UN System 
incessantly attracts scholars and officials both inside and outside of the country. Most of these 
arguments could be categorized as belonging two schools of thought. 
Some scholars think that the US influence on the United Nations has been gradually weakened, 
so the US is inclined to build a new Roman Empire in order to take control of international affairs. 
They believe that the UN can be counted on as an instrument of US policy, which means that “if the 
UN could function upon the US willingness, then follow the instructions of the UN, if not, just 
bypass it without any hesitation.”13 As the US administration advocates pre-emption in doctrine and 
practice and the state extends its influence worldwide, the notion of America as an empire is 
becoming central to contemporary political debate.14 Similarly, many liberal scholars think that 
                                                        
11 Marcus, David L., “Allies, Foes, See Lack of US leadership on Land Mines, Global Warming. Washington Called 
Indecisive,” Boston Globe, December 21, 1997. 
12 In order to better understand the definition of “global public goods”, please see Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stein, Oxford University Press, 
1999. Specifically speaking, the global public goods have been defined as outcomes (or intermediate products) that 
tend towards universality in the sense that they benefit all countries, population groups and generation. At a minimum, 
a global public good would meet the following criteria: its benefits extend to more than one group of countries and do 
not discriminate against any population group or any set of generations, present or future. In a highly divided world, 
global public goods raise the familiar issue of how to ensure their provisions, given that internationally there is no 
equivalent to a national institution of government. But global public goods also raise two other issues: who defines 
the political agenda, and hence the priorities for resource allocations? And who determines whether global public 
goods are in fact accessible to all population groups? Both issues—prioritization and access—are important areas for 
further research and policy debate. 
13 It has been abstracted from the interview by the author to Ted Carpenter, Vice President for Defense & Foreign 
Policy Studies（program）at CATO Institute. 
14  On this topic, see Stephen Howe, “American Empire: The History and Future of an Idea,” at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/0612idea.htm; also see Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The 
Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Harvard University Press, 2004. Bacevich, professor of international 
relations at Boston University, interprets America as the new Rome: committed to maintaining and expanding an 
empire acquired by design, not accident. He argues persuasively that the foreign policies of Clinton and George W. 
Bush reflected an essential continuity because all three administrations had essentially the same view of America’s 
vital interests and how best to secure them. They accepted an American mission as the guardian of history, 
responsible for changing the world by making it more open and more integrated. They accepted an American global 
international organizations, including the United Nations, are not merely strategic tools of the 
hegemon because these organizations provide meeting places, promote information exchanges, and 
thus enhance the transparency of international politics, as well as reinforce the influence of small and 
medium states. 
Others, including Professor John Ikenberry, argue that the US still remains attractive to other 
states and should occupy the dominant place in the postwar international order. In examining 
postwar settlements in modern history, he argues that powerful countries do seek to build stable and 
cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments 
and restrain power.15Compared with the brute force used in power politics that causes high cost and 
reluctant compliance, international organizations are useful instruments for a hegemonic state 
because they help to veil domination.16 They help the US to spread burdens, manage risks, and 
spread its values and ideology. At the same time, the legitimacy provided by international 
organizations could be another useful instrument of policy for a hegemonic state. They could also 
universalize the interests of the US at a time when it needs to reassure others about the way it would 
use its dominant position in the global system.17 Neorealists usually tend to support this view of the 
US-UN relationship. 
Considering all of the above, the reality is that the influence of the US has undergone various 
changes, though generally speaking its controlling power seems to be waning. Since the United 
States cannot always dominate postwar international organizations (even those that have been 
established mainly by its advocacy and efforts), a number of political and economic elites tend to 
support the unilateral approach in dealing with international affairs. Specifically, they believe that 
the US can use military and economic power directly to get whatever it wants. Thus, in the 1950s, 
the hegemon usually took action under the flag of the United Nations, such as during the Korean War. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
leadership, manifested by maintaining preeminence in the world’s strategically significant regions. They accepted the 
necessity of permanent global military supremacy. Other supporters of “American Empire” include Chalmers 
Johnson (The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic Metropolitan Books,2004), 
Anders Stephanson (The New American Empire: A 21st-Century Teach-In on U.S. Foreign Policy, New Press, 2005), 
and so on. 
15 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, 
Princeton University Press, 2000; also see See John G. Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American 
Order,” in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004. 
16 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The third World Against Global Liberalism, University of California Press, 
1985, p. 62. 
17  Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), US Hegemony and International 
Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 10. 
However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the US was irritated by attacks from within the UN and even 
withdrew from UNESCO, which was dominated by the USSR and the Third World. Therefore, in 
order to better understand the changing influence of the US on international organizations and trace 
the specific deeds the US committed through other organizations, an empirical and comprehensive 
study is both necessary and urgent. Only after we identify the truth can we predict the future of the 
relationship between the US and postwar international orders. “Despite the importance of this debate 
and the centrality of America to multilateral cooperation, there is a relative scarcity of general 
studies of the relationship between the United States and multilateral organizations. This seeming 
neglect of a major global issue has provided further impetus to this project.”18 Thus, this dissertation 
is a systemic research of the US influence on the UN system, by which is meant, what are the 
ultimate factors that determine the objective US policy outcomes of the United Nations. Why is the 
US able to exert influence on different organizations? Also, if, during the same time period, attention 
was focused on a given organization, why did the influence also alter over time? These are the 
questions to which this thesis proposes answers.  
The reason for the concentration on postwar international organizations is that international 
organizations are entities and a core part of the postwar international order. Global society has 
become increasingly institutionalized. Since the 1990s, many official and civilian international 
organizations appear to be covering a broad range of issues, from economy to culture to 
communication, taking both the traditional and informal collaboration approach. Another advantage 
of focusing on organizations is that there is simplicity and clarity to the concept of a global 
organization. This is in contrast to the complexity and uncertainty of the concept of order, which 
facilitates strictly scientific research.19 
                                                        
18  Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), US Hegemony and International 
Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, p. 5. 
19 There are many controversies on the concept such as regimes, institutions or order, the use of which to great extent 
depends on the international relations scholar. For example, Stephen Krasner is fond of the word “regime,” and his 
broad definition on “international regime” includes a series of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge. Principles are a coherent set of theoretical statements about 
how the world works. Norms specify general standards of behavior. Rules and decision-making procedures refer to 
specific prescriptions for behavior in clearly defined areas. This understanding on international regime is similar to 
Keohane’s definition on “international institution.” “Order” is widely accepted as a most extensive concept that even 
some scholars use to conclude international and domestic characteristics. See Robert O. Keohane, “International 
Institutions: Two Approaches,” in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 290. 
Discussions on “order” can be reached in Robert Gilbin, War and Change in World Politics, Princeton University 
Press, 1981, and many works of Ikenberry and Stephen Krasner. 
This dissertation organically combines an analytical framework and an empirical study on one 
important issue. That is to say, the thesis, at the very beginning, refers to some prevalent and 
persuasive theories, from which two significant variables are abstracted and applied to an analytical 
framework. Then, the hypothesis is proposed and then supported using empirical studies to 
demonstrate the validity of the theoretical logic. Thus, this study is not only a historical study, but 
also a scientific study. The dissertation also follows the comparative approach when conducting the 
empirical studies. US influence varies as the US power status varies; and US influence is also 
different in the same stages of various organizations in which the degree of openness differs. 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Research on 
US Influence in International Organizations 
The influence of the US on postwar international organizations has undertaken various 
transformations. Why have these changes occurred? Different schools of international relations give 
different explanations for the relationship between states and international organizations. After doing 
a literature review of the relationship between the US and international institutions, this chapter 
explores what the primary factors may be in determining the US’s general influence on postwar 
international organizations.  
In order to specify the level of “influence,” the article adopts “critical”, “substantial”, and 
“moderate” to describe the different ranks of influence exerted by the states. Perhaps “weak” should 
also be used when discussing and understanding state influence. However, this research focuses on 
the United States, a hegemonic state that is so strong that its influence has almost never fallen into 
the category of “weak” even during its period of relative decline. Concretely speaking, Critical 
Influence describes the situation where a state has decisive influence on some of the 
decision-making process, especially when the state can often successfully rally enough support on 
most of the major issues in order for its policy to prevail. Substantial Influence describes the 
situation where a state has great influence on some of the decision-making process, but it often 
cannot successfully rally enough support on most of the major issues, but is often able to veto the 
passage of most unfavorable resolutions. Moderate Influence describes the situation where a state 
has general influence on some of the decision-making process, but it cannot rally enough support for 
both its own policy or veto unfavorable resolutions. However, the state still enjoys its legal rights as 
a formal member, and its vote can to some extent influence the final outcome. 
The clarification of these three kinds of influence sets a standard for an analysis of the US 
impact on international organizations. It can also be used to describe other states, especially 
powerful states in the center of the international organization arena. The following review includes 
the theoretical and empirical studies on this topic through which we can find various viewpoints 
regarding US influence on international organizations. Then, the hegemonic features in postwar 
international organizations are examined, and  how the US realized its dominance in the 1950s and 
in some areas even until the present is explored. Two variables, power status and organizational 
openness, are extracted on the basis of existing theories. With the alteration of the relative US power 
status, US influence inevitably varies; meanwhile, in organizations with different levels of openness, 
US influence has also presented different faces. That is to say, the source of US influence on postwar 
international organizations depends on its power status and the openness of the organizations. Finally, 
the time span division of this research is explained, and the rationale of selecting the IMF, UNESCO 
and the UNSC as case studies is also explained. 
 
1.  Literature Review on Relationships between States and International 
Organizations 
Fundamentally speaking, there have been three mainstream schools of international relations 
theory: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Both Realism and Liberalism developed from 
reductionist theories, which focus on the unit level. The Traditional Realism of Hans J. Morgenthau 
mainly refers to national policy in the struggle for power. “International politics, like all politics, is a 
struggle for power. Whatever ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate 
aim.”20 He also explored the constraints on balance of power and even talked about the influence of 
world public opinion and international law in the struggle among states for power. When discussing 
international law, he referred to the charters of international organizations such as the League of 
Nations and the United Nations. However, the primary objective of his discourse was to depreciate 
utopian viewpoints.21 Traditional Liberalism also concentrated on the importance of international 
law or international organizations in regulating the behavior of states. Neorealism, Neoliberalism, 
and Constructivism are all systemic theories that attempt to explain how international institutions 
come into being and the influence of major states in creating or governing them. 
 
1.1 Neorealist Studies 
Neorealism is based on Kenneth N. Waltz’s Structural Realism that explains the international 
outcome from the structural level. Waltz summarizes the international structure into main two areas: 
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(a) structures are defined according to the principle by which a system is ordered. Systems are 
transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. To move from an anarchical to a hierarchic 
realm is to move from one system to another; and, (b) structures are defined by the distribution of 
capabilities across units. Changes in this distribution will lead to changes in the system.22 Under 
anarchy, power distribution is the most important factor in determining international alignments such 
as military alliances and economic interdependence. This theory of Waltz’s has paved the way for 
other Neorealism studies, the most distinguished of which has been the Hegemonic Stability Theory 
of Robert Gilpin. 
Moreover, Waltz depreciates the importance of international institutions and considers 
institutions to be the instruments of great powers in the structure. In his famous Theory of 
International Politics, he insists that military alliances (which are generally defined as a kind of 
international institution23) have turned out to be irrelevant under the bipolar structure. The hegemon 
can make its decisions independently and pay little attention to the attitudes of its allies.24 The 
emergence of superpowers meant that losing or wining the support of other great powers wouldn’t 
radically change the outcome of the US-Soviet competition. Accordingly, the hegemon needn’t 
worry about its influence in a military alliance. After the end of the Cold War, Waltz recognizes the 
relative independence of international organizations such as NATO. However, he still insists that the 
survival or function of international institutions must depend on the hegemon.25 The United States 
has been the dominator of postwar international organizations due to its hegemonic status. 
Another Realist scholar, John Mearsheimer, also believes that an international organization is 
only an instrument of interest struggles among the great powers. His central conclusion is that 
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international institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus holds little promise for 
promoting stability in the post-Cold War world because “the most powerful states in the system 
create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power or even increase it. 
In this view, institutions are essentially arenas for acting out power relationships.” “Institutions 
largely mirror the distribution of power in the system” and “reflect state calculations of 
self-interest.”26 That is to say, the most powerful state dominates international institutions and 
institutions themselves are irrelevant. 
Robert Gilpin is another significant Realist. Like other realistic scholars, he argues that 
international institutions have been created by the hegemon and work for the interest of the hegemon. 
What is different about his views is that he places emphasis on the autonomous function (to some 
extent) of international institutions. Comparatively speaking, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer 
attach little importance to these institutions, though they agree that institutions can work for the 
hegemonic interest. Gilpin has carefully studied the British hegemony and American hegemony and 
their relationships with the liberal international order. According to his research, the liberal order 
needs the leadership of a powerful hegemon, and it can greatly promote the hegemon’s interest. If 
the hegemon declines, newly rising states will unavoidably challenge the crucial parts of the old 
international order, and thus the international system will encounter some destabilizing factors. 
Therefore, the international order has been the central concern of great power conflicts. His theory 
has often been called “Hegemonic Stability Theory” or “The Theory of Hegemonic War.” 27 
According to him and many other hegemonic theorists, political power distribution in the 
international order will vary rather than the nature of international order varying. For instance, 
before World War II the new international order usually meant the redistribution of control or 
occupation of territories including colonies. However, the core part of Gilpin’s Realism is the same 
as that of other Realists: the dominant influence of the hegemon in international institutions depends 
on its power status.  
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The research of Stephen D. Krasner concentrates on the relationship of states and international 
institutions. He is also a distinguished realist28 and believes that the concentration of capabilities has 
a great impact on the nature and form of the international order. At the same time, he believes that 
institutions themselves can to some extent be independent.29 His article “Structural Causes and 
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables” and the famous book, Structural Conflict: 
The Third World Against Global Liberalism most typically represent his main thoughts on this 
issue.30 In the article, he concluded that there are three categories of state-regime relationships: 
“conventional structural arguments do not take regimes seriously: if basic causal variables change, 
regimes will also change. Regimes have no independent impact on behavior. Modified structural 
arguments, represented here by a number of adherents of a realist approach to international relations, 
reckon regimes as mattering only when independent decision-making leads to undesired outcomes. 
Finally, Grotian perspectives accept regimes as a fundamental part of all patterned human interaction, 
including behavior in the international system.”31 Krasner is inclined to belong to the modified 
structuralists group. Furthermore, in this article, he has distinguished the change of principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures. Principles and norms provide the basic defining 
characteristics of a regime. “There may be many rules and decision-making procedures that are 
consistent with the same principles and norms. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are 
changes within the regimes, provided that principles and norms are unaltered.” As I will elaborate 
later, the changes to the IMF during the 1960s and 1970s are an example of this type of change. 
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“Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.”32 The changing that occurred in 
UNESCO during the 1970s and the early 1980s were more representative of this type of change. 
Distinguishing the difference between these two types of change has helped to define the concept 
“openness of international organizations” in section 4 of this chapter. 
The book Structural Conflict comprehensively examined the relationship between the Third 
World and the postwar international order. Krasner brought forward three elements to explain the 
outcomes of challenges to the liberal order by the Third World. The first is the declining tendency of 
US power. The second is the openness of respective international institutions. The last is the flow of 
thoughts, which examines whether the Third World states are able to coordinate with each other, thus 
uniting their thinking and speak into a single voice. Specifically, he asserts that the more severely US 
power declines, the more open international institutions are, and the more consolidated the Third 
World is, the more likely it is that the Third World succeeds.33 Krasner has not clearly defined the 
standard for “openness of international organizations,” but his emphasis on the autonomy of 
international institutions has made his arguments more persuasive.  
Krasner’ research has important implications for this research dealing with US influence on the 
United Nations System primarily because he has combined power status and openness to better 
explain the relationship between states and international institutions. Accordingly, these two 
elements can be used to analyze whether the US is able to dominate the postwar international order. 
The third element is unnecessary for this research on account of the fact that the US is a single state 
and not a group of states, the latter of which needs to make great efforts to precipitate collective 
action. The theoretical contribution of this research is that the general pattern of power status and 
openness is delineated, and a scientific definition of openness is proposed.  
There are a large number of empirical realist works on power status and states’ influence on 
international organizations. For instance, Susan Strange has studied the relationship between the US 
and the IMF. Her conclusion is that “the Fund’s course in the future as in the past will be determined 
mainly by how the most important governments, especially that of the United States, will react to 
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these developments in the international political economy.”34 The Anatomy of Influence, edited by 
Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, comprehensively explores states’ influence on various 
international organizations such as the ILO, UNESCO, WHO, the IMF, UNCTAD, and GATT, and it 
should be counted as an excellent realist study of international organizations. Another book that 
needs to be mentioned here is The United States and Multilateral Institutions, whose author also 
refers to US power and American domestic factors to explain the US-IGO relationship including the 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), the IMF, WHO, the World Bank, and IFO 
(International Food Organizations).35  
Another important survey that bears noting here is US hegemony and International 
Organizations.36 This work is different due to the fact that regional international organizations have 
been included. The authors of this book use power distribution and domestic politics to explain the 
US impact on international organizations. There is also a significant book, written in Japanese, 
which is worth noting here: United Nations and America by Mogami Toshiki. Toshiki uses the Iraq 
War as the basis of his analysis. In this book, he clearly depicts the evolution of the relationship 
between the United States and the United Nations. His concept of “the US under the UN”, “the UN 
under the US” and “the UN versus the US” all provide various angles from which to evaluate US 
influence on the UN. The discussion in Chapter 5 regarding “multilateralism and imperialism” is 
thought provoking and illuminates international practice concerning the great powers. There are 
many more articles and works concerning US influence on some special organizations. Generally 
speaking, these works and articles tend to combine international and domestic factors to better 
understand the US impact on international organizations. These works are more appropriate for a 
deep exploration of the issue, but this research aims to bring forward a simple analytical framework 
to account for the decisive factors of US influence on international organizations. I will constrain the 
analysis to the systemic level with the work of Stephen D. Krasner as a basis. Domestic factors 
undeniably have some effect on US influence, but they cannot be integrated into a systemic pattern 
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and theorized.37Therefore, this research is limited to seeking an objective outcome that highlights the 
variation in US impact. Thus, it is both rational and appropriate to exclude US policies implemented 
in international organizations in that they don’t belong to the sphere of this research. 
 
1.2 Neoliberalist and Constructivist Studies 
Both Neoliberalists and Constructivists believe that institutions can be independent from 
hegemonic power and play an important role in international affairs, though they differ on whether 
international institutions should be material or ideational. The primary representative of 
Neoliberalism, Robert O. Keohane, argues that institutions can be formed by not only the hegemon’s 
promotion, but also through spontaneous multilateral negotiations. If these institutions are arrived at 
through negotiation and consultation among many states, it will be very difficult for a single state to 
alter those institutions. As for the institutions created by the hegemon, if they can effectively provide 
a public good, they may be able to survive after the decline of the hegemon. Therefore, institutions 
can constrain the influence of the hegemon.38 The point of Neoliberalism is inherently related to the 
openness of the organization itself. If the formation of some international organization is based on 
open and multilateral discussions, the potential influence exerted by a single state will be reduced. 
Once an institution comes into being, its initial principles and norms will become increasingly 
difficult to change. Actually, the difference between Neorealism and Neoliberalism lies mainly in the 
recognition of the autonomic state of international institutions. As the following section 4 shows, 
these Neorealist ideas facilitate further understanding of the essentiality of openness in international 
organizations. 
Constructivists argue that international institutions are shared ideas formed through repetitious 
international interaction. Therefore, the hegemon does not have a superior place in this school of 
international relations. What is more, shared ideas can independently be a critical influence in 
shaping the identities of states. Constructivists admit that a state’s power matters, but they add that 
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the impact of power is inferior to that of the state’s identity.39 Many Constructivist scholars have 
studied the autonomy of international organizations, but perhaps the most distinguished achievement 
in this area is Rules for the World, written by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. They begin 
with the fundamental idea that international organizations are bureaucracies that have the authority 
to make rules and exercise power. At the same time, Barnett and Finnemore maintain that such 
bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules, producing unresponsive, inefficient, and 
self-defeating outcomes. Authority gives international organizations autonomy and allows them to 
evolve and expand in ways unexpected by their creators.40  
Both Liberal Institutionalism and Social Constructivism cannot provide a cause-effect 
explanation for the relationships between states and international institutions because their 
theoretical stance is that institutions or shared ideas can be independent from the hegemon. If states, 
even the hegemon, do not observe the existing institutional arrangements, its prestige and other 
interests will also be harmed. That is to say, institutions can constrain and regulate a states behavior.  
For Constructivists, states are also compelled to comply with an existing political culture, or its 
institutional manifestation. Neorealism departs with liberalism and constructivism on this point. 
Neorealism insists that institutions are mostly created by the hegemon and supported by hegemonic 
power. Thus, when the prerequisite undergo some changes, the hegemon’s influence in those 
institutions will be unavoidably challenged. Accordingly, this research first explores the hegemonic 
features of postwar international organizations.  
 
2. The General Hegemonic Features of Postwar International Organizations 
Generally speaking, the postwar international system has been hegemonic, though US influence 
has undergone changes as the empirical studies show. Many scholars have described the US as the 
new Roman Empire after listing its formidable and insurmountable military and economic power. 
Actually, as Joseph Nye and many other international political scholars claim, the US is even more 
powerful than the old agricultural empire of the Romans. In comparison, its leading status hasn’t 
been limited to just a few sectors as was the case with the Roman Empire. Although the former 
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British Empire controlled the sea and established some international regimes, it still cannot compare 
with the US in the area of comprehensive capabilities. However, as Robert O. Keohane says, 
hegemony is “unlike an imperial power, it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of 
consent from other sovereign states…Indeed, the hegemon may have to invest resources in 
institutions in order to ensure that its preferred rules will guide the behavior of other countries.”41 
That is to say, the hegemon must endow international institutions with autonomy to some extent. The 
US successfully constituted and dominated a set of rigorous and formal institutional systems after 
the Second World War that have been called the “hegemonic order.” 
 
2.1 The Rules of Resource Distribution 
In many international organizations concerned with the distribution of international resources, 
the distribution or transaction rules are usually consistent with American national interest or were 
originally designed to meet the demands of the major powers. The emergence of the Bretton Woods 
System, the emphasis on human rights, the liberal principles of UNESCO, and the entitling of veto 
power to the great powers all reflect the great impact posed by the great powers, which at the same 
time would be taken advantage of by them to impose their will on the member states that long for 
public goods and political or economic resources. There is a trend indicating that the United Nations 
(UN) has embraced the neo-liberal agenda and is being geared towards promoting the interests of 
transnational capital, in particular by elevating the influence that the private corporate sector has 
within the organizations. Additionally, the relationship between a state and the UN is being 
reconstituted through a reconfiguration of the principle of sovereignty and its relationship to the 
principle of prohibiting the use of force. The phenomenon of armed humanitarian intervention and 
the doctrine of pre-emptive use of force are manifestations of the transformed relationship between 
sovereign states and the UN. We can clearly trace the changes to a number of international rules and 
laws after 1945 that have been profoundly penetrated by US influence and interest. In the newly 
released UN reform report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all,” when defining security and development, Kofi Annan used the words “Freedom from Fear” and 
“Freedom from Want;” two exact phrases used by former US President Roosevelt. When referring to 
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Human Rights, Annan believes that it is necessary to establish a voluntary fund to secure freedom 
and democracy. This idea is an exact echo of what President Bush stated at his inauguration. Thus, 
there are numerous comments indicating that the report tried hard to “fawn on” the United States. 
The liberal international economic order embodied in the organizations mentioned above was 
designed to cater to the largest and most economically advanced state in the international system. A 
hegemonic state can compete in a favorable environment under a liberal economic system. Since the 
hegemonic state is much larger and enjoys much higher productivity than its trading partners, the 
costs and benefits of openness are asymmetrical for all members of the system. Therefore, it’s not 
hard to understand the idea that the hegemonic state will have a preference for a certain international 
structure that facilitates the spreading of liberal order and increases its aggregate national income. 
Moreover, it increases its rate of growth during its ascendancy - which means its relative size and 
technological predominance are increasing. Further, this type of open structure increases its political 
power because the opportunity costs of closure are lowest for a large and developed state. The social 
disruption that is generated by such arrangements is mitigated by its size and the mobility of its 
factors.42 An open regime for capital provides opportunities for portfolio and direct investment. 
On the other hand, close economic ties permit the possibility of exercising political influence. 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye asserted that interdependence is also a kind of power.43 The 
state, which is relatively dependent from this relationship, can use it to pursue some other political 
goals. For instance, in the case of IMF loans, the United States usually impels some states to adopt a 
reforming policy, even utterly alter their foreign policies, by threatening to cut off economic aid or 
ties. Therefore, the liberal features of postwar global international organizations not only elevate 
American economic status, but also contribute to an increase in American political capital. 
 
2.2 Decision-Making Process 
In a number of international institutions (especially in critical politico-economic global 
international organizations), the US enjoys a greater share of the votes in the decision-making 
process. For example, IMF quotas and voting power are determined essentially by the member’s 
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economic scale and openness to trade, which are indicators of a country’s power in the global 
economy and the extent to which a country can contribute financial assistance to other members in a 
crisis. The quotas are revised regularly to keep up with developments in the world economy. The 
voting power of each state in the IMF, set by the Articles of Agreement, is the sum of its 250 basic 
votes (the same for each member) and one vote per SDR 100,000 of its quota in the Fund. The quota 
of each state also determines its capital subscription to the Fund and its access to Fund borrowing. 
Decision making in the IMF is usually done by consensus; the Board rarely takes a formal vote. 
However, the most commonly heard criticism of the IMF is that it’s under the control of the rich 
countries and only acts in their interest. The G7, and especially the United States, are always the 
target of this criticism. 
 For instance, there are numerous studies representing the detrimental impact of high 
agricultural trade barriers and export subsidies in Europe, the United States, and Japan. These 
advanced countries are systematically denying farmers in poor countries their only opportunity for 
development by excluding their products from the markets of rich countries and reducing prices in 
the world market through the dumping of unneeded agricultural surpluses. Here, the special and 
almost dominant position of the United States in the IMF cannot be neglected. At the end of World 
War II, the United States accounted for 22 percent of world exports and held 54 percent of official 
international reserve assets. Those percentages were reflected in a 33 percent quota share for the 
United States in the IMF. In addition, it was understood that the Fund would not make any major 
decisions without US approval. Technically, the Articles of Agreement require an 85 percent 
majority for certain major decisions and 50 percent for most others. In practice, the IMF has 
normally deferred to the United States on any controversial issue and even some common lending 
decisions. 
 
2.3 Value and Ideology Penetration 
American values and ideology have penetrated postwar international organizations to a great 
extent. Joseph Nye refers to this penetration as “soft power.”44 He summarizes soft power as power 
that is a “directing, attracting and imitating power” (or co-optive power), which is the ability of a 
                                                        
44 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s only Superpower Can’t Go It Along, Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
country to attract and influence other countries by ideas, values and ideology. This power is closely 
related to intangible entities such as culture, ideology, and social system. The cultural universality of 
a country and its ability to determine norms, rules, and regimes that regulate international behaviors 
can be counted as key resources of a country’s power. 45 In Nye’s opinion, today’s world is different 
from the past when war was the great arbitrator. Now, the most interesting types of power do not 
come “out of the barrel of a gun” and have become “less coercive and less tangible.” This 
penetration enhances the attraction of other states to the US and makes US value-oriented behavior 
legitimate and reasonable.  
Unlike in the past when military power reigned supreme, the modern era has seen the rise of a 
more appealing approach: “getting others to want what you want” through cultural attraction and 
ideology. McDonalds, Hollywood, Levi’s, and Michael Jordan have been popular icons of America 
for a long time. In addition, English has become the “universal” language. From informal daily 
conversations to formal international conferences in both developed countries as well as developing 
countries, English has wide-ranging usage. One phrase, “Made in the USA”, seems to represent a 
kind of advanced trend. In addition, the universities of the United States have recently turned into 
shrines for intellectuals and talented students throughout the world. This has two very large benefits 
for the US. First, it shows the attractiveness of the United States as a place for academic study. 
Second, it offers the United States the unparalleled privilege of absorbing intelligence and wisdom 
from all across the globe. It’s the first time in history that a great power hasn’t needed to conquer 
territory before they could conquer minds. However, there is an increasing protest in many countries 
calling for the restoration of one’s own distinct culture or the furious rejection of the encroachment 
of American culture.  
The cultural and ideological penetration by the US not only spreads through direct approaches 
(such as education or business), but also through the indoctrination of many global international 
organizations. The ideas of democracy, freedom, representative government, and human rights 
originated from European and American culture and have now been firmly and universally accepted 
as a set of political principles throughout the world. This American ideological domination 
penetrates the charters of almost every single global international organization. 
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 3. The Power Root of the US Influence In the Postwar International 
Organizations 
If we want to understand the root of the US’s overwhelming influence, we must know how 
these international organizations have come into being. Neorealists such as Robert Gilpin suggest 
that a great power creates favorable international institutions including some specific organizations; 
therefore, there is one direct way to establish or modify the institution, and US preponderance can be 
derived from its overwhelming power status. 
3.1 Relative Power and the US Influence on International Organizations 
Power theory can also directly explain the US’s overwhelming influence on postwar 
international organizations. 
First, international organizations have been established on the basis of the power superiority of 
the hegemon, a viewpoint upon which Hegemonic Stability Theorists insist and Neoliberal 
Institutionalists partly agree.46 Hegemonic Stability Theory emphasizes Neorealism institutional 
thought surrounding the rise and fall of hegemonic power. The theory argues that international 
organizations have been created by the hegemon and consequentially will benefit it more. If changes 
take place in the distribution of state capabilities, newly rising states will not be able to avoid 
challenging the existing hegemonic order.47 Therefore, peacefully or not, the influence of the 
hegemon on international organizations will decrease. Accordingly, the organizations themselves 
(including their principles, rules, and arrangements) will be altered. The more drastic the decline of 
the hegemon, the more likely rising countries will challenge the existing order. For instance, the 
power distribution in the IMF has been prescribed as a system of quotas based on the economic scale 
of the member states. Therefore, the incessant development (positive or negative) of every member 
state in the IMF will naturally lead to quota redistribution and voting power reallocation. As for 
global communication institutions, Krasner notes, the power evolution has evoked some 
corresponding changes in this regime.48 
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Second, according to Neorealist master Kenneth N. Waltz, the, great powers must learn from 
their successors in international competition in order to survive and thus become more similar in 
crucial state sectors. This is called “the socialization effect,” which is also transferred to the 
organization and reinforces the hegemon’s interest. If the hegemon declines or has been surpassed by 
other great powers, the hegemonic ideology and institution will lose its attraction in international 
organizations. Because it holds hegemonic status, US values, institutions, and ideology have great 
appeal to other states, which makes permeating international institutions with American concepts 
and ideology relatively easy. In the economic arena, a wide-ranging set of international economic 
organizations—including the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT—all grew up under a protective 
American “umbrella” and actually are often derived from American initiative. The world economy 
itself was heavily influenced by the rise of modern multinational corporations and banks whose 
contemporary form is largely of US origin. Accordingly, the US benefits greatly from the liberalized 
principles of postwar international institutions. 
Third, the hegemon is able to affect the function and decision-making process of international 
organizations by providing indispensable funds, technology, and personnel. A well-known case that 
needs to be mentioned here is the US withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984. The US walked out of 
UNESCO to protest the organization’s growing politicization and “anti-Western” bias, rampant 
budgetary mismanagement, and advocacy of policies that undermine freedom of the press and free 
markets.49 When talking about returning to this organization, one American analyst commented on 
this issue negatively, “if the United States were to rejoin UNESCO, it likely would again become its 
largest financial contributor by providing 25 percent of the biennial budget (approximately $136 
million every two years).”50 Therefore, it appears that when the most powerful states in a system 
cannot realize the goal they have originally set, they can reject that arrangement even though they 
may not be able to build a new one. The withdrawal of the US put huge pressure on UNESCO, but 
the institution lasted with the support of two newly rising great powers—Japan and the Soviet Union. 
At the same time, US influence has been removed from this cultural organization for more than ten 
years. 
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Although unfortunate, it cannot be denied that without the participation of the most powerful 
states, any kind of system will finally turn out to be an empty shell. As Richard Haas said, by action 
or inaction, the US affects the course of history.51 When President Clinton decided not to attend the 
World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, the president of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) complained. He said that a summit without Clinton is 
like “Hamlet” without the king of Denmark.52 Another less familiar example concerns the war in 
Bosnia. In 1992, the Europeans essentially told the US, “Hands off, this is our war.” However, it 
only ended in 1995 when the U.S. grudgingly accepted the responsibility that comes with being No. 
1 and dispatched a handful of cruise missiles to Pale, the capital of the Bosnian Serbs. In global 
diplomacy, nothing happens unless Washington shakes off its lethargy and grabs the reins.53  
Fourth, hegemonic states enjoy the highest “prestige” in international politics; a prestige which 
Robert Gilpin has described as “monetary” in the world economy. This makes challenging US 
interest-oriented international institutions highly risky.54 At the symbolic level, the hegemonic state 
can be seen as a role model of how economic development can be achieved. Its policies may be 
emulated, even though they may be inappropriate for other states. If some country is reluctant to be 
subjected to changes due to dramatic asymmetries, military power can be used to coerce the weaker 
states into an open structure. At the same time, the hegemonic state can use its economic resources to 
facilitate international institutions. In terms of positive incentives, it can offer access to its large 
domestic market and to its relatively cheap exports. In terms of negative ones, it can withhold 
foreign grants and engage in competition that is potentially ruinous for weaker states in third-world 
markets. Therefore, the hegemon can frequently amass majority support through a number of 
diplomatic methods under the condition that most of the international organizations make important 
decisions through voting by the member states instead of executive decision. If the hegemon 
declines and becomes a secondary country in the international system, its capability for providing 
incentives and acquiring support will accordingly shrink. 
Fifth, as the hegemon, the US provides security protection to many alliances, and thus a great 
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number of states support the US in the establishment and functioning of international organizations 
as a kind of exchange or cooperation. Realist in orientation has been the mainstream foreign policy 
strategy since 1940. This has specifically been manifested by containment, deterrence, and the 
maintenance of the global balance of power. Facing a dangerous and expanded Soviet Union after 
1945, the United States stepped forward to fill the vacuum left by a waning British Empire and a 
collapsing European order to provide a counter-weight to Stalin and his Red Army. Although 
containment and global power balancing ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this 
strategy yielded a bounty of institutions and partnerships for America.55 Among the most significant 
ones have been NATO and US-Japan alliances. American-led security partnerships have survived the 
end of the Cold War by providing a bulwark for stability through commitment and reassurance. The 
United States maintains a forward presence in Europe and East Asia, where its allies gain security 
protection as well as a measure of regularity in their relationship with the world’s leading military 
power. This strategy relies on a loose framework of consultations and agreements to resolve 
differences. The purpose of alliances always went beyond their primary influence in countering a 
specific threat from a hostile state or bloc. For example the post-war alliance system has been 
important not only in balancing and ultimately removing the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but 
also in managing relations between the various alliance partners and their neighbors. This influence 
has survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. A good example is the contribution that the United 
States’ alliance with the Republic of Korea has made toward maintaining stability on the Korean 
Peninsula. 
 
3.2 The Measure of National Power 
At first glance, the disparity between American power and that of the rest of the world looks 
overwhelming. “In terms of military power, the United States is the only country with both nuclear 
weapons and conventional forces with global reach. American military expenditures are greater than 
those of the next eight countries combined, and it leads in the information-based ‘revolution in 
military affairs.’ In economic size, America’s 31% share of world product (at market prices) is equal 
to the next four countries combined (Japan, Germany, Britain and France). In terms of cultural 
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prominence, the United States is far and away the number-one film and television exporter in the 
world.”56 However, US superiority was not so prominent during the 1960s and 1970s when it was 
confronted with challenges coming from the USSR, Europe, and Japan. Since Chapter 2 examines 
US power evolution in detail, here, the focus is on the measure of national power and the influence 
of relative power status on a state’s influence on international organizations. 
First, in international politics, absolute power doesn’t make much sense and we must refer to 
relative power distribution. According to realism, international society has been in a state of anarchy, 
which means that there is a lack of a central government to ensure security and enforce laws. All 
states must try their best to enhance their military and economic capabilities at the same rate as other 
great powers. However, the status of state power cannot merely depend on its own efforts; it is 
always calculated by comparison with the other great powers. The relative distribution of power 
constitutes the core concept of Waltzian Structural Realism. “Structures are defined, by the 
distribution of capabilities across units. Changes in this distribution are changes of system.”57 
Morgenthau also elaborated on this issue, “when we refer to the power of a nation by saying that this 
nation is very powerful and that nation is weak, we always imply a comparison. In other words, the 
concept of power is always a relative one. When we say that the United States is at present the most 
powerful nation on earth, what we are actually saying is that if we compare the power of the United 
States with the power of all other nations, as they exist at present, we find that the United States is 
more powerful than any of the others.”58 
Second, national power is a comprehensive concept covering political, economic, military, and 
even cultural factors. However, what are the factors determining the power of a nation in the 
international arena? Morgenthau has put forward eight elements for measuring national power: 
geography; natural resources; industrial capacity; military preparedness; population; national 
character; national morale; and the quality of diplomacy.59 However, Morgenthau also emphasizes 
that the importance of these factors might change over time and thus cannot be regarded as 
permanent. He adds that we should not give any single factor any more importance than the others.60 
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Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin are also supporters of the comprehensive national power 
conception. In his book War and Changes, Gilpin writes, “through a process of diffusion to other 
states, the dominant power loses the advantage on which its political, military, or economic success 
has been based. Thus, by example, and frequently in more direct fashion, the dominant power helps 
to create challenging powers.”61 Waltz further points out that we cannot measure the economic, 
military, and other powers of various states respectively. His standard includes five elements: 
population; territory; national resources; economic power; political stability and capability.62 
Third, the measure of the postwar power structure is based on the capabilities of individual 
states without including national alliances or groups.63 During the modern era, alliance politics has 
played a central role in the struggles between great powers. However, under the multi-polar system, 
the alliances have been too changeable and unstable and they cannot be considered as a part of 
national power despite their acting as an external-balancing instrument. After World War II, the 
structure of the international system was radically transformed with the emergence of the 
superpowers. Other great powers have become peripheral in the foreign policy of the hegemon. That 
is to say, they cannot radically alter the power distribution between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Consequently, it’s not rational to consider the power aggregation of all the developing states 
as a pole or unitary great power in world politics.  
Hence, the influence of a state, especially the hegemon, is closely related to its power status in 
the international system. If certain changes in the international structure occur and affect the power 
status of the hegemonic state, its influence in international organizations will also correspondingly 
change for better or worse. As the Hegemonic Stability Theory tells us, if the hegemon has lost its 
leading status in the international structure, other great powers will challenge or even replace it with 
a new institution or, more specifically, a brand-new international organization. 
 
4. The Openness Root of US Influence on Postwar International Organizations 
In contrast to the importance Neorealists place on power, Neoliberalists emphasize the 
importance of multilateral negotiations and coordination. The US preponderance in the early Cold 
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War era did not merely depend on its unparalleled national power and capability to set a series of 
favorable principles and rules, but also lay in these principles and rules themselves. Therefore, in 
order to comprehensively understand the nature of US influence on international organizations, we 
should not neglect the other factor: the openness of these institutions. 
 
4.1 The Definition of Openness 
As mentioned above, institutions can, to some extent, play an independent and important role in 
governing an international system. This has been the main point of Liberal Institutionalism. Robert 
O. Keohane emphasizes that the function of institutions is to provide public goods, such as meeting 
places, information exchanges, or contract surveillance. The focus while researching the significance 
of the institutions themselves (rather than the alteration of influence of their member states) is not on 
the politics, but rather the distribution of resources. Neoliberalists also argue that negotiations and 
the multilateral method should be another important way to establish or change international 
institutions. International institutions have been created through multilateral negotiations when most 
countries have accepted the authority and function of the organizations. If some state attempts to 
change an existing institution, it must persuade so many other negotiating partners that the process 
always turns out to be laborious and futile. For instance, it has been almost impossible for any 
country to change the rules of the World Trade Organization.64 Hence, the number of states that can 
participate in the decision-making process and the amount of voting power each individual member 
state holds is of critical importance. The more open an institution is, the more persuasive the theory 
of the liberal institution will be. Also, the more autonomy an institution is endowed with, the less 
likely that it will be dominated by an individual state. 
In comparison to the explanatory power of the theory of Liberal Institutionalism on formation 
and evolvement of an international organization, Neorealists directly refer to the term “openness” 
and explore its relationship with power. As mentioned above, Stephen Krasner gave an excellent 
analysis on the relationship of the Third World and the postwar liberal international order. He 
defined openness as the voting power distribution among nations for decision-making. According to 
him, the openness of international institutions should be the most significant factor in determining 
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the outcomes of Third World efforts. He divided the relations of state and international organization 
into four categories: congruent (which means state power creates the institution, but the institution 
does not merely meet the demands of its creator), incongruence (which means state power can not 
control the institution, but the institution is not anti-hegemon either), dynamically stable (which 
means that state power decides the institution and institutional reciprocally enhances state power), 
and dynamically instable (which means the institution impairs the hegemon’s power). The decline or 
relative decline of the great power will lead to a redistribution of power, thus leading to openness. 
Thereafter, the transformation of openness will again result in a change of resource distribution and 
ultimately induce a corresponding variation of relative power. Three factors will stimulate 
international institutions into transferring from congruence or dynamic stability to incongruence or 
dynamic instability. First is the initial autonomy of the international institution when it was 
legitimately established. Second is the decision-making rights enjoyed by the bureaucrats. Third is 
the direct influence of hegemonic decline, such as reluctance to provide financial aid or failing to 
rally support through promising some tempting benefit. Thus, the openness of international 
institutions will be elevated and the hegemon will gradually lose its influence after the establishment 
of these institutions and a variation in the relative power distribution. For example, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the US had to suspend its support to many international organizations such as 
UNESCO.65 
Therefore, the discourse of Krasner could mainly be categorized as Neorealist even though it 
simultaneously embodies some elements of Liberal Institutionalism. According to Krasner, the 
decline of a hegemon’s relative power will lead to a change in institutions or in its influence on 
existing institutions. The rights enjoyed by the bureaucrats to affect the decision-making procedure 
could be counted as another reason. The first factor is concentrated on here in order to better 
understand the impact of openness on the hegemon’s influence on international organizations.  
The original organizational principles fundamentally decide the basic power distribution and to 
a great extent eliminate the possibility of a redistribution of voting power. The bureaucrats of some 
international organizations may seek to show their independence in order to justify the significance 
of their institutions. However, since the senior officials and executives have always been elected 
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through voting of the member states, they have to rely on the paramount state to consolidate their 
position or to pursue reappointment. The UN Secretary General position is a good example.  
As for the influence of power on openness, the relative decline of the hegemon won’t lead to a 
revolutionary change in existing organizations. For instance, the relative decline of the US 
hegemony has caused the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, but the IMF and its liberal 
principles remain functioning. The changes instead have been to the operational rules of the 
institutions. Only after structural transformation occurs will the basic organizational principles likely 
be replaced. According to Robert Gilpin and other Neorealist scholars, the international order since 
the modern era has been selfish and hegemonic, though the specific content of the various orders 
differs. For instance, before World War II, territory distribution was the core part of international 
order because of the dominant status of agriculture in economic surplus. After a hegemonic war, the 
winners would redistribute the territorial domains.66 This kind of order was finished so that newly 
rising states would tend to challenge the existing orders and establish another favorable international 
order. Therefore, the limited openness of international institutions has been the primary cause of 
hegemonic conflicts. However, the basic organizational principles of this distribution won’t be 
changed after structural transformation. The economic and technological reforms have changed the 
nature of contemporary international order to some extent. Trade and financial hegemony (not 
territory and population) have become the foremost pillars of national power and the core parts of 
the international order. As mentioned above, the US established a series of international 
organizations to manage the world economy and politics. The openness of these organizations is 
elaborated on in the next chapter. Now, however, it is necessary to emphasize that some of the 
critical organizations are still relatively closed, especially those related to resource distribution. 
There is another advantage to limiting the scope of openness to the basic organizational 
principles of international organizations. If the definition of openness includes other factors such as 
concrete procedures or operational rules, it will be very difficult to identify the extent of and the 
change in openness because such procedures and rules vary all the time. Accordingly, the openness 
of international organizations will be changing all the time. Even during the same period, different 
orientations of procedures and rules changes make it impossible to identify whether the organization 
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is being more open or closed, not to mention doing comparative study among different organizations. 
For instance, when we want to identify US influence on the IMF, it is difficult to compare the direct 
voting power of the 1950s and the early 1960s with US influence in the 1990s, which depended on 
more factors such as soft power. If we define openness as a basic organizational principle, the 
comparison among various organizations then becomes feasible. For example, UNESCO is 
organized so that each member has an equal vote, but the IMF has a weighted vote system. The 
limitation enabled the parsimony characteristic of this research and makes scientific study possible. 
Changes to procedures and rules are influenced by power and openness and they can directly reflect 
the transformation of the influence of the great power. Therefore, they can be used as important 
examples to demonstrate the relationship between power/openness of the state and the corresponding 
influence of the state.  
Since there are many merits used to define openness as a basic organizational principle (such as 
consistency and comparability), according to what standard should the openness of an organization 
be identified? Two standards in particular deserve examination. 
The first is access to the organization. If entry into an organization is convenient with low 
conditionality, the organization should be classified as relatively open. After the Second World War, 
in order to exclude the majority of developing states and protect the privileges enjoyed by the great 
powers (or to put it another way “maintain the efficiency of the organization), critical political and 
economic organizations created restrictive clauses for membership entry. For instance, any state or 
customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may join (“accede to”) the 
WTO, but the WTO members must agree on the terms. These terms included steps such as “tell 
about yourself,” “work out with us individually what you have to offer,” “Let’s draft membership 
terms,” and “the decision.”67 In fact, some organizations are relatively closed on account of their 
regional geography, such as the European Union or special cooperation groups such as OPEC 
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries).68 
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The second is the decision-making process. Will any member state share equal voting rights or 
is their say measured according to other conditions? The weak states usually prefer the national 
sovereignty principle and tend to support the “one state, one vote” way of decision-making. 
However, great powers are inclined to maintain their privileges through some kind of weighted 
voting power distribution. If an organization adopts the equal voting power distribution in 
decision-making, it could be counted as a relatively open organization because the great powers will 
have to persuade most of the member states to support its ideas. UNESCO is an example of this type 
of organization in the United Nations System. Since the 1970s, developing states have often 
dominated the agenda and the passage of resolutions. However, the IMF and the UNSC (United 
Nations Security Council) are relatively closed and allow the great powers a degree of dominance. 
Lately, the membership of most global international organizations has become very universal, 
so the first standard has been not so remarkable when compared to the second one. However, it is 
still very important for states such as Russia that are struggling to enter the World Trade 
Organization. Based on these two standards, we can clearly identify the openness of some 
international organizations. 
 
4.2 Openness Extent and US Influence on International Organizations 
The openness of international organizations has had a great impact on US influence since the 
end of World War II.  
First, if an international organization is very open and every country enjoys equal voting rights 
in the decision-making process, the outcome of negotiations will tend to reflect the majority’s 
interest regardless of whether the final decision represents a very slim majority or an overwhelming 
majority. This doesn’t mean that the resolutions passed by open organizations will definitely go 
against the hegemon, although the North Countries or South countries usually don’t share common 
interests or views in international affairs. That is to say, a majority or an alliance in such 
organizations mainly depends on interest coordination or conflict. However, openness has greatly 
limited the hegemon’s ability to manipulate universal international organization such as the UN 
General Assembly. It has been impossible for the US to dominate the discussion process on the 
Israel-Palestinian problem and often finds that it is the lonely ally of the condemned. The larger the 
membership is, the more difficult hegemonic domination becomes. It bears noting that in multilateral 
negotiating occasions, the relations among nations will be doubled or tripled. The hegemon must not 
only deal with bilateral relationships with its negotiating partners, but sometimes also coordinate the 
relationship between negotiating partners. Therefore, the difficulties of dominating multilateral 
negotiations will be doubled. In fact, Waltz also uses this logic to demonstrate why a bipolar 
structure is more stable than other structures. Under a bipolar structure, other countries are irrelevant 
and the two superpowers only need to negotiate with each other and so compromise or cooperation 
are much easier to arrive at.69 
Second, if an international organization is relatively closed and states have unequal say in the 
decision-making process, the hegemon will be more likely to impose its will on other member states. 
In this type of decision-making process, the hegemon is usually attributed the largest share of the 
voting power and thus can have a much greater impact on the affairs of an organization than other 
powers. As is elaborated in the next chapter, most critical political and economic international 
organizations after WWII have been relatively closed so as to protect American hegemonic interest. 
The IMF has been the leading financial management organization in the postwar period in which 
different states enjoy different voting powers on the resource distribution of the Fund. The US 
enjoyed such preponderancy during the 1950s and early 1960s that almost all the major issues were 
decided in favor of the hegemon’s opinion. Even if the US could not decide the major issues in such 
organizations by itself, its privileges often make it capable of vetoing unfavorable resolutions. Other 
great powers had to adjust their policies or stances and approach the hegemon’s opinions in order for 
their resolutions to pass. Hence, the interest of the hegemon could also be at least partly maintained. 
Furthermore, since there was little openness and a few great powers controlled much of the voting 
power, the hegemon usually did not need to persuade most of the member states; rallying several 
great powers was more effective. Therefore, a small degree of openness greatly reduces the 
difficulties the hegemon faces when it needs to rally enough support for its own stance. 
Finally, two points should be stressed. One point is the continuity of the institution itself as 
Liberal Institutionalism argues. Once institutions form and come into effect, they will gain 
momentum from many aspects: the organizational bureaucracy, participants’ custom, beneficial 
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members, and the cost of some institutional changes. In the case of postwar international 
organizations, after the basic principles had been established, they endured more than a half-century 
of the international political process even though the end of the Cold War transformed the structure 
from bipolar to unipolar. As long as radical changes don’t happen to the hegemonic power status of 
the US, America will continue to enjoy the gains brought by the institutions. Even after the total 
decline of the United States, existing institutions may survive and only the voting power of the great 
powers will be redistributed. Another point is related to the extreme situation such as the UN 
General Assembly in the 1950s, but it is appropriate here to notice that some other factors may limit 
the influence of openness. If the member states of an open international organization are mostly 
allied with the hegemon, the hegemon can still successfully realize its complete domination. 
However, as time passes by and new countries become members of the organization, the influence of 
the hegemon will naturally decrease. Even in the UN General Assembly, the US controlled most of 
the discussions in the 1950s, but after the mid-1960s (when a number of newly independent 
countries took part in the United Nations) things began to change greatly.  
Therefore, the openness of international organizations also has a great impact on US influence 
on postwar organizations. The US can use weighted voting power and the corresponding advantage 
to promote its national interest in most critical institutions that are related to the distribution of 
important resources. The importance of openness is supported both by Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism. When doing an empirical study of US influence on the United Nations System, the 
impact of openness is clearly shown. In conclusion, the status of power and the extent of openness 
combined decide a state’s influence on international organizations. 
 
5. Timespan Limitation and Selection of International Originations 
The first international organization came into being a long time ago. Since the beginning of the 
Westphalia system, there have emerged a large number of international treaties and organizations, of 
which the League of Nations and the postwar United Nations System should be counted as the most 
prominent. In order to facilitate further studies and make them representative, the scope of my 
research will be limited to the postwar period and concentrate on the United Nations System. 
The postwar era has been a golden age for the development and institutionalization of various 
international organizations. The United Nations System stays at the center of world governance 
while more and more international organizations come into being for dealing with interstate affairs. 
Although many international organizations emerged between the two World Wars, those institutions 
lacked the support of the main powers and were too weak to play an important role in international 
politics. Compared with this period, states are becoming increasingly dependent on formal 
international organizations so as to realize their national interests. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan 
Snidal have carefully examined why states act through formal international organizations and drew 
the conclusion that “by taking advantage of the centralization and independence of IO’s, states are 
able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a decentralized basis.”70 Only when states 
place an emphasis on their interests in international organizations will a study on the influence of 
states on international organizations be meaningful and possible. 
This empirical study concentrates on the United Nations System first because it has been a core 
part of the postwar international order and thus has been able to enjoy great significance in global 
politics. In comparison to regional international organizations and other intergovernmental or 
nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations enjoys a much higher level of prestige and 
capabilities, and its fields of work cover almost every aspect of human life. Therefore, I will select 
several representative organizations within the United Nations System: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in the economic and financial field, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the cultural field, and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in the political and security field.  
The first reason why these three organizations were chosen is because they are critical 
international organs and leaders in their respective fields. The UNSC is the most important 
organization in the international security field. It is also the only body that can impose compulsory 
obligations on the UN member states. The UNSC also fulfills many other critical missions inside the 
UN, such as recommending an applicant country to be a new member state as well as candidates for 
the position of Secretary General.  
The IMF is one of the three important organs that are in charge of the world economy together 
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with the World Bank and the WTO (World Trade Organization). However, the World Bank is 
focused on reducing poverty and providing long-term loans to poor countries and is not a regulating 
organization. The WTO, which formally emerged in 1995, is in charge of much of the world’s trade. 
Before the formation of the WTO, GATT was the main coordinating organization in this field. Its 
primary function was to organize multilateral negotiations rather than manage world trade. There 
had been no managing organ for trading affairs before the founding of the WTO. Furthermore, 
compared to the WTO, the IMF not only aims at promoting the stability of international finance, but 
also directly influences the economic policy and structure of its member states. It is well known that 
finance is the core of the modern international economy. The IMF is the only international economic 
institution to be so deeply involved in the monetary policy of its member states economic policy. As 
elaborated on in Chapter 5, the IMF has often successfully persuaded states in crisis to reform their 
domestic economic structure.  
UNESCO is the most important organization in the culture field. Though the culture field seems 
to be not very important when compared with the security and economic fields, UNESCO has played 
a very important role in the political struggles between the US, the USSR, and the Third World. 
Actually, UNESCO has been the best example for examining the influence of openness. Even as the 
hegemon, the US, lost its domination of UNESCO in the late-1960s. 
The second reason for choosing these organizations is technological. These three organizations 
are not only critical organizations within the United Nations System, but also represent different 
levels of openness. As elaborated on in the next chapter, the IMF and the UNSC are relatively closed 
when compared with UNESCO. Through n empirical study based on the evolution of power and the 
extent of openness, the changing influence of the US is clearly demonstrated. As US power evolved, 
its influence within these organizations also underwent corresponding changes.  It is also shown 
that with changes in openness, US influence on different organizations during the same period is also 
not identical. That is to say, the status of power and extent of openness decide American influence on 
international organizations. This is the theoretical conclusion of this chapter. 
Why were other organizations within the UN system not chosen? Generally speaking, there 
are 6 principal organs in the UN system: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic 
and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council. 
Among these, the Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council seem to 
play the most significant role in dealing with multilateral negotiations. They are also the most 
frequently referred to organs. The International Court of Justice is a very special organization with 
high-level technological specialization, but it has no great influence on daily international affairs. 
The Secretariat, as an executive institution, is led by the Secretary General and should not be 
regarded as an international organization.  
Considering the close relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, 
especially considering that the most important issues have to go to the Security Council in the first 
place, It was finally decided to limit the focus to the Security Council and the Economic and Social 
Council. In the Economic and Social Council there are three categories: the Specialized Agencies, 
the Functional Commissions, and the Programmes and Funds (P&F). For the convenience of this 
research (especially considering that there are a great deal of decision-making procedures to explore), 
the Functional Commissions and the Programmes and Funds categories were excluded from the 
scope of the research at this stage. The voting share is very important in defining openness, which 
has been determined by a stable membership status or according to assessment by the organizations, 
while the P&F lacks this feature. 
Relative power and organizational openness have a great impact on state influence on 
international organizations. Considering that the focus of this dissertation is to examine the US 
influence on the United Nations System, the next chapter, Chapter Two, investigate the evolution of 
the American power status and the openness of three representative organizations: the IMF, 
UNESCO and the UNSC. Chapter Two will also reviews existing studies on the relationship of 
power, openness, and US influence on these three institutions. 
 Chapter 2: Relative Power, Organizational Openness, and  
Existing Empirical Studies 
In the first chapter, power and openness were identified as two major elements in deciding 
states’ influence on international organizations. Since the dissertation focuses on the United States, 
this chapter discusses the evolution of American power and the openness of three selected 
organizations: the IMF, UNESCO and the UNSC. This chapter will also examine existing empirical 
studies on the relationship of power evolution, organizational openness, and states’ influence. Based 
on these two factors, a hypothesis of American influence is formulated. 
 
1. US Power Evolution and Existing Studies on the relationship between Relative 
Power and US Influence 
 
1.1 The Postwar US Power Evolution 
It has been widely recognized by international relations scholars that the US is the hegemonic 
power after World War II. If the United States is a hegemon— “a leading or paramount power”—it is 
because it enjoys a preponderance of power.71 From 1945 to the mid-1960s, the United States had 
preponderant power status in the international arena. However, soon thereafter, the Soviet Union 
finally arrived at a roughly equal military level with the hegemon, and with Europe and Japan on an 
economic level. However, the fact cannot be denied that the United States has always been, in the 
Clinton administration’s words, “the indispensable nation” for most international collaboration and 
action.72 When the United States fails to get involved in international crisis situations such as 
Bosnia and Rwanda, they are not averted and, in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, the consequent 
ethnic cleansing took many lives.73 If we trace history back a little bit earlier, it is widely 
believed—rightly or wrongly—that American abstention fatally weakened the League of Nations so 
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that it could not forestall the events that led to the Second World War. As Secretary of States James F. 
Byrnes lamented in a November 1945 speech, “after the first World War we rejected the plea of 
Woodrow Wilson and refused to join the League of Nations. Our action contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the League.” “Now,” he said, “the situation is different. We have sponsored the 
United Nations Organization. We are giving it our wholehearted and enthusiastic support. We 
recognize our responsibility in the affairs of the world.” Although this reflects a somewhat simplistic 
interpretation of the interwar years and of the League’s capacities, this lesson in America’s 
indispensability spurred the architects and supporters of the United Nations on both sides of the 
Atlantic during the 1940s.74 
To sum it up, the hegemony is the primary deciding factor in the international system, and thus 
it is very important to clearly understand the evolution of US power. 
 
1.1.1 American Preponderance in the 1950s 
Owing to many unique geographical and political factors, the United States has developed at an 
amazing speed and has become the fourth biggest industrialized country since the mid-1860s. Before 
World War I, the US had already been widely recognized as a world power. Although it also 
experienced the 1929 Great Depression, the New Deal helped to revive the economy. After World 
War II, most other parts of the industrialized world were left in ruins, but US economic productivity 
remained intact. The year 1941 witnessed the failure of the atomic weapons build-up in German 
while the United States’ success was documented by Henry R. Luce’s essay “The American 
Century” in Life magazine. It proclaimed that America was not at war simply to defeat the Axis 
powers. The United States must “exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such 
purpose as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.”75 However, was the distribution of power in 
the late 1940s truly bipolar or was it an American hegemony?  
As the competitive rival of the Soviet Union, both countries had taken a lead in a power contest 
even before World War II. According to the estimation of Historian Paul Kennedy, the United States 
had become the mightiest industrial power by 1938. At that time, the population of the Soviet Union 
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and the United States were each at least twice as large as that of any other great powers. Before the 
emergence of nuclear weapons, population was still an important kind of power resource. The war 
then transformed this potential power into actual military power. In 1943, U.S. armaments 
production was three times that of Germany, Britain, or the Soviet Union.76 American GNP surged 
by 50 percent during the war, whereas the West Europeans lost a quarter of their economies and 
Soviet economic growth was choked back by a decade.77 The War completely destroyed the central 
position of Europe on the world power politics stage, and a new structure, bipolarity, emerged. The 
US and the Soviet Union became the two poles of power on the postwar international stage.  
However, the US was much stronger than the Soviet Union, and this imbalanced power 
distribution in the international system was defined as a hegemonic system. Historian Arnold 
Toynbee argues that the United States had to overtake Britain as the leader of the world. American 
President Truman began to accept this opportunity and challenge in 1947 when the United States 
planned to provide aid to Greece and Turkey; a role that Britain would have played previously. In 
WWII, The United States lost 350,000 people in the war; the Soviet Union lost 20 million. As late as 
1950, the U.S. economy was three times larger than the Soviet Union’s, five times that of Great 
Britain, and ten times more than Japan.78 At the end of the war, the United States had sixty-nine 
military divisions in Europe, twenty-six in Asia, occupied part of Germany and all of Japan, and had 
a monopoly of nuclear weapons. Although by 1948 the United States had cut back from 3 million to 
100,000 troops in Europe, it still had predominance in many power resources.79 Economically, the 
United States produced 27 percent of the global GDP in 1950. Militarily, during the 1950s and 60s, 
American planners talked of “assured annihilation”, a one-sided concept. US dominance in the 
1950s was complete and palpable. 
By the mid 1960s, Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow claimed that, “the United States has 
now occupied the role of chief policeman for the free world for about twenty years. The office has 
required diplomatic and military exertions of us in a long series of conflicts—from Iran, Lebanon, 
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Turkey, and Greece to Berlin, Korea, Cuba and Vietnam.”80 At the same time, Harvard Professor 
Samuel Huntington argued that, “by the year 2000 it should be clear retrospectively that the 
dominant feature of international politics during the thirty years after World War II was the 
expansion of American power.”81 The United States played a critical role in establishing postwar 
international organizations and various military alliance systems. It also successfully contained its 
challenger, the Soviet Union, in the global sphere. In order to reinforce anti-Communist forces, the 
US carried out the Marshall Plan to revive the Western European economy. According to the 
statistics released, the cost of Marshall Plan paid by the United States was approximately $13 billion 
over four years or about 1.5 percent of the American Gross National Product. In 1994 dollars, this 
amount would be $100 billion. The United States was able to finance the system because, at the end 
of World War II, it was the world’s major creditor.82 The hegemon cultivated a huge alliance system 
based around its hegemonic power. 
 
1.1.2 The Relative Decline in the 1960s and the 1970s 
With the aid flowing in through the Marshall Plan and with European regional cooperation, it 
only took a few years for the European states to restore their economic power. Thus, the hegemon in 
the mid-1960s began to realize that it not only needed to confront the military and economic 
challenges posed by its traditional enemy, but also those posed by its traditional friends; friends 
which were already becoming strong economic rivals. Though overall capitalistic strength was 
enhanced, the relative status of the hegemon instead declined. Compared with the hegemon, these 
states enjoyed the benefits of “free-riding,” and thus could concentrate more on their domestic 
development. What is more, the Vietnam War further undermined US prestige.  
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile. This greatly shook 
the hegemon’s confidence in its security. Beginning in the 1960s, the “assured annihilation” concept 
changed to “mutually assured destruction,” which suggested that the US nuclear advantage was 
counteracted by the USSR military buildup. US status and influence also received difficult 
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challenges from the anti-systemic movement, the oil embargo, and domestic inflation. Military 
expenditures in this war led to a loss of control of the world money supply. This coincided with both 
a worldwide revolt against the timidity of the established left (the “world revolution of 1968” against 
dominant communists, nationalists, and social democrats) and a narrowing of the economic gap with 
Germany and Japan. Thus, as Immanuel Wallerstein says, by the early seventies, the foundations of 
the US hegemony were shattered, and the period since then has basically been one of slow decline.83  
American President Richard Nixon evidently agreed with this opinion on America’s relative 
decline. He told the country that America had lost the preeminent status it held in the1950s, though it 
still remained the strongest state among the five power centers of the world. Due to a series of 
economic problems(including lagging industrial production, an enfeebled dollar overseas, and a 
serious deficit in the nation’s balance of payments), he noted that since the end of World War II, the 
economies of the major industrial nations of Europe and Asia had “regained their vitality. They have 
become our strong competitors.”84 By 1970, however, Business Week declared that “the colossus 
that emerged after World War II” was “clearly facing a crisis of the decay of power.”85 In December 
1971, the New York Times ran a page-one story by Max Frankel declaring “the United States does 
not labor alone in the reconstruction of power relationships and may not be dominant in the process 
any more.”86 
In terms of this evolution, a number of scholars have tried to provide various explanations and 
solutions for this decay. By the late 1960s the expense of maintaining hegemonic status was under 
scrutiny. It was no longer a forgone conclusion that the benefits would justify the costs. The process 
of scrutiny was highly convoluted and far from being a conscious operation. However, once it started 
it became clear the hegemon had entered a downward trend.87  
To sum up, the relative decline of the hegemon was visible from three aspects. The first was the 
decline of US economic power compared to other market economies such as Japan, Western Europe, 
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and other newly industrializing countries. Some scholars concentrated more on the impact of 
American traditional values, enterprise management, technological innovation, and educational 
factors. They believed that the US capitalist model was out of date. The second aspect was that the 
decline of economic power was leading to a decay of comprehensive national power. Since 
economic power is the basis of other developments (especially military buildup), the hegemon 
actually faced a potentially great crisis in different areas. The third aspect was a relative economic 
decline caused primarily by overspending for military purposes. Most scholars insisted this view 
indicated that the US was undergoing the same overreach that Ancient Rome or Great Britain had 
experienced. They advised the hegemon to narrow its international fronts and commitments. In this 
respect, the problems that the United States was confronting were similar to those of previous 
imperial or hegemonic powers such as Britain, France, and Spain.88 
After the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the United States officially recognized the 
equal strategic status of the Soviet Union. From the economic aspect, the hegemon had changed 
from the world’s largest creditor to debtor. Its former steadfast ally in East Asia, Japan, replaced the 
hegemon as the largest creditor. Its share of world product slipped from 33 percent of the total in 
1950 to 23 percent in the 1980s. Its share of world exports fell from 17 percent in 1950 to 10 percent 
in 1988, and its share of world monetary reserves dropped even more dramatically, from 50 to 9 
percent. The dynamics of US productivity and that of international trade point to a fundamental loss 
of competitiveness by US industry. This is shown also by the progressive loss of market share both 
in the US domestic economy and in the world market. In the US automobile market, where the trade 
deficit was $31 billion in 1986, the share of US production fell from 95.9 percent in 1960 to 82.8 
percent in 1970, and then to 72.9 per cent in 1980.89 In the 1980s the import penetration of the US 
market accelerated so that by 1984, 25 percent of steel, 30 percent of apparel, and 42 per cent of 
machine tools were imported.90 The American economy suffered from inflation and stagnation at 
the same time, which impelled the Reagan administration to adopt neo-conservative economic 
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reform. However, “in spite of all the promises of economic renewal, after two terms of the 
neo-conservative policies of the Reagan administration, the US has slower rates of growth than 
Europe and Japan, no increase of productivity, a current account deficit in the balance of payments 
close to $150 billion and a currency that lost most of the overvaluation of the early 1980s.”91 
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the US hegemon experienced a difficult time as it faced 
comprehensive challenges. However, these challenges and the US reaction (especially the economic 
reform advocated by the Reagan administration) provided a solid basis for the long-term 
development experienced during the Clinton administration. During this period, the Third World also 
tended to be more independent and struggled to establish a new international economic and political 
order. As Chapter 4 discusses in detail, the US even retreated from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1984. “Early in the 1990s the mood in the 
United States was tinged with pessimism, out of concern about industrial decline, Asian competition, 
rising unemployment, and economic inequality.”92 
 
Figure 1. Economic and Financial Comparisons of Major Industrial Economies, 1950-8593 
 Country 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
US 1.00  1.00   1.00  1.00 
Germany 0.14  0.22   0.23  0.22 
Japan 0.10  0.16   0.33  0.40 
UK 0.22  0.21   0.19  0.19 
Ratio to 
US GDP 
France 0.14  0.15   0.19  0.19 
US 17 18 17 16 15 13  12 
Germany 3 7 10 11 12 11  10 
Japan 1 2 3 5 7 7  7 
UK 11 10 9 9 7 5  6 
Shares 
world 
exports 
France 5 6 6 6 6 6  6 
Shares US 16 14 13 13 14 13 13 19 
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Germany 4 6 8 10 10 9 10 8 
Japan 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 7 
UK 12 12 10 9 7 6 6 6 
world 
imports 
France 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 6 
US 68 62 47 34 30 27 28 28 
Germany -- 3 8 11 11 12 10 10 
Japan -- -- 1 1 1 2 3 3 
UK 9 6 7 5 4 2 2 2 
Shares 
world 
gold 
reserves 
France 2 3 4 11 10 10 9 9 
 
1.1.3 The Revival and Preponderance since 1990s 
Information technology not only radically reformed US military equipment, but also created a 
solid basis for another American economic boom century. This is usually referred to as the “New 
Economy,” which began to experience progress in the mid-1990s. Through the adoption of 
information technology, US productivity was greatly increased. This increased productivity is critical 
for ensuring long-term economic growth and a rising standard of living. According to the report of 
the President of American Council on Competitiveness, “in the 1990s, America was the only country 
able to grow the economy, create new jobs, and increase the standard of living without inflation. 
During the mid-1990s, 2/3 of GDP growth was attributable to increases in productivity growth that 
created economic wealth. A high rate of average productivity growth during the period from 1995 to 
2000 made it possible for the U.S. to achieve full employment without triggering inflationary 
pressures. The creation of 35 million new jobs in the US from 1985-2000 and a doubling of real 
income—largely attributed to harnessing innovation capacity—boosted economic growth.”94 
Harvard economist Dalew Jorgenson also pointed out the comprehensive growth of the US 
economy in the 1990s. He gave a brief comparison with 1990 as a midline. His research reveals the 
fact that, “after strong output and TFP (Total Factor Productivity) growth in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s, the U.S. economy slowed markedly during 1973-1990, with output growth falling from 
3.99 percent for 1948-1973 to 2.86 percent for 1973-1990 and TFP growth declining from 0.92 
percent to 0.25 percent. Growth in capital inputs also slowed from 4.64 percent to 3.57 percent. 
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Between 1990-1995 and 1995-1999, the contribution of capital input jumped by 0.95 percentage 
points, the contribution of labor input rose by 0.24 percent, and TFP accelerated by 0.51 percent.” 
He also writes, “The unanticipated U.S. growth revival of the 1990s has considerable potential for 
altering economic perspectives. In fact, this is already foreshadowed in a steady stream of excellent 
books on the economics of IT.”95 
Compared to the fast growth of the American new economy, Europe and Japan failed to 
maintain their rate of economic development in the 1990s. The Japanese economy experienced 
stagnation for more than 10 years after its economic “bubble” broke. Between 1990 and 2000, 
Japanese per capita GDP grew only by an average of 0.8 percent per year. Western European 
countries reached the Single European Act, but the development of the Union was also not satisfying. 
The economies of the member states grew slowly because of their “welfare state” model. While the 
latter’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.2 percent, the European Union’s managed only an 
annual average increase of 2.1 percent. Furthermore, the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis 
highlighted the failure, or at least the problems, of the Asian capitalist model. It seemed as if only the 
US economy was prospering in the 1990s. According to Paul Rhode and Gianni Toniolo, “a few 
years later, those who returned to the United States after spending some time away were surprised by 
the U-turn in the country’s prevailing mood. Open optimism about the future of the economy had 
replaced the creeping pessimism. Japan and the ‘Asian Tigers’ were no longer perceived as 
threats.”96 
Nye in Bound to Lead has concluded that the United States is still the dominant world power. 
With no challenger in sight, the United States will remain the dominant actor of the world scene if it 
adapts to the new power realities of an increasingly interdependent world.97 Besides economic 
development, Nye also points out that the hegemon enjoyed great “soft power” in the globalization 
era. In The Paradox of American Power, he identifies two types of power that exist in current 
international relations. “Traditionally, the test of a great power was ‘strength for war.’”98 That 
strength is measured by relative military might, which is in turn dependent on economic growth, 
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population, and technology.99 More and more in today’s interconnected world, however, “a country 
may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, 
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”100 This 
type of strength is measured by the relative attractiveness and stability of a country’s culture, 
ideology, and institutions.101 In the era of globalization, American culture, education and institutions 
powerfully contribute to reinforcing the US hegemony through altering many people’s way of 
thinking. 
Many other international relations scholars also emphasize American primacy after the Cold 
War. According to Michael Mandelbaum, the central feature of the world at the outset of the 
twenty-first century is the enormous power of the US. “This country possesses the most formidable 
military forces and the largest and most vibrant national economy on the planet. From within its 
borders emanate the social and cultural trends that exercise the greatest influence on other societies. 
The United States is no longer a mere superpower; it has ascended to the status of hyperpower.”102 
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth conceive that “if today’s American primacy does not 
constitute unipolarity, and then nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will 
last and what the implications are for American foreign policy.”103 In the military field, the amount 
the US spent on defense in 2003 was more than the next 15 to 20 biggest spenders combined. 
Regarding military R&D, the US spent three times more than the next six powers combined. And 
after all that, military spending still only cost 3.5 percent of American GDP. Paul Kennedy lively 
describes the US preeminence with the case of a warship. “The USS ENTERPRISE—a heavy, 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, well over 100,000 tons in displacement, 4 football fields long, 20 
stories high, 70 high-powered aircraft, 2,800 crew for the ship, plus 3,300 flying and servicing the 
aircraft—a floating, armed fortress. The cost of the ship alone, plus the aircraft, is enormous—but it 
is never alone, at sea. For protection it is always accompanied by an AEGIS—class missile cruiser, 2 
or 3 or 4 frigates or destroyers, supply ships, and 2 hunter-killer submarines underwater. The price of 
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the whole carrier task-force is around $18bn. No one else can afford one—after all, it’s more than 
half of the entire Italian defense budget.”104 
Without referring to too many details, we should at least quote Robert Lieber’s statement that 
“American primacy has been sustained and even enhanced [in the 1990s], and it is likely to continue. 
The dimensions of this primacy include, inter alia, military strength, the capacity to project power at 
a great distance, technology, economic dynamism and culture.”105 It has been widely accepted that 
the US has revived its hegemony in the post-Cold War period, and is the unrivalled power in all 
critical areas: political, military, economic, technological, and cultural. The power gap between the 
United States and its major challengers grew in the 1990s. As professor Edward Luck has said, the 
United States is not the only major power in the world, nor the only one to throw its weight around 
the halls of the UN from time to time.  However, the scope and reach of American power, as well as 
of its interests, are without precedent.106 If we expect to understand today’s international politics, it 
will be nearly impossible if the hegemon’s influence is not been taken into account. 
 
1.1.4 A Quantitative Analysis on US Power Evolution 
In this part, US power evolution is analyzed in a quantitative way mainly using two databases. 
Hans Morgenthau considered the “elements of national power” as geography, natural resources, 
industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of 
diplomacy, and quality of government. However, is it possible to measure morale, the quality of 
diplomacy, and quality of government? Evidently, no one disagrees that it is almost impossible to 
numerically measure such “intangible” elements of power. Therefore, this research uses only 
numerically measurable indicators to measure power, as many other empirical analysts do.  
In many empirical studies about national power, three types of power aspect are often 
considered: the military aspect, the industrial aspect, and the demographic aspect. The National 
Material Capabilities data includes six measures covering three aspects of national attributes. Two 
measures involve military capabilities (military expenditures and military personnel), two measures 
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assess industrial capabilities (energy consumption and iron/steel production), and the final two 
measures involve demographic variables (total population and urban population). The second 
database for power comparison is from the United Nations Statistical Division. It focuses on the 
most frequently used economic indicator: the GDP (Gross Domestic Products). The GDP of a 
country is defined as the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a 
given period of time. The GDP can measure spending on all goods and services. The GDP can also 
measure all income earned. The GDP per capita is often used as an indicator of the living standard 
within an economic entity. The argument in favor of using the GDP is not that it is a good indicator 
of the standard of living, but rather that (all other things being equal) the standard of living tends to 
increase when the GDP per capita increases.107 Figures 2, 3 and 4, clearly illustrate the changes in 
economic power distribution. Just as Robert Gilpin demonstrated in War and Change in World 
Politics, economics has become increasingly crucial for military competition because advanced 
technologies are applied to military equipment and have revolutionized warfare.108 After World War 
II, economic competition has to a great extent replaced military competition among great powers 
because of the emergence of nuclear weapons. 
Figure 1 shows the general level of comprehensive national power of major countries, including 
the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. The US hegemon was at its peak in 1945 when its iron 
and steel production was 6 times that of Russia, over 1,000 times that of China, and more than 30 
times that of Japan. The US military expenditure was over 10 times that of Russia, 400 times more 
than China, and 200 times more than Japan. After twenty years, the iron and steel production of the 
hegemon was less than 2 times that of its biggest challenger, Russia. Compared to China and Japan, 
the gaps were also greatly reduced to less than 10 times (China) and 3 times (Japan). For military 
expenditures, US spending was roughly equal to that of Russia and less than 10 times more than 
China. The relative decline of American national power can be easily observed through the data of 
1980. In that year, the iron and steel production of the hegemon declined to less than that of Russia 
and Japan and only about 3 times more than China. For military expenditures, US spending was one 
fourth less than that of Russia (partly because of Soviet actions in Afghanistan) and about 6 times 
that of China (partly because of the war between China and Vietnam). After the Cold War, US 
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national power was revived and the power gap was enlarged again. In 2000, the iron and steel 
production was about 2 times that of Russia, roughly equal with Japan, but a little less than that of 
China. For military expenditures, the US spent about 6 times more than Russia and about 7 times 
more than China and Japan. Of course, in the post-Cold War era, the American economic advantage 
is not in the traditional iron and steel sectors. Figure 1 shows that US power has an overall advantage 
represented by all the indicators.  
Figure 2. American and Other Great Powers’ Power Evolution109 
Country Year Irst milex milper energy tpop upop
USA 1945 72304 90000000 12123 1219068 139928 39100
USA 1955 106173 40518000 2935 1415958 165931 47688
USA 1965 119260 51827008 2660 1700357 194303 50841
USA 1970 119309 77827008 3070 2200786 205052 55468
USA 1975 105897 90948000 2098 2208506 215973 55728
USA 1980 101456 1.44E+08 2050 2449597 227726 57197
USA 1985 80067 2.45E+08 2244 2341609 238466 60260
USA 1990 89726 2.9E+08 2180 2567218 249907 64116
USA 1995 95191 2.78E+08 1620 3031435 262755 66943
USA 2000 101803 3.03E+08 1366 2986683 278357 75342
RUS 1945 12252 8589076 12500 151257 177300 29189
RUS 1950 27329 15510433 4300 273968 180075 33388
RUS 1955 45272 29542096 5800 423077 196159 41400
RUS 1960 65294 36960032 3600 629705 214329 51252
RUS 1965 91021 46000000 2780 872487 230936 63050
RUS 1970 116000 77200000 4300 1084614 242767 75424
RUS 1975 141000 1.28E+08 4100 1395109 254469 86831
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RUS 1980 148000 2.01E+08 3900 1684036 265484 100807
RUS 1990 154000 1.29E+08 3400 1971344 281344 111594
RUS 2001 58970 63684000 977 828530 146933 65389
CHN 1945 48 228612 4775 27135 548586 27040
CHN 1950 606 2558000 4000 29555 571889 37965
CHN 1960 18660 6727610 3234 291769 657492 65888
CHN 1970 17790 23775520 2850 342126 830675 97851
CHN 1980 37120 28500000 4650 635807 998877 134470
CHN 1990 66350 6060000 3500 985524 1155305 170707
CHN 2000 127236 42000000 2810 1138547 1277558 232601
JPN 1945 2082 4002481 6095 34266 72147 22004
JPN 1960 22138 454148 263 92588 93216 38258
JPN 1965 41161 852603 246 167414 97952 43685
JPN 1970 93322 1649789 236 334550 103403 53526
JPN 1975 102313 4535240 237 414372 111573 61109
JPN 1980 111395 9297521 242 421841 116807 65829
JPN 1990 110339 28730000 250 457906 123478 72347
JPN 2000 106444 45316000 237 660658 126714 76772
 
Figure 2 shows the changes in economic power distribution since 1970 through which we can 
understand the revival of the US economy. After 25 years of postwar development, Germany, France, 
the USSR, and Japan again rose to be economic powers. The GDP is the primary indicator used to 
measure economic size. In 1970, the US GDP was less than 3 times that of Germany and Japan and 
about 4 times that of the USSR. Ten years later, the US GDP was only 2 times that of Japan. After 
the Cold War, the US economy has made great progress and consolidated its status in the world. In 
2004, the US GDP was about 2.5 times that of Japan, 4 times more than Germany, and over 20 times 
that of Russia. Thus, US relative economic power has increased. Economic scholars attribute this 
relative growth in the 1990s to the “New Economy,” motivated by information technology, the 
Clinton administration’s emphasis on economic interests, and the stagnation of the European and 
Japanese economies. 
 
Figure 3. Estimates of GDP at constant 1990 prices in Million US Dollars110 
Country or Area  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
China 95972 123602 160920 268157 382996 685057 1018308 1418895
France 696292 826048 964295 1048423 1231026 1306731 1506859 1605404
Germany 1037829 1160240 1363756 1445440 1711898 1903089 2101931 2163728
Japan 1334541 1666411 2065085 2405191 3039693 3279466 3492799 3630132
United Kingdom 627989 697847 762723 842613 989564 1074873 1257014 1379367
United States 3037076 3490144 4184681 4905249 5757200 6506166 7968520 8785218
USSR (Former) 748970 982508 1255599 1474033 569708 353709 382917 485031
Western Europe 2295206 2627657 3057111 3269752 3848940 4185990 4741490 4946090
World 11604614 13996601 16892716 19190986 21944297 24419682 28786266 31811940
 
Figure 3 shows the general changing tendency of world economic power distribution. It is very 
clear that US economic growth has undergone a relatively slow period, and even decreased in 1975 
and 1980. The rapid growth of the American economy has been very obvious from 1990 to 2004. As 
we know, the American economy has already developed into a mature one, and thus it is really a 
surprisingly increasing process in the post-Cold War period. The Japanese economy experienced 
rapid growth from 1971 to 1990, but the pace was much slower in the 1990s. The economic growth 
rate of Western Europe roughly shares similar tendencies with that of the hegemon, but its growth 
was much lower in the 1990s. Since the US’s economic size has been always bigger than that of 
Western Europe, the power gap is actually becoming larger if you don’t take into account growth due 
to the enlargement of the EU. 
Figure 4. Estimates of Rates of Growth of GDP (in Percent)111 
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Country or Area  1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
China 5.7 6.9 6 12.6 2.7 10.5 8 9.5
France 4.8 -0.3 1.6 1.5 2.6 2.4 4.1 2.3
Germany 3.3 -1 1.3 2.2 5.7 1.9 3.2 1.6
Japan 4.7 3.1 2.8 5.1 5.2 2 2.4 2.7
United Kingdom 2 -0.5 -2.1 3.6 0.8 2.9 3.9 3.1
United States 3.5 -0.2 -0.2 4.1 1.9 2.5 3.7 4.2
USSR (Former)... 3.9 6.5 1.7   -4.1 10 7.3
Western Europe 4 -1.2 1.8 2 4.3 2.1 3.6 1.9
 
The GDP per capita is widely recognized as a good indicator of a country’s level of 
development. 112 Figure 4 shows the evolution of the GDPs of the major powers. Compared to the 
whole GDP data, this indicator can tell us, in a more concrete way, the living standard of people and 
the economic development level, both of which are closely related to national power. Generally 
speaking, the wealthier a country is, the more resources its government can extract during periods of 
crisis. Since economic development is greatly dependent on technological level and management, 
the GDP per capita could reflect a state’s internal efficiency. Furthermore, wealthier countries are 
usually more stable than poor ones. In examining Figure 5, we can find that European countries and 
Japan have closed the Per Capita GDP gap with the hegemon. Japan even surpassed the United 
States in 1995. However, in 2004, the US per capita GDP increased to 2 times what it was in 1990 
while Japan lagged behind. The United States has comprehensively revived its national power since 
the 1990s. 
 
Figure 5. Estimates of Per Capita GDP in US Dollars113 
Country or Area  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
China 112 177 307 283 337 585 863 1283
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France 2866 6617 12531 9495 21149 26261 21776 32984
Germany 2669 6008 11688 9062 21551 30891 23076 33162
Japan 1959 4496 9098 11225 24605 42105 37361 36501
United Kingdom 2255 4222 9655 8133 17434 19658 24514 35718
United States 4878 7376 11991 17229 22530 27234 34364 39650
USSR (Former) 1659 2569 3498 3337 3840 2694 1772 4047
Western Europe 2744 6376 12253 9408 21677 29359 23152 34203
 
1.2 Existing Studies on the Relationship between Relative Power and US Influence 
As specified above, the relative power of the United States has undergone a process of change 
from its preponderant status before the mid-1960s, to relative decline in the 1970s and the early 
1980s, and then to revival and sole superpower status since the 1990s. Chapter One has explored the 
theoretical relationship between relative power and state influence on international organizations. In 
terms of the specific and special relationship between the US and international organizations (which 
is elaborated on in the following chapters), the power evolution of the state together with the 
openness of a given organization significantly determines the outcome of US policy. As mentioned 
in Chapter One, there is an increasing amount of literature describing this peculiar linkage, so some 
representative depictions are only briefly referred to here. In this section, some existing empirical 
studies about the relationship between relative power and US influence on the United Nations 
system is examined. 
 
1.2.1 Studies of the Relationship of US Power and Influence on the UNGA 
Edward Luck is a very distinguished scholar in the study of the US relationship with the United 
Nations. His famous work, Mixed Message, refers from time to time to the critical role of power and 
openness in determining the effect of US influence on the United Nations. On one hand, Luck 
recognizes America’s hegemonic power in the postwar ear as well as the great influence the US has 
on the UN as a result of this power. On the other hand, he has not carefully investigated the process 
of change as it applies to American power. “However, we cannot deny that US still remains the most 
powerful nation in the UN. Given its raw power, as well as the strength of its political convictions, 
the US has had less need to develop or rely on its diplomatic skills than have smaller or medium 
powers.” Luck cites the words of Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary General of the UN, to describe US 
power and its advantage in imposing its will on other countries. “Like in Roman times, they have no 
diplomacy…you don’t need diplomacy if you are so powerful.”114 
Luck then examined the influence of US power in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). “Given 
the imbalance of power, the founders of the United Nations, well aware of the dilemma of trying to 
reconcile in its decision making processes the realities of power and principle of universality, tried to 
have it both ways.115” Actually, the UNGA is a very open organization, reflecting the principle of 
universality. As theoretically specified in Chapter One, the increasing openness of an international 
organization will lead to a decline in a great power’s influence on the organization. However, by 
using its power to threaten or lobby other countries, the US can still exert substantial influence on 
the UNGA during its prosperous periods. Luck’s discourse is very elaborate and interesting. He cites 
the words of Winston Churchill, “it is anomalous that the vote or prejudice of any small country 
should affect events involving populations many times exceeding their numbers, and should affect 
them as self-advantage or momentary self-advantage may direct.”116  
Luck notes the relationship between relative power declining and influence  on the UNGA 
decreasing during the late 1960s and the 1970s. He also cites many useful arguments that enhance 
his viewpoint that voting power distribution deviated too much from material power distribution 
during that period, and thus the openness of the UNGA should be changed to reflect the distribution 
of power. Of course, as defined in Chapter One, openness is one of the basic organizing principles, 
and is to some extent independent of power distribution. Yet, we can still review some of Luck’s 
discourse and citations to understand their views on the relative decline of the US in the 1960s and 
1970s. Luck cites the speech of US Ambassador Stevenson in 1963. “The United States does not 
own or control the United Nations. It is not a wing of the State Department. We are no more and no 
less than the most influential of the 110 members. If we were less, we would be failing to exert the 
influence of freedom’s leader; if we were more, we would destroy the effectiveness of the United 
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Nations, which depends precisely on the fact that it is not an arm of the United States or of any other 
government, but a truly international organization, no better or worse than the agreements which can 
be reached by the controlling majorities of its members.”117 
For the reform of the UNGA, Luck has reviewed the arguments of Henry Lodge in 1967 to 
explain this issue. “Remember that the General Assembly is not an accurate mirror of world opinion 
and that equality in voting as between large and small nations has created such a sense of injustice 
that, although well aware of the difficulties, I support the proposition that the US be changed so that 
voting more nearly corresponds with the ability to carry out the things which are voted.” “Less than 
one tenth of one percent of the budget…should become an associate member” without vote, and that 
“half of the ten elected seats in the Security Council should be rotated among the larger states.”118 
According to such a plan, the voting power distribution inside the UNGA and Security Council 
would directly reflect material power distribution. Indeed, the openness of the UNGA has harmed 
US influence. These scholars were trying to revise the openness of international organizations to 
counteract the effect of the decline in hegemonic power. In this way, Luck has directly and 
extensively touched on the relationship between US power and its influence on international 
organizations. 
Richard Bissell is another important scholar on the US relationship with the United Nations. He 
has examined the changes inside the UN, the declining influence of the hegemon in the UNGA, and 
many other specialized agencies. “Over time, the specialized agencies have increasingly come under 
the watchful eye of the General Assembly, not so much regarding their performance on mandated 
issues, but concerning their conformity to political resolutions of the General Assembly. Thus, the 
rising hostility to Israel and to South Africa in the specialized agencies trailed the growth of hostility 
in the General Assembly. In addition, the transformation of economic issues (such as energy) into 
issues of ‘high politics’ has led to their being considered by the General Assembly. The United States, 
of all major developed countries, is perhaps least willing to accept such a shift in the international 
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policymaking environment.”119  
Bissell refers to the relationship between America’s power and its influence. In his view, the US 
uses many instruments (especially financial means) to enhance its influence on the UN. For instance, 
he has noted that, “in September 1978, Congress placed a restriction on funds appropriated for US 
assessed contribution to UN agencies, prohibiting their use for technical assistance activities (the 
Helms Amendment). The reason the US Congress was dissatisfied with the UN could be generalized 
as followed: the loss of the US and Western European controlling influence in the Organization, 
disagreement with various political actions of the General Assembly, the use of the United Nations 
by the developing countries to bring about a redistribution of wealth and power through the creation 
of a New International Economic Order, the nature of financing for technical assistance programs, 
dissatisfaction with recent decisions of the Committee on Contribution of the General Assembly, and 
finally, the size and growth rate of the budgets of the UN and the specialized agencies.120 The 
above-mentioned causes could also show us a great deal about US anxiety over its waning influence 
on these organizations. The hegemon has tried to use its power to consolidate its substantial 
influence on the UNGA, with financial means being the primary instrument. 
 
1.2.2 Existing Studies of the Relationship of US Power and Influence in the IMF 
Nagaire Woods discusses, in US Hegemony and International Organizations, the relationship 
between the US and the IMF. “The well-recognized concept is that the United States enjoys a special 
position in the IMF. When the institutions were created, their structure, location, and mandate were 
all pretty much determined by the United States.”121 However, what is more important in his 
discourse is the criteria for measuring US influence on the IMF. These criteria only refer to the role 
of US power from the perspective of finance funding, resource lending, and staff nationality. 
However, they also show the importance of openness. “In order to measure the US influence in the 
IMF, there have been four characteristics defined as followed: (a) how is the organization financed? 
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What proportion of the core budget is paid by the United States? Can the institution acquire 
additional resources for special purposes and whether or not US approval is required for such 
payments? (b) what shapes the use of resources in the IMF, or how much influence the US exercises 
over the lending and operational decisions taken by the institutions; (c) how the staffing and 
managements have been put together? For instance, the composition of the staff in terms of 
nationality and training, the need for US approval and the relationship between the prevailing 
training and mind set of the staff and US interests, etc; and (d) how the IMF mandate is formulated 
and the representative and deliberative functions of the organizations. Who is represented and with 
what voting power, the rationale for the existing structure of representation and the role of the US in 
shaping it, the requirements for change, and to what extent formal decision-making rules are 
overridden by informal conventions and norms.”122 The criteria (a), (b), and (c), (as specified in 
Chapter One) are closely related to US power. 
Susan Strange is another important scholar who studies US influence on the IMF. She once 
described multilateral institutions as either serving as “instruments of the structural strategy and 
foreign policy of the dominant state or states” or providing necessary public goods, thus “allowing 
states to enjoy the political luxury of national autonomy without sacrificing the economic dividends 
of world markets and production structures.”123 Strange tends to define the IMF as the former, 
reflecting the concepts and interests of the strongest country. “The function of the organization was 
originally conceived by its American author, Harry Dexter White, reflecting the concerns and 
interests—both ideological and material—of the United States (and to a lesser extent of Britain and 
the developed European countries), the Fund was directed by its Articles of Agreement to the pursuit 
of three monetary objectives: liberalization, stabilization, and nondiscrimination.”124 Since Strange’s 
writing mainly focuses on the decision-making process of the IMF, her viewpoints are also involved 
in Section Two. 
 
1.2.3 The Existing Studies of the Relationship of US Power and Influence on UNESCO 
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Mark Imber, in his study on UNESCO, refers to both relative power and organizational openness. 
In his view, power and openness are desirable values in international organizations. “In practice, 
what we have seen is that, on one hand, some organizations have been controlled or circumscribed 
by the most powerful member states while on the hand, since these institutions can provide the 
global public goods, states have to compromise with it sometimes on condition of the autonomy of 
the international organizations.” Imber talks directly about the use of American power (such as 
financial means) to influence UNESCO. “There is some suggestion that the US ability to exploit its 
dominant role in funding the agencies has itself become a political instrument in the formulation and 
execution of the policy. The threat of financial damage has been used, more or less crudely, as a 
threat to obtain a curtailment of alleged politicization or indeed to obtain more, as evidenced in Mr. 
Newell’s late and escalating demands upon the UNESCO constitution. Financial power has 
confronted voting power and this might in its own way be seen to constitute a form of politicization; 
an attempt to manipulate the agenda and conduct of the agencies by the threat of financial 
punishment.”125 
Imber also reviews the changes of the US apportionment in UNESCO. However, due to the 
openness of UNESCO, it seems that this did not greatly contribute to US influence. As Imber acutely 
observes, “It is certainly easy to point up the extraordinary variations in contributions between the 
figure of 25% and the lowest assessment of 0.01% paid by 78 states in most of the organizations. It 
has not gone unnoticed that this produce equally extraordinary variations in the relationship between 
voting rights and financial contributions. 78 states can muster a near majority of votes on the basis of 
0.78% of contributions. It has been seen in the preceding cases that the US arguments concerning 
politicization have been underpinned by the implicit and sometimes explicit argument that 
politicizations is made easier by the financial irresponsibility of the majority.” 126 Thus, Mark 
Imber’s study has placed importance on both relative power and organizational openness. 
Furthermore, he has briefly summarized the evolution of the US influence on UNESCO. “The role 
of UNESCO in the Korean War during 1950-3, the allegations of promoting world government in 
the McCarthy period in 1954-5, and more substantially, the passage of three resolutions highly 
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critical of Israel during 1974-5, each produced criticism, review and some expression of 
disenchantment.” 127 
Figure 6. UN member states with largest assessments128 
1946 1980-2 
USA 38.89% USA 25.00% 
UK 11.98% USSR 11.10% 
USSR 6.62% Japan 9.58% 
France 6.30% FRG 8.31% 
China 6.30% France 6.26% 
 
2. Openness of International Organizations and Existing Studies on the 
Relationship between Openness and US Influence  
As section one discloses, US relative power in the postwar period underwent a period of change, 
and this evolution has had some impact on the US’s role in international organizations. In existing 
studies, some scholars have also referred to the importance of the organization’s openness. Openness 
is directly related to the legitimacy and the influence of small states. As American President Harry 
Truman said, “if peace is to endure it must rest upon justice no less than power…That does not mean 
that each [nation] must enjoy an equal voice, but it does mean that each must be heard.”129 I have 
noted in Chapter One that some international organizations are so open that the hegemonic power 
cannot have a great influence. Alan Keyes pointed out in the mid-90s that, “the democracies in the 
United Nations no longer can tolerate the adverse consequences of the imbalance between power and 
responsibility, between voting majorities and financial contributions, between obligations and 
benefits.”130 This section first examines the openness of international organizations, and then the 
existing studies on the relationship of organizational openness and US influence on postwar 
institutions. 
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2.1 The Openness of International Organizations 
According to the definition of openness in Chapter One, the first criterion is the entry of 
member states. If an organization can be joined easily with low conditionality, this organization 
should be a relatively open one. The second criterion is participation in the decision-making process. 
If an organization adopts equal voting power distribution in decision-making, it will be relatively 
open because the hegemon will have to persuade most of the member states to support its policies. In 
this section, a brief introduction to these organizations is presented first, and then their membership, 
the functions of the main governing bodies, and the distribution of voting power is explored.  
 
2.1.1 The Openness of the IMF 
The IMF was conceived during the Bretton Woods Conference, which aimed at designing and 
constructing the postwar economic system in July 1944. Delegates from forty-four countries 
participated in this meeting and drew up the Article of Agreement for the International Monetary 
Fund. The IMF came into existence in December 1945 when the first 29 countries signed its Articles 
of Agreement. The statutory purposes of the IMF today are the same as when they were formulated 
in 1944.131 Today, the IMF has developed into a critical international organization of 184 countries, 
working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, 
promote high employment, sustainable economic growth, and a reduction of poverty.132 The IMF is 
the central institution of the international monetary system—the system of international payments 
and exchange rates that enable business to take place between different countries. As the only 
international agency whose mandated activities involve active dialogue with virtually every country 
on economic policies, the IMF is the principal forum for discussing not only national economic 
policies in a global context, but also issues important to the stability of the international monetary 
and financial system.133 
 
2.1.1.1 Membership of the IMF 
In terms of the first criteria mentioned above, the entry of member states, the IMF could be 
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counted as a relative open organization. The Articles of Agreement states, “Section 1.  Original 
members. The original members of the Fund shall be those of the countries represented at the United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference whose governments accept membership before 
December 31, 1945. Section 2.  Other members. Membership shall be open to other countries at such 
times and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors. These 
terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles consistent with those 
applied to other countries that are already members.”134 As Figure 7 shows, 185 countries have 
become member states of the IMF. That is to say, this organization is a universal international body. 
Figure 7. Growth in IMF Membership, 1945 – 2003135 
 
 
2.1.1.2 Functions of the Board of Governors 
The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body in the IMF. It consists of one 
governor and one alternate governor for each member country. According to Section 2, Article XII, 
this body has the following major powers in the Fund: 
“(a) All powers under this Agreement not conferred directly on the Board of Governors, the 
Executive Board, or the Managing Director shall be vested in the Board of Governors. The Board of 
Governors shall consist of one Governor and one Alternate appointed by each member in such 
manner as it may determine. Each Governor and each Alternate shall serve until a new appointment 
is made. No Alternate may vote except in the absence of his principal. The Board of Governors shall 
select one of the Governors as Chairman. (b) The Board of Governors may delegate to the Executive 
Board authority to exercise any powers of the Board of Governors, except the powers conferred 
directly by this Agreement on the Board of Governors. (g) The Board of Governors, and the 
Executive Board to the extent authorized, may adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
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or appropriate to conduct the business of the Fund.”136 
Thus, the distribution of power in the Fund is the primary factor for the Fund’s openness. We 
can clearly see that voting power, not the number of members, has a prominent role in the process. 
Since voting power in the Fund is mainly dependent on quotas, states have unequal voting power in 
determining the affairs of the organization. As Chapter Three discusses in detail, quota adherence is 
the fundamental organizing principle of the International Monetary Fund. 
“(c) The Board of Governors shall hold such meetings as may be provided for by the Board of 
Governors or called by the Executive Board. Meetings of the Board of Governors shall be called 
whenever requested by fifteen members or by members having one-quarter of the total voting power. 
(d) A quorum for any meeting of the Board of Governors shall be a majority of the Governors having 
not less than two-thirds of the total voting power. (e) Each Governor shall be entitled to cast the 
number of votes allotted under Section 5 of this Article to the member appointing him.”137 
 
2.1.1.3 Functions of Executive Board 
The Executive Board is another important body of the Fund. It mainly takes charge of carrying 
out the decisions made by the Board of Governors. “(a) The Executive Board shall be responsible 
for conducting the business of the Fund, and for this purpose shall exercise all the powers delegated 
to it by the Board of Governors.”138 The Board is currently composed of 24 Executive Directors. 
Each of the five countries with the largest quotas—United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom—appoints its own Executive Director, usually from its finance ministry or central 
bank. Three other countries—China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—have enough voting power to elect 
their own Executive Directors. The remaining 176 members are organized into 16 constituencies of 
countries, each of which elects an Executive Director. For instance, the Nordic constituency 
comprises Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. Basically, 
this means that although all the members are represented, not all are directly represented nor do they 
enjoy equal voting power. 
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On account of the importance of the Executive Board, 85 percent voting power is required in 
order to increase or decrease the number of Executive Directors required. “The Executive Board 
shall consist of Executive Directors with the Managing Director as chairman. Of the Executive 
Directors: five shall be appointed by the five members having the largest quotas; and fifteen shall be 
elected by the other members. …For the purpose of each regular election of Executive Directors, the 
Board of Governors, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, may increase or 
decrease the number of Executive Directors.”139 In the working procedure of the Executive Board, 
“A quorum for any meeting of the Executive Board shall be a majority of the Executive Directors 
having not less than one-half of the total voting power.” “Each appointed Executive Director shall be 
entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under Section 5 of this Article to the member appointing 
him.” Thus, 0the prominent role of voting power in deciding the legitimacy and outcomes of 
meetings can be clearly seen. 
 
2.1.1.4 Quotas and Voting Power in the IMF 
Quota adherence is the fundamental power distribution principle in the Fund. That is to say, 
voting power is not distributed by the “one for each” principle. On the contrary, the voting powers of 
states are based on their quota. “Quota subscriptions generate most of the IMF’s financial resources. 
Each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota. …A member’s quota is broadly determined by 
its economic position relative to other members. Various economic factors are considered in 
determining changes in quotas, including GDP, current account transactions, and official 
reserves.”140 In order to promote a degree of fairness in the IMF, every country is assigned 250 
basic votes. According to the IMF Website, voting power is calculated in the following way:  
“(a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each part of 
its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights. (b) Whenever voting is required 
under Article V, Section 4 or 5, each member shall have the number of votes to which it is entitled 
under (a) above adjusted (i) by the addition of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred 
thousand special drawing rights of net sales of its currency from the general resources of the Fund up 
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to the date when the vote is taken, or (ii) by the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each 
four hundred thousand special drawing rights of its net purchases under Article V, Section 3(b) and (f) 
up to the date when the vote is taken, provided that neither net purchases nor net sales shall be 
deemed at any time to exceed an amount equal to the quota of the member involved. (c) Except as 
otherwise specifically provided, all decisions of the Fund shall be made by a majority of the votes 
cast.” 141 Most critical issues, such as an increase or decrease in Executive Directors or the 
distribution of quotas, requires an 85 percent majority. As specify in Chapter Three, this has given 
the US a de facto unilateral veto in the IMF. 
Since the next chapter deals with quotas, voting power, and major events regarding the US-IMF 
relationship, here, the basic organizing principle of the Fund are clarified. Though membership in the 
organization is relatively open (presently including almost all the countries in the world), its main 
governing bodies are organized mainly according to the quota system. Since the distribution of votes 
is not equal, but dependent on a members’ quota, this organization actually has been relatively closed. 
The US hegemon has enjoyed the greatest share of votes in the Fund. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
relatively open membership policy does not endow most medium and small sized states with 
corresponding influence. In short, the organizing principle of the major decision-making body 
accords with the logic of power politics in nature. 
 
2.1.2 The Openness of UNESCO142 
UNESCO—the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO)— was founded in November 1945. “UNESCO is working to create the conditions for 
genuine dialogue based upon respect for shared values and the dignity of each civilization and 
culture. This role is critical, particularly in the face of terrorism, which constitutes an attack against 
humanity. The world urgently requires global visions of sustainable development based upon 
observance of human rights, mutual respect and the alleviation of poverty, all of which lie at the 
heart of UNESCO’s mission and activities.”143 UNESCO is the most important intergovernmental 
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organization in the cultural field. This organization has conducted a series of significant activities 
such as the World Heritage Convention. The World Heritage Convention has greatly contributed to 
the preservation of the world’s historical legacy. It has also been deeply involved into the political 
struggles involving issues of cultural diversity and information control. The US-UNESCO 
relationship is clarified in Chapter Four, so for now the focus is on the openness of UNESCO’s 
membership and voting power distribution. 
 
2.1.2.1 Membership 
UNESCO is quite an open organization with respect to the entry of member states. There are 
191 member states in the organization. Even though the United States and its several allies withdrew 
from UNESCO, all of them came back within twenty years. UNESCO could be counted as one of 
the most universal specialized agencies in the UN system. According to the UNESCO constitution, 
“membership of the United Nations Organization shall carry with it the right to membership of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. …Subject to the conditions of the 
Agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization, approved pursuant to 
Article X of this Constitution, states not members of the United Nations Organization may be 
admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a 
two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference. …Territories or groups of territories which are 
not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate 
Members by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting, upon 
application made on behalf of such territory or group of territories by the Member or other authority 
having responsibility for their international relations. The nature and extent of the rights and 
obligations of Associate Members shall be determined by the General Conference.”144 As for 
withdrawing from UNESCO, the constitution states, “any Member State or Associate Member of the 
Organization may withdraw from the Organization by notice addressed to the Director-General. 
Such notice shall take effect on 31 December of the year following that during which the notice was 
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given.”145 
2.1.2.2 Function and Vote in a General Conference 
Similar to the IMF, the major governing bodies of UNESCO are composed of two parts: the 
General Conference and the Executive Board. The General Conference is the highest authority of 
UNESCO. “The General Conference shall determine the policies and the main lines of work of the 
Organization. It shall take decisions on programs submitted to it by the Executive Board. The 
General Conference shall, when it deems desirable and in accordance with the regulations to be 
made by it, summon international conferences of states on education, the sciences and humanities or 
the dissemination of knowledge; non-governmental conferences on the same subjects may be 
summoned by the General Conference or by the Executive Board in accordance with such 
regulations.” Furthermore, the members of the Executive Board are also elected from the General 
Conference. “The General Conference shall elect the members of the Executive Board and, on the 
recommendation of the Board, shall appoint the Director-General.”146 
As to the membership of the General Conference, the constitution states that, “The General 
Conference shall consist of the representatives of the State Members of the Organization. The 
Government of each Member State shall appoint not more than five delegates, who shall be selected 
after consultation with the National Commission, if established, or with educational, scientific and 
cultural bodies.”147 Each member in the Conference enjoys equal voting right in the Conference. 
“Each Member State shall have one vote in the General Conference. Decisions shall be made by a 
simple majority except in cases in which a two-thirds majority is required by the provisions of this 
Constitution, or the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference. A majority shall be a majority of 
the Members present and voting.”148 
 
2.1.2.3 Function and Vote in Executive Board 
The Executive Board is in charge of the routine functions of UNESCO. It recommends new 
members to the General Conference, prepares the agenda for the General Conference, examines the 
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program of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates submitted to it by the 
Director-General, and then submits them to the General Conference with such recommendations as it 
considers desirable. More importantly, “the Executive Board, acting under the authority of the 
General Conference, shall be responsible for the execution of the program adopted by the 
Conference. In accordance with the decisions of the General Conference and having regard to 
circumstances arising between two ordinary sessions, the Executive Board shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure the effective and rational execution of the program by the Director-General.”149 
As for the membership of the Executive Board, they “shall be elected by the General 
Conference and it shall consist of fifty-eight Member States. The President of the General 
Conference shall sit ex officio in an advisory capacity on the Executive Board. …Each Member of 
the Executive Board shall appoint one representative. It may also appoint alternates.”150 As in the 
General Conference, each member of the Executive Board enjoys an equal vote. Each Member of 
the Board shall have one vote. “Decisions of the Board shall be taken by a simple majority of the 
Members present and voting, except where otherwise specified in these Rules. For the purposes of 
determining the majority, only Members casting an affirmative or negative vote shall be counted as 
‘present and voting’; Members who abstain from voting shall be considered as not voting. …In the 
following cases a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting is required: reconsideration 
of proposals (Rule 45); consultation by correspondence (Rule 60); amendment of Rules of Procedure 
(Rule 66); suspension of Rules of Procedure (Rule 67); establishment, before each session of the 
General Conference, of the list of States not Members of UNESCO which are to be invited to send 
observers to that session.”151 
Thus, either from the membership policy of the organization or the distribution of voting rights 
inside the General Conference and Executive Board, UNSECO can be considered a very open 
organization. No privileges have been attributed to great powers according to their contributions or 
economic level. As we will see in Chapter 4, the US gradually lost its influence as more and more 
developing countries joined the organization. 
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 2.1.3 The Openness of the UNSC 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the primary international organization aimed at 
“maintaining international peace and security.” In the United Nations system, the UNSC is the only 
international organization in which a resolution, once made, must be observed by its member states. 
According to the UN charter, “while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.” 152 
In Article 24, the Charter further states that, “in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”153 In Article 25, “the Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the present Charter.”154 The members’ obligation is emphasized again in Article 43, “all 
Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”155 
Besides the power to enforce international peacemaking, the Security Council also plays an 
important role in deciding whether an applicant state should be admitted to the United Nations. “The 
Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is 
able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to 
recommend the Applicant State for membership. If the Security Council recommends the Applicant 
State for membership, it shall forward to the General Assembly the recommendation with a complete 
record of the discussion. If the Security Council does not recommend the Applicant State for 
membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the 
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General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.”156 
 
2.1.3.1 Membership 
As for membership, the UNSC is very special in that the member states have been classified 
into two groups: permanent member states (with the right to veto) and non-permanent member states 
(no vetoing rights). According to Article 23 of the UN Charter, “the Security Council shall consist of 
fifteen Members of the United Nations. The People’s Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall 
elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security 
Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the 
United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of 
the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. …The non-permanent members of 
the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the 
non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to 
fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. Each member of 
the Security Council shall have one representative.” 157 
 
2.1.3.2 Voting in the UNSC 
As for voting in the UNSC, “each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in 
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting.”158 As Article 31 states, “any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of 
the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before 
the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially 
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affected.”159 
Thus, except for procedural matters, the five permanent members enjoy a veto right on 
substantial matters. As is elaborated on in chapter 5, this veto right ensures that proposals 
unfavorable to the permanent members won’t be passed. Considering that these five countries are 
permanent members of the Security Council, they have been given a privileged status in the 
organization. Compared to the nearly 200 members of the United Nations General Assembly, the 
Council is composed of only 15 members. In either matters of membership or distribution of voting 
power, the United Nations Security Council is a relatively closed organization. 
 
2.2 Existing Studies on the Relationship between Openness and US Influence 
Some scholars have also touched on the relationship between an organization’s openness and 
US influence on these organizations. Here, several representative studies of this relationship are 
examined based on the two elements of openness: membership and voting power. 
 
 
2.2.1 Existing Studies of the Relationship of Membership and US Influence  
Leland Goodrich specifically discussed the relationship between UN membership and US 
influence. “Initially the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, was predominantly 
European and Western Hemisphere in membership.”160 “Except for the Soviet Union and other 
members of Communist bloc, who constituted a small minority within the organization, members of 
the United Nations accepted the values and policy assumptions of the West, which the charter 
incorporated. Therefore, the United States found it relatively easy to pursue its national objectives 
within this framework, assuming a role of leadership with the great majority of other members 
willing to accept it.”161 It cannot be denied that the United Nations managed for the first time to 
bring weak states to the negotiating table. Thus, even though the US and its allies constituted an 
absolute majority in the United Nations in the 1950s, the great openness of the UNGA, and even the 
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relatively closed UNSC, can bring opportunities for weak states to speak on the world stage, just as 
emphasized in the introduction.  
Goodrich has traced the change in UN membership and its influence on the US role in the 
UNGA. “Following the initial membership deadlock which was finally broken in 1955, the 
membership of the United Nations quickly changed in size and character. Under the impact of the 
rapid liquidation of colonialism, membership not only more than doubled within two decades, but 
newly independent states, formerly colonies, and predominantly Asian and African, acquired 
majority status.” “This development has threatened the special interests of the major powers who 
originally believed that their special interests would be sufficiently protected by voting privilege in 
the Security Council and the fact that on most questions the General Assembly could only 
recommend.”162  
A number of international relations scholars have noticed this change in the UNGA. Developing 
countries became the majority and dominated the issue agenda of the UNGA in the 1960s and 1970s. 
For instance, according to Leon Gordenker, “in the General Assembly before the flood of new 
members, the United States could almost always obtain a recommendation to back its position. Years 
later, the new members seized the procedural opportunities of the General Assembly where they 
could control the agenda. Consequently the General Assembly has had a leading role in such matters 
of security as the Rhodesian case (before the United Kingdom brought it to the Security Council), 
the future of Namibia, and the situation in the Middle East. Led by the smaller states and the African 
group, whose views usually were harmonized in the OAU, the Assembly has branded South Africa 
as a breaker of the peace and has demanded the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council.”163 
“In other worlds, the growing proportion of small states among the total membership of the UN 
system can be seen in the evolution of a well-organized, but informal, consultative mechanism which 
permits the majority in the General Assembly and elsewhere to criticize the great powers and the 
influential smaller countries at will.”164  
Edward Luck agreed with the importance of membership on a state’s influence. According to 
him, “it is an old saw, moreover, not only at the UN, but also in the American foreign policy 
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community, that the United States simply is not good at multilateral diplomacy, that it is 
uncomfortable in global political gatherings, and that it does much better one-on-one, where its 
power can be brought to bear more directly and fully. The breadth and diversity of the UN’s 
membership, plus the skewed nature of the voting formulas in its plenary bodies, no doubt make it 
more difficult for the United States to exercise its power effectively. The perception of America as 
the helpless giant in UN forums is sufficiently prevalent to make many Americans fret about the 
apparent disparity between their power outside and inside of the world body.”165 
Similarly, Richard E. Bissell has also discussed the change in the organization’s membership 
and US influence in international organizations. With greater openness and the increasing 
membership of the UNGA, “it has already been maintained that disagreements with the majority will 
be frequent. However, in order to determine the proper US response, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two types of disagreements: (1) constitutional (i.e., changes in the rules of operation of an 
organization as they existed when the United States joined) and (2) issue-oriented (where the action 
is constitutional within the terms of the Charter or founding document of the organization). The 
more serious case, clearly, is the constitutional question.”166 
UNESCO is a typical example in Bissell’s discussion. “Another consequence of the expanded 
membership of the United Nations, and more particularly the nature of the new membership, has 
been a change in the principal concerns of the organization. For instance, in an organization like 
UNESCO where the member states enjoy equal voting rights, the initial preoccupation with 
questions that are only concerned with the political interests of the great powers have now been 
transformed to the equal attention to the developing countries, their concern about economic 
prosperity, or the New International Information order. Generally speaking, the main concerns of the 
international community have been altered to population, food, energy, housing and environment as 
well as emphasizing the interdependence among the countries instead of dependence. …The United 
States has realized that the abdication of leadership does not imply that American resources are any 
less avidly requested by the Third World.”167  
Another important scholar, Nigel White, paid attention to the membership of the UNSC and 
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discussed the debates on the enlargement of this organization. “Membership issues tend to merge 
with issues of representation and the composition of the Security Council is the prime example. Even 
though the membership of the Security Council was increased from eleven to fifteen in 1965, this 
still fails to make the council member representative of the whole UN membership in that we can 
observe without difficulties that the ratio of council members was actually decreased instead. The 
Council of the ICAO, for instance, consists of thirty-three contracting states elected by the assembly, 
giving adequate representation to the States of chief importance to the provision of facilities for 
international civil air navigation; and other states whose designation will ensure that all the major 
geographic areas of the world are represented on the Council.”168 
 
2.2.2 Existing Studies on the Relationship of Voting Power and US Influence 
The issue of voting power is probably the most remarkable aspect of international organizations 
because it directly relates to states’ influence and negotiating outcomes. Theoretically, Michael 
Crozier tells us something about politics within large-scale organizations. Each individual within a 
complex organizational hierarchy is continually engaged in a dual struggle: to tie his colleagues to 
precise rule-based behavior, thereby creating a more stable and certain environment in which to 
operate, while also trying to retain as much autonomy and discretion as possible for himself.169 In 
other words, a leading state will try its best to lock in other states as much as possible while securing 
itself a position unencumbered by institutional rules and obligations. The leading state will also 
make use of its ability to limit its capacity to exercise power in indiscriminate and arbitrary ways as 
a “currency” to buy institutional cooperation from other states. For all of these reasons, Americans 
have not found a comfortable way to reconcile their domestic democratic principles and their sense 
of “Exceptionalism” with the realities of decision making in intergovernmental bodies, particularly 
universal ones. At the same time, the architects of international organizations have been unable or 
unwilling to find a way to fully reflect or take into account America’s preeminent position in the 
world when creating intergovernmental decision-making structures. These twin dilemmas continue 
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to grip American attitudes and policies toward international institutions.170 
The veto right is a very obvious privilege of the five great powers, and a number of scholars 
have written about its influence on the UNSC. For instance, Leon Gordenker once argued that, “as 
approached in the UN system of 1945, maintaining peace involved the prohibition of unauthorized 
use of force in international relations, rapid suppression of any such use of force, and a joint 
supervisory role for the great powers. If any member other than a great power did indeed use or 
threaten to use force, the US was to have the capacity, directed by the Security Council, to suppress 
the outbreak.”171 “Frivolous or impractical schemes—that is those which the permanent members 
would not support—would be ruled out by the fact that the Security Council could act only on the 
basis of unanimity of the great powers.”172 The existence of veto rights have shown that the US can 
not control the UN Security Council, though it has been a beneficiary.  
Nigel D. White also noted that the US and other great powers use their veto right to dissuade the 
passage of unfavorable resolutions. “However, with article 4(1)173 laying down the criteria for the 
admission of new members, during the Cold War, the superpowers in the Security Council judged 
new applicants according to wider geopolitical criteria. …The major powers in the Security Council 
did not accept this view…The Soviet Union had rejected it from the very beginning; the United 
States implicitly rejected it in 1975 when it blocked the admission of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and Republic of Vietnam for reasons other than those mentioned in Article 4 of the UN 
Charter.”174 
As specified above, the voting power distribution in the UNGA is very different from the UNSC. 
The basic organizing principle of the UN General Assembly is one state, one vote. This definitely 
constrains a great power’s influence. As Nigel White points out, “although the UN organization 
provides for majority voting in its organs, the basic principle is one-nation, one-vote. The smallest 
nations in the United Nations—the so-called microstates—have equal say. The United States has 
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been assessed for 25% of the regular budget, whereas the smaller nations pay 0.001%. Japan and 
Germany are the second and fourth largest contributors to the regular budget, although neither is 
rewarded with a permanent seat on the Security Council and the right of veto. It could be argued that 
while the United Nations has moved away from sovereign equality by allowing for majority decision 
making, it has not fully or fairly done this to reflect the real interest and power of states.”175 Nigel 
White also gives a very refined conclusion on the organizing principles of the UNGA and UNSC. 
“On one hand, the charter declares the sovereign equality of all its members, interprets this principle 
procedurally into the one-nation, one-vote rules of the General Assembly, and then limits the scope 
of the Assembly’s power by declaring that its decisions are binding only on internal budgetary and 
administrative matters. In the smaller Security Council, with its unprecedented legal and 
enforcement powers, on the other hand, the charter gave the United States and its four principal 
wartime allies veto power over nonprocedural matters.”176 
White also talks about the institutions of weighted voting power in other international 
organizations. “Whether certain states should be given more votes or voting power than others, is 
“the criterion on which the extra weight should be given. Should it be population, national income, 
power, or some other criterion”177 such as contributions to the budget of the organization? The main 
UN organizations that use weighted voting are the IMF and the IBRD, for two reasons. First, their 
task is confined so precisely to one field that criteria for weighting can be found there. Second, and 
perhaps more significantly, the organizations would not have been as effective, indeed might not 
have been established, had the major donating states not obtained dominance in decision making.”178 
Other researchers agree with the viewpoint that the voting power inside the IMF should be relatively 
closed. “Before the establishment of Bretton Woods System, it was widely acknowledged that there 
must be a core group working in very close cooperation among the major industrial countries, 
although its work must be related to global problems.”179 As Richard Cooper stated, “in the 
monetary arena wide participation is desirable, but not so desirable as to allow it to hold up 
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important cooperative steps between the key nations.”180 
Ngaire Woods has also done very concrete studies on the voting power distribution inside the 
IMF and US influence. “The United States had just over a third of the voting power in the IMF and 
no drawing from the IMF was approved without US agreement first being made clear. While on the 
other hand, it can not be denied that the IMF itself embodies autonomous characteristic or it would 
be redundant in that it would have no difference with the government agencies of the US, and the 
legitimacy and mobilizing power would be greatly debased.” 181 Similar to the definition on 
openness presented herein, Woods thought that the influence of the US on the IMF can only be 
understood through the basic organizing principles rather than through concrete processes. “In 
contrast to the informal influence such as the staffing and managements, the power of the US in the 
formal structures of decision making in the IMF is vital to understanding its influence.”182 “All 
other powers are delegated to the executive boards of the institutions. In other words, the United 
States has more formal power than any other state in all the agencies of oversight and management 
of the IMF.”183  
Susan Strange is an influential scholar on the study of the IMF, and she emphasizes the voting 
power distribution among the board of governors. “At the top of each institution is the board of 
governors who meet once a year and make overall strategic decisions. In the IMF, the governors are 
advised by the International Monetary and Financial Committee—formerly the Interim 
Committee—in which the voting power of each representative is weighted as per the Executive 
Board. Representation is based on the principle of one state, one governor, but not of one state, one 
vote. The governors wield unequal votes, based on a system of quotas. Together with the qualified 
majority voting arrangements, this has assured to the United States a predominant position.”184 
Seymour Finger, the former American ambassador to the UN, also concludes that the openness of the 
IMF comes from the membership and the weighted voting systems. “Consequently, the IMF 
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provides a global context; its membership encompasses virtually all countries, furthermore, 
membership in the IMF is open to any country that wants it and is prepared to abide by its articles. 
At the same time, the Fund has weighted voting, small committees which have the effect of weighted 
representation, and facilities which enable the monetary authorities of problem countries to consult 
frequently and closely.”185 
Mark Imber also talks about the equal voting power distribution inside UNESCO and its 
influence on the US role. “In the case of UNESCO, the dominant 25% US contribution of the 
assessed budgets is supposed to permit it some privileges while in practice, not as in the IMF, this 
particular authority has not been represented obviously because of the ‘one nation, one vote system’ 
feature attributed to UNESCO. Therefore, it is natural to have the arguments that constitutional 
reform should reflect some recognition of the budgetary contributions of leading actors.”186 “In 
terms of UNESCO, when the US withdrew from this organization in 1984, it has listed several 
reasons to justify its deeds, such as statism, budgetary expansion and politicization, among which the 
politicization has been the most frequently quoted cause for the confrontation of the US and 
UNESCO. While what bears noting here is that from the inception of this organization, it would be 
naïve to expect that the mandate of UNESCO would have been non-political at all. The Soviet Union 
refrained from joining UNESCO until 1954, perceiving all to clearly the emphatic liberalism upon 
which the organization’s commitment to learning through the free exchange of knowledge was 
derived.”187 The equal voting power distribution and the increasing membership of UNESCO 
finally led to US withdrawal from UNESCO. 
 
3. The Influence Level and Hypotheses for American Hegemony 
3.1 Influence Level 
We have examined the historical evolution of the United States and the openness of different 
organizations. The review of existing studies also shows that these two factors have promoted the 
changes in US influence in international organizations. However, the existing studies lack systemic 
                                                        
185 Seymour Maxwell Finger, “US Policy Toward International Institutions,” US Policy in International Institutions: 
Defining Reasonable Options in an Unreasonable World, edited by Seymour Maxwell Finger and Joseph R. Harbert, 
Westview Press, 1982, p. 169. 
186 Mark F. Imber, The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies, p. 
121. 
187 Ibid., p. 100. 
theoretical formulation, and thus their research is fragmented and fails to present any clear model for 
predicting US influence. Moreover, they lack systematic studies on US influence on various 
organizations during different periods. Based on Chapter One, a clear analytical model and 
corresponding hypotheses can be put forth here. Three levels of influence are noted in Chapter One; 
here there will be a little bit more discussion to help us understand the outcome of the combination 
of power and openness. 
In order to specify the level of “influence,” the article uses the terms “critical,” “substantial,” 
and “moderate” to describe the different ranks of influence exerted by states. Maybe “weak” or 
“low” should also be used in understanding state influence. However, this research focuses on the 
United States; a hegemonic state which is so strong that its influence almost never decreases to the 
level of “weak” even when its power status suffers relative decline. “Critical,” “substantial,” 
“moderate,” and “low” are four terms usually used to describe level of influence or risk. For example, 
from April 2003, all social services in the UK are obliged to use the same framework to assess the 
risks faced by people who ask them for help. Risks must be placed in either “Critical,” “Substantial,” 
“Moderate” or “Low” categories.188  
The British government specifies the standard for grading the risks. Critical risk means having a 
need to be designated first priority for help. “Your needs will be assessed as critical if: life is in 
danger; you have significant health problems; serious abuse or neglect has occurred or might occur; 
vital personal care or domestic routines cannot be sustained; vital involvement in work, education or 
learning cannot be sustained; vital social support systems and relationships cannot be sustained; vital 
family and other social roles and responsibilities cannot be undertaken.”189 Similarly, “substantial” 
means that quality of life is significantly influenced by some difficulties, and “moderate” means 
several aspects of the quality of life are difficult to sustain. This grading model provides a good 
reference for classifying state influence on international organizations. 
In my dissertation, Critical Influence describes a situation where a state has a decisive 
influence on a decision-making process. Essentially, a state can often successfully rally enough 
support on most of  the major issues in order for its policies to prevail. Substantial Influence 
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describes a situation where a state has a great influence on a decision-making process, but cannot 
often successfully rally enough support on most major issues. However, it is often able to veto the 
passage of most unfavorable resolutions. Moderate Influence describes a situation where a state has 
influence in the decision-making process, but can neither rally enough support for its own policy, nor 
veto unfavorable resolutions. However, it still enjoys the legal rights of a formal member and its vote 
can to some extent influence the final outcome. The definitions of these three kinds of influences set 
a standard for an analysis of the US impact on international organizations. It can also be used to 
describe other hegemonic states. After identifying the level of a state’s influence, power and 
openness are extracted through theoretical analysis of the US hegemonic status in the postwar 
international order. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses for American Influence 
After combining the research of the power evolution of the United States and the openness of 
international organizations, we can put forward solid hypotheses for American influence on the IMF, 
UNESCO, and the UNSC based on the theoretical discourse in Chapter One. If the hegemony is 
preponderant and the organization is relatively closed, it will be relatively easy for the hegemon to 
play a critical role in the organization. If the hegemony is preponderant, but the organization is 
relatively open, then the hegemonic states can substantially influence the decision-making of the 
organization through many material instruments. Similarly, the hegemon can maintain substantial 
influence on an organization when it is relatively closed through certain established privileges. When 
the hegemon is relatively declining and the organization is relatively open, then it is very difficult for 
the hegemon to substantially influence the decision making of the organization. The illustration 
below may facilitate a better understanding of this hypothesis.  
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In this analytical framework, the horizontal axis represents the openness of international 
organizations from relatively open to relatively closed, while the vertical axis represents the relative 
power position of the United States from preponderant to a relative decline. In the two quadrants of 
substantial influence, the sources of the US influence are different: one is from the preponderant 
power, and the other is from the openness of the organization. However, this difference won’t cause 
any inconveniences for this research. In fact, in the empirical part, the changes of US influence and 
its relationship with changes of relative power or organizational openness are elaborated on. More 
importantly, though the sources of state influence are different, the level of substantial influence is 
the same. Regardless of whether the United States gets this influence by using its power or privileges, 
substantial influence always essentially means that the hegemon can prevent unfavorable draft 
resolutions from being passed in an organization. This dissertation explores the basic changes in US 
influence and finds reasonable causes for these changes. The aim is not to investigate every nuanced 
change, since that task would be impossible. 
 
3.2.1 American influence on the IMF 
Since the IMF is a relatively closed organization, in which the vote power distribution is based 
on the institution of quotas, the influence of the hegemon could be hypothesized as follows: 
From 1945 to 1965, American relative power was preponderant and the openness of the IMF 
was relatively closed. Thus, the hegemon had critical influence. 
From 1966 to 1985, American relative power relatively declined and the openness of the IMF 
was relatively closed. Thus, the hegemon had substantial influence. 
From 1986 to 2005, American relative power was revived and the openness of the IMF was 
relatively closed, so the hegemon once again had critical influence. 
 
3.2.2 American influence on UNESCO 
Since UNESCO has been a very open organization composed of over 190 members with a “one 
state, one vote” voting system, the influence of the hegemon could be hypothesized as follows: 
From 1945 to 1965, American relative power was preponderant and UNESCO had a high 
degree of openness. Thus, the hegemon had substantial influence. 
From 1966 to 1985, American relative power declined and UNESCO had a high degree of 
openness. Thus, the hegemon had moderate influence. 
From 2003 to 2005, American relative power was revived and UNESCO had a high degree of 
openness. Thus, the hegemon once again had substantial influence. 
 
3.2.3 American Influence on the UNSC 
Since the UNSC has been a relatively closed organization, with no more than 15 members and 
veto rights for the great powers, the influence of the hegemon could be hypothesized as follows: 
From 1945 to 1965, American relative power was preponderant, and the openness of the UNSC 
was relatively closed. Thus, the hegemon had substantial influence. 
From 1966 to 1985, American relative power relatively declined, and the openness of the 
UNSC was relatively closed. Thus, the hegemon had moderate influence. 
From 1986 to 2005, American relative power was revived, and the openness of the UNSC was 
relatively closed. Thus, the hegemon once again had substantial influence. 
Combing these hypotheses, the basic framework of this dissertation is as follows: 
Influence Power Openness Example 
Critical Preponderant Relatively Closed IMF (1945-1965); IMF (1985-2006) 
UNSC (1945-1965); UNSC (1985-2006) 
Substantial Preponderant Relatively Open UNESCO (1945-1965); UNESCO (2003-2006) 
Substantial Relative Decline Relatively Closed IMF (1965-1985); UNSC (1965-1985) 
Moderate Relative Decline Relatively Open UNESCO (1965-1985) 
 
4. The Significance of this Framework for Studies of International Organizations 
To sum up, chapter one and two focused on three issues: the theoretical investigation of state 
and international organizations, the empirical examination of the evolution of US power, the 
openness of three organizations, and the existing studies on the relationship of power, openness, and 
state influence. Actually, the review of the existing empirical studies has preliminary proved the 
theoretical conclusion of Chapter One. However, as the review shows, these existing studies on 
international organizations lack a consistent and parsimonious analytical framework. Indeed, various 
theories have referred to the importance of relative power and organizational openness, and there are 
a number of empirical studies on the importance of these two variables. However, many 
international scholars (especially those who do empirical research) have not made substantial 
progress in finding an effective model. When examining their discourse on the causes of the 
changing US influence in the United Nations system, they often lack theoretical consciousness and 
just concentrate on how to fully understand the phenomena, but do not comment on which factors 
are more important or decisive. They sometimes directly notice the importance of these two factors, 
but none of them have intentionally explored the linkage from a theoretical perspective. Actually, 
many scholars of international organization studies tend to emphasize the importance of domestic 
politics and a number of other unstable variables. Thus, their work on international organizations to a 
great extent observe the methodology of interpretation (how we can understand best), not 
explanation (which factor is most important). This tendency in the studies of international 
organizations is very obvious and dominant.  
There might be a number of reasons for this tendency. In my own view, the primary reason is 
the disconnection of theoretical study and empirical study. Indeed, as Chapter One has shown, 
institutionalism puts more emphasis on the importance of international organizations. Sometimes, 
we also talk about the theory of international organization, but this theory is mainly focused on the 
impact of international organizations on states. It is aimed at only one empirical field. However, for 
other issue areas (such as those that this dissertation studies), institutionalism itself cannot be 
directly applied to them. Actually, the core issue of this dissertation is contrary to the core issue of 
Neoliberalism. It concentrates on how states can influence the decision-making of international 
organizations. Thus we need to “transform” the previous theoretical logic, or look at the theory from 
a different perspective. This task is too difficult for those who are not interested in international 
relations theory. However, for theory specialists, their interest and energy has been attracted to the 
enduring debates among different theories. They try to demonstrate that a certain theory is more 
convincing in some issue areas than other theories, and do not apply their theory to different areas, 
not to mention in the opposite way.  
And so, we can read many works on international organizations, but it is very difficult for us to 
find a book that analyzes state influence in international organizations using a consistent and 
parsimonious framework. Some people might think that we do not need to find such a framework; 
interpretation is enough. However, the point of scientific study is to tell us which factors are more 
important than others so we can better predict the future of a particular phenomenon. If we just use 
different theories or elements to understand the issue areas, we won’t know which factors are 
involved in the development of this area. Thus, we cannot provide any useful predictions. 
Furthermore, the more elements we use to interpret or understand the problem, the more limited the 
universality of this study will be. We might be satisfied with a very detailed description of the 
process in some international organizations, but the conclusion of this type of study has little value 
for understanding other organizations. Thus, the theoretical framework must be parsimonious and 
just focus on only a few factors. 
Instead of doing a purely historical study which requires the author to dig up as much evidence 
as possible to answer a question comprehensively, this thesis follows the political study route, in 
which the most significant factors are of great necessity. If we can grasp the most important factors, 
and demonstrate that they are enough to understand the basic changes or evolution of some issue 
areas, why is there any need to add other factors that will just complicate a specific case? We can 
better understand a broader reality by using a theoretical framework. If I just do a very detailed case 
study without aiming at finding any theoretical conclusions, then as many elements as possible may 
be used. However, this approach is not satisfying for a dissertation. By demonstrating this analytical 
framework in three typical cases, this dissertation provides a basis for future research on state and 
international organizations. In fact, we can say it is the beginning as well as the most important step 
of a research project. Based on this analytical framework, we can continue to study the influence of 
any great power in any important organization.  
Of course, the key point is that the explanatory power of these two factors must be 
demonstrated. The concrete hypotheses about American influence in three typical organizations have 
been listed, and the next three chapters will carefully examine whether the changes in US influence 
on these organizations are consistent with the changes in hegemonic power and the openness of 
these organizations. Chapter Three concentrates on US influence on the IMF; Chapter Four on 
UNESCO; and Chapter Five on the UN Security Council. 
Chapter 3: The Changing Influence 
Of the United States in the IMF 
Based on the theoretical part (chapter 1 discussed how power and openness related to a state’s 
influence in international organizations, and chapter 2 reviewed American power evolution and the 
openness of the main international organizations, leading to several assumptions regarding American 
influence in these organizations), this chapter concentrates on American influence in the IMF, which 
has proven to be formidable most of the time, while at the same time being variational over time. 
The basic organizing principle of the Fund has been basically closed because the voting power 
distribution has been based on the economic scale of the member states. Therefore, the assumptions 
about American influence in the IMF are briefly reiterated:  
(1) Power (predominant) + Openness (closed) = Critical Impact in the IMF 
(2) Power (relative decline) + Openness (closed) = Substantial Impact in the IMF 
In the remainder of this chapter, concrete assumptions regarding American influence are first 
discussed and then the key facts of hegemonic impact are examined. 
 
1. Assumptions about American Influence in the IMF 
Since the establishment of the IMF, its basic principles of liberalization and fundamental 
decision-making process have been maintained for more than 50 years. Though the fundamental 
rules of the IMF haven’t been modified over the years, the change in the hegemon’s power status has 
affected American influence in the Fund through transforming the regulations or procedures such as 
the revision of the Articles of Agreement, the redistribution of quotas and voting power, the 
emergence of new facilities, the senior officials designation, and so on. What is more, in practice, the 
IMF came to be more sympathetic toward developing countries in the 1960s and the 1970s, most of 
whom directly or indirectly opposed the “old” international political and economic order dominated 
by the United States. All of which, to some extent, reflected the relative decline in American power 
on the international stage and the corresponding waning of its influence in this organization. 
Nevertheless, generally speaking, these changes did not severely impair US influence on the Fund. 
Therefore, when exploring the change of U.S. influence, power should be considered the main factor, 
and if based on the postwar evolution of US hegemony, an analytical approach divided into three 
stages can be adopted as follows: 
 
1.1 Stage 1: 1945-1965 Power at its Zenith and Critical Impact on the IMF 
The IMF was conceived in July 1944 at an international conference held at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, U.S. The IMF came into existence in December 1945 when the first 29 countries 
signed its Articles of Agreement. The statutory purposes of the IMF today are the same as when they 
were formulated in 1944.190 Countries that joined the IMF between 1945 and 1971 agreed to keep 
their exchange rates (in effect, the value of their currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar, and in the 
case of the United States, the value of the US dollar in terms of gold) pegged at rates that could be 
adjusted with the IMF’s concurrence, but only to correct a “fundamental disequilibria” in the balance 
of payments. Thus, the dollar standard institution under the American hegemony replaced the Gold 
standard institution under the British hegemony.  
Furthermore, American power superiority was directly fused into the quota distribution in the 
IMF. At the end of World War II, the United States accounted for 22 percent of world exports and 
held 54 percent of official international reserve assets. Those percentages were reflected in a 33 
percent quota share for the United States in the IMF at that time, and it was broadly accepted that the 
Fund would not make any major decisions without US approval. In recent years, the United States 
has still contributed up to 17.67 percent of the capital subscriptions in the IMF, which are the 
institution’s primary source of financing.191 During this period, the United States could usually rally 
enough support in order for its policies on important issues in the IMF to prevail. 
 
1.2 Stage 2: 1965-1985 Relative Decline of the Power and Substantial Impact on the IMF  
In 1965, America directly joined the battle in Vietnam, which exhausted its energy disastrously 
throughout the 8 years till 1973, the end of that war. Other immediate effects of this war lay in the 
impairment of the US’s high reputation of being capable of exerting a prominent and decisive role in 
the IMF, and of its mighty economic capabilities, and external payments position as well. In 
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combination with a dramatic increase in domestic spending on President Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society programs, the rise on external military spending further worsened the overvaluation of the 
U.S. dollar under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. “The Vietnam War was by no 
means the sole culprit in this decline, but its catalytic role was certainly substantial.”192 
With regards to the international situation, the confrontation between the East-West coalitions 
remained the distinct feature of international politics on the one hand; while on the other, Japan and 
the European countries underwent an accelerating development era. In addition, one after another of 
the Third World countries had become independent rather than remaining colonized states, thus these 
countries gradually formed a group with their own accordant voice in the international political and 
economic arenas that sometimes resulted in their being neglected powers in the decision-making 
process in international organizations. When domestic factors are taken into account, the Reagan 
administration actually marked a sharp break with the past in its initial skepticism toward the IMF (a 
skepticism that disappeared with the debt crisis) and it also epitomized the growing difficulty that 
preceding administrations had experienced in mobilizing support to commit resources to 
international organizations that indirectly led to the negative attitude toward the US government and 
thus reduced its influence in international organizations. These twenty years proved to be a period of 
a decreasing US role in the Fund caused by the relative decline of hegemonic power. However, the 
United States still retained substantial influence over IMF decision-making that was mainly achieved 
through the 85% majority clause for crucial issues such as the redistribution of Quotas and voting 
power. 
 
1.3 Stage 3: 1985-Now Revival of US Power and Critical Impact on the IMF 
After Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party, 
which clearly elicited the declining reality of the USSR, the United States again won back its leading 
role in the international community and thus acquired more say in orientating and deciding 
international affairs. At the same time, the Japanese and German economies underwent severe 
problems. This era also witnessed the final dissolution of the USSR, while American new economic 
prosperity enabled it, for the second time since the end of World War II, to undeniably become the 
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engine of world economic development and the leader in world politics. Roughly speaking, the 
disparity between American power and that of the rest of the world looks overwhelming. In terms of 
military power, the United States is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional 
forces with global reach. American military expenditures are greater than those of the next eight 
countries combined, and it leads in the information-based “revolution in military affairs.” In 
economic scale, America’s 31% share of world products (at market prices) is equal to the next four 
countries combined (Japan, Germany, Britain, and France).193 In terms of cultural pervasion, the 
United States is actually the number-one film and television exporter in the world. It also attracts the 
most foreign students each year to its colleges and universities. 
Concretely speaking, the US influence during this period came mainly from three conditions. 
Firstly, although with the passage of time, the Third World and Europe achieved some progress in 
having an effect on the decision-making process, they usually failed to consolidate their position in 
the IMF’s functions so as to fully realize their rights and strategic goals. Secondly, the US obtained 
predominant influence upon the end of the bipolar structure and could thus use a number of 
resources to carry out its strategies. Alliances, economic aid, and soft power are all useful 
instruments in enhancing American influence. Thirdly, the most important factor lies in the 
enlargement of the power gap between the unipolar hegemon and other states. The supreme prestige 
of American power makes it relatively easy for the US to persuade its negotiating counterparts to 
support American goals. During this period, the United States renewed its critical impact on the IMF 
through both its strong economic power and soft power. 
 
2. The US Quota and Voting Power in the IMF 
On the basis of the comprehensive analysis above, some concrete instances are brought forward 
and construed in this section so as to reveal the changing influence of the US on the IMF. 
As mentioned above, the formal basis of American influence within the organization has been 
twofold: the weighted voting system, which allocates quotas and voting shares according to formulas 
that reflect international economic influence, and the changing pattern of special majorities, which 
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subjected decisions of particular importance to an effective US veto.194 In the early years, given the 
relative share of the America quota, weighted voting is of the greatest significance in understanding 
American influence within the organization at that time. As the economic weight of the United States 
in the world economy declined, caused by the economic growth of Europe, Japan, and the Third 
World, the relative status of the US descended, while special majority requests grew rapidly in a 
reverse tendency. The changing quotas and voting power reflect, on one the hand, the openness of 
the IMF decision-making process, and on the other hand, the power status of the United States in the 
international structure. 
 
2.1 Quotas and Their Calculation 
Member’s quotas delineate basic aspects of their financial and organizational relationship with 
the IMF. This includes: (1) Subscriptions. A member’s quota subscription determines the maximum 
amount of financial resources that a member state is obliged to provide to the IMF; (2) Voting 
power. The quota largely determines a member’s voting power in IMF decisions. Each member state 
is entitled to 250 basic votes195 plus one additional vote for each SDR 100,000 of quota; (3) Access 
to financing. The amount of financing a member can obtain from the IMF and its access limit is 
based on its quota under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements; and, (4) SDR allocations196. A 
members’ share of general SDR allocations is established in proportion to its quota.197 
The quota formulas themselves have evolved slowly over time, starting from the formula that 
was devised at the Bretton Woods conference. The changes made in 1962-63 and 1983 did not 
fundamentally alter the structure of the quota formulas. The original Bretton Woods formula related 
a member’s quota to its national income, reserves, external trade, and the fluctuation of its 
exports.198 
A member’s quota is broadly determined by its economic position relative to other members. 
Various economic factors are considered in determining changes in quotas, including GDP, current 
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account transactions, and official reserves. When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned an initial 
quota in the same range as the quotas of existing members that are considered by the IMF to be 
broadly comparable in economic size and characteristics. Therefore, the United States, the largest 
economy, and the developed states have, all along, possessed the most quotas in the IMF and have 
enjoyed the most voting power. In the 1950s, owing to the unsurpassed advantage over other great 
powers in the economic field, the United States obtained correspondingly insurmountable quotas and 
voting power in the IMF, which positioned the United States to play a decisive role in the IMF. 
However, with the recovery of the European and Japanese economies, the United States’ exceptional 
preponderance, mainly caused by the Second World War, phased out in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Accordingly, there has been some limited amount of change in U.S. quotas and voting power. 
However, the collapse of the USSR and the renewal of the U.S. economy in the 1990s reinforced 
American status in the Fund. Hence, the role of the US in the IMF has been directly related to its 
power status in the international structure. 
 
2.2 The Changing Distribution of Quotas and Voting Power 
2.2.1 Quotas Distribution (1944-1999) 
The design and specification of the Bretton Woods formula were subject to several 
preconceived constraints.  These constraints included: (1) the United States, which held the bulk of 
international liquidity, would supply a major part of the IMF’s assets; (2) the quota of the United 
States would be twice as large as the quota of the United Kingdom; (3) the combined quotas of the 
United Kingdom, including its dominions and colonies, should be equal to that of the United States, 
and the quotas of other large members should be reasonably related to those of the United States and 
the United Kingdom 199 To put it more simply, the major concern was that US military allies 
(President Roosevelt’s big four) should have the largest quotas, with a ranking on which the 
President and the Secretary of State had agreed. Under such preconditions, the IMF staff had 
carefully tried time and again to calculate different variables so as to obtain a “qualified” formula 
which adhered to these requirements: therefore, it is undeniable that power politics logic has been 
present in the working spirit of the IMF since its establishment.  
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In practice, the US quotas in the IMF have increased many times beyond its initial $275,000, as 
the following figure shows200: 
Figure 1: The United States: Quotas (In Thousands of SDRs)  
Date  SDR Amount  
Pre April 30, 1973 6,700,000 
April 10, 1978 8,405,000 
December 30, 1980 12,607,500 
December 29, 1983 17,918,300 
December 11, 1992 26,526,800 
February 03, 1999 37,149,300 
 
However, the relative quota of the United Stats hasn’t remained unchanged during the past 60 
years.  The most striking change is in the decline of United States voting power: from 37.9% of the 
total voting power on December 27, 1945, the date on which the Articles took effect, to 33.1% on 
April 30, 1946, to 21.4% on April 30, 1971201, to now, with 371,493 millions of SDRs (about $56.9 
billion) constituting only a 17.46% quota of the Fund202. Alterations in quotas have also given 
Europe, Japan, and the LDCs (Less Developed Countries) more power.  As a matter of fact, the 
share of LDC votes rose from 22% in 1947 to 35.8% percent in the early 1980s. To ensure U.S. 
unilateral veto, coincidentally, there was an increase in the kinds of decisions that require special 
majorities of 70 or 85 percent. Theoretically speaking, Germany, with 6.08 percent of the votes, 
France, with 5.02 percent, and the United Kingdom, with 5.02 percent, could vote together to 
exercise a veto. However, they haven’t coordinated their positions in IMF as yet.203 Neither could 
the large coalition of developing countries be organized to influence an IMF decision. As a result, 
the United States remains the only member with effective and practical veto power though its quota 
proportion has been reduced. The development of quota distribution not only tells us about the 
                                                        
200http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exquota.cfm?memberKey1=1020&date1key=2005%2D05%2D31&finpositi
on_flag=YES.  
201 Joseph Gold, Voting and Decisions in the International Monetary Fund: An Essay on the Law and Practice of the 
Fund, Washington, D. C., International Monetary Fund, 1972, pp. 25-26. 
202 See the Official Website of the IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/sched_a.htm. 
203 Nagaire Woods, “The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the 
World Bank and the IMF,” US Hegemony and International Organizations, Edited by Rosemary Foot, S. Neil 
MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
change of American influence in the Fund, but also the closed openness of this organization.  
 
2.2.2 Basic Votes (1944-2003) 
Further exacerbating the lack of voice of many members of the IMF is the fact, already 
mentioned above, that voting power on the Boards of the institutions is unequal, and, indeed, has 
become more unequal over time. Originally, steps were taken to ensure some equality among 
members by allocating each member an equal number of “basic votes.”  
Although voting power is closely related to quotas, it is not exactly proportionate to them 
because each member has 250 votes regardless of the size of its quota. The 250 votes are referred to 
here as basic votes. This number was proposed at Bretton Woods after pre-Conference negotiations 
in which other numbers, including zero, were discussed as possibilities. The authors of the plans for 
the Fund and the negotiators felt that the bold step of weighting the voting power of members in a 
major international organization strictly according to quotas, which in the main reflected economic 
and financial factors and status, should be combined with the political consideration of the 
traditional equality of states in international law. Thus, the basic votes were to serve the function of 
recognizing the doctrine of the equality of states. In addition, the introduction of the basic votes 
could more or less avoid the close adherence to the concept between the IMF and a private business 
corporation.  
Moreover, the basic votes were intended to perform another function. It was contemplated that 
some members might have a quota so small that they would have virtually no sense of participation 
in the affairs of the Fund if their voting power depended only on their quota.204 As stated in the first 
definitive version of the White Plan that emphasized the importance attached to basic votes as a way 
of giving an adequate voice to all members: 
 
“…the real problem is how to distribute the voting power. If each member of the board were to 
be given an equal vote, then a small country that invested one million dollars would have as 
much power in making decisions as a country that has subscribed a hundred or a thousand times 
that amount. With the possibility that the number of small countries participating will be much 
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greater than the large countries, a one-vote-one–member arrangement is palpably unwise. On the 
other hand, to accord voting power strictly proportionate to the value of the subscription would 
give the one or two powers control over the Fund. To do that would destroy the truly 
international character of the Fund, and seriously jeopardize its success. Indeed, it is very 
doubtful if many countries would be willing to participate in an international organization with 
wide powers if one or two countries were to be able to control its policies.”205 
 
Considering all the above, it is self-evident that the effect of an increase in basic votes is to 
increase the voting power of those members whose voting power is below the average voting power 
for Fund membership as a whole, and thereby to allow the smallest members to have an increased 
measure of influence in the Fund’s decision-making process. The declining role of basic votes in the 
Bretton Woods institutions is perceived by some as weakening the voice of small developing 
countries in the decision-making process within the Fund. More statistically, in 1955, these “basic 
votes” comprised 14 percent of all votes, yet the successive general increases in quotas have reduced 
the share of basic votes to the present 2 percent. With the increase in quotas, the proportion 
represented by basic votes in the total falls together with a relative raise in the voting power of larger 
countries. With the accession of new members, the total number of basic votes rises, but not 
necessarily their share; nevertheless, the importance of the basic votes of any given member in the 
total continues to diminish. With the nearly 37-fold increase in quotas since then, the share of basic 
votes in the total has declined despite a four-fold growth in membership. This has substantially 
shifted the balance of power in favor of large countries and away from the compromise agreement 
contained in the Articles that was designed to protect the participation of small countries.206 The 
decrease in basic voting share is a reflection of small countries having become more peripheral in the 
decision-making of the IMF in the unipolar world. 
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Figure 2, Relative Importance of Basic Votes, 1945-2003 
 Basic Votes 
 Number of 
Members 
Total Votes Number Percent of Total 
Schedule A/1 45 99,390 11,250 11.3
1958 68 108,930 17,000 15.6
1965 101 179,928 25,250 14.0
1970 115 236,835 28,750 12.1
1976 132 319,714 33,000 10.3
1978 140 432,415 35,000 8.1
1983 145 646,415 36,250 5.6
1990 152 1,387,910 38,000 2.7
1998/2002 183 2,166,040 45,750 2.1
2003 184 2,173,313 46,000 2.1
1) Schedule A refers to schedule A in the Articles of Agreement, as agreed at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 
1944, which entered into force on December 27, 1945. It includes the votes of Denmark, whose initial quota was not 
specified in Schedule A and the former Soviet Union, which did not become a member of the Fund. 2) Including 
countries whose voting power was/is suspended.207 
 
3. The US, Personnel, and IMF Decision-Making 
3.1 The US, Membership and IMF Personnel Selection 
Dexter White worked hard in 1944 to persuade the Soviet Union to join the IMF in the belief 
that economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States would be the key to 
postwar peace and prosperity. The Soviet delegation to Bretton Woods did sign the Articles ad 
referendum, but Joseph Stalin eventually refused to ratify the agreement, apparently because he 
feared (not without justification) that Fund policies would largely be controlled by the West. When 
that tension segued into the Cold War, White’s vision of universal membership was dashed. Poland 
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withdrew from membership in 1950. Four years later, Czechoslovakia was forced to withdraw. 
Shortly after taking power in 1959, Fidel Castro pulled Cuba out. For more than three decades after 
Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong took control of China, the U.S. government blocked efforts 
by the People’s Republic to be seated as China’s representative on the IMF Executive Board. Most 
other countries in the Soviet or Chinese spheres of influence simply did not join.208 The most 
famous example is the expulsion of Czechoslovakia. The US insisted that it did not comply with the 
articles of the Fund, but America’s opinion met with opposition from almost the entire board. In the 
deciding vote on this issue, the opponents abstained. The American executive director at the time, 
however, conceded that “there is no doubt that the majority felt it was unwise to force the issue.”209 
On the selection of the IMF Managing Directors, traditionally the managing director has been 
European, but the US took the lead in the appointing of the first managing director. When a 
managing director’s accomplishments did not meet American expectation, the United States made it 
clear that it would not support a renewal of his tenure. As late as 1963, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer was 
nominated by the American Executive Director.210 
However, the US could not solely decide the appointments of the managing directors in the 
1970s since Europe and many developing states had enhanced their independent economic power 
and organized blocs in the international affairs forums. Europe and the underdeveloped states 
insisted that the representation of the managing director should match the allocation of quotas. 
Though the United States explicitly expressed its dissatisfaction with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer and 
successfully prevented his reappointment, the US was unable to get the nomination of Emil Van 
Lennep past the veto of the G-9, which represented the developing countries. The history of Lennep 
in the OECD demonstrated that he was strongly inclined toward the interests of the developed 
countries. The Executive Board then settled on Johannes Witteveen. When choosing the successor to 
Witteveen, “the G-9 sought involvement in the procedures of selection before the informal floating 
of names through an informal board meeting; they also challenged but then conceded the convention 
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that the managing director should be a European. The choice of Michel Camdessus as managing 
director remained largely a European decision, although the United States indicated that Camdessus 
was an acceptable candidate.”211 
With the tendency toward globalization and the universalization of American culture, US soft 
power has been greatly enhanced after the Cold War. Although several great powers sometimes still 
quarrel on the selection of the managing director, US-leading knowledge and value together with its 
supporters pervade in the Fund’s internal realm. At the beginning of 2000, the US administration 
claimed that the next managing director could be an American, which sparkled a furious debate and 
struggle in the IMF with the result that the Europeans still occupied their traditional status. However, 
the first deputy managing director was more active and in charge of more concrete functions of the 
Fund. As for the IMF claim that Executive Board decision-making was based on consensus, 
Executive Directors understood the unequal distribution of power on the Board that was reflected in 
the Board’s decisions. According to one Executive Director, it was understood that the United States 
had the most powerful presence on the Board. As a result, the Managing Director often regurgitated 
the United States’ position in his statements. Executive Directors were not treated as equals within 
the institution. As previously noted, the US Executive Director received documents and established 
meetings with staff members quicker than other Directors.212 
 Recently, there has developed an original school of thought that focuses more on choosing 
officials from among graduates of institutions that teach in English instead of the rigidly 
geographical standard---such as favoring South Asia over East Asia, or Britain over other European 
countries, with the result that the graduates mostly come from the United States or the UK. 
Therefore, US “knowledge” is embedded in both international financial institutions and is yet 
another instrument through which US economic and political interests are furthered. Today, in the 
IMF, the staff is overwhelmingly US or UK trained in economics and finance. In national terms in 
1968, an analysis of senior staff in the IMF revealed that 32 of 54 were from four English-speaking 
countries: 23 from the United States, 6 from the UK, 2 from Canada, and 1 from Australia.213 A 
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much more recent research reports, although the nationality of staff had been diversified so that 41 
percent of staff were from English-speaking industrialized countries, some 90 percent of those with 
Ph.D.’s received from the United States or Canada were among those being hired at the time of the 
study.214 
 
3.2 The Limited Change of IMF Decision-making 
The limited change in the decision-making process in the 1960s and the 1970s reflected the 
relative decrease in the American role in the Fund. It was clear by the 1970s that, even on major 
policy issues, that the United States needed the backing of other key players within the International 
Monetary Fund, since the Europeans, under the First Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement, 
ensured that significant decisions required a special majority of 85 percent, and thereby theoretically 
granting the European Community an effective veto over those decisions. Special 
majorities—essentially exceptions to the general rule that decisions in the Fund were made by 
majority vote—grew in importance from the First Amendment of the Articles (1969) to the Second 
Amendment (1978). It was under the Second Amendment that two special majorities—70 and 85 
percent—were finally confirmed as required for decisions of particular significance. What must be 
emphasized here is that the amendments cannot be regarded as a change of openness because the 
openness of an international organization is established by its basic organizing principles. However, 
as Kahler pointed out, it was clear by the 1970s that even on major policy issues the United States 
needed the backing of other key players within the International Monetary Fund.215 
The European and the developing states tried to use the special majorities leverage to protect 
their national interest within the Fund. The leverage, with new reserves and quota redistribution, 
reflected the trend of power redistribution since the 1960s. Actually, the First Amendment itself 
resulted from the bargaining that took place between the US and the European states. The 
negotiations between the US and France finally lead to the Jamaica Accords and the Second 
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. Other bargaining between the US and Europe also 
prevented the emergence of a substitution account in the late 1970s. Although US influence 
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decreased in the Fund, the IMF was not dissolved or set aside. The United States found it sometimes 
became the minority, and a long-time observer of the Fund, Frederick K. Lister, claimed that the US 
lost in the staff salary matter for the first time in the early 1970s. He commented that the Europeans 
and the developing states had been capable of influencing decision-making though the US still 
retained a number of leverages it could use to impose its preference on other countries. As Lister 
notes, “increasing awareness of the role of special majorities has spread throughout the Fund’s 
membership, partly because smaller countries participating in voting blocs have now gained a better 
grasp of how such blocs can exercise veto powers in specific circumstances.”216 
Another point of view regarding the revision of decision-making rules argues that the US 
supported the 85 percent majority procedure in order to obtain sole veto power instead of having to 
make great effort to coordinate with the other member states. However, though the developing states 
and Europe could also exercise veto power at the same time, under most circumstances they were 
unable to consolidate their votes in order to do so. Therefore, only the US has exercised sole veto 
power and thus successfully exerted this power. However, the changes in voting power distribution 
more or less indicated that US influence on the IMF has declined from the peak of 1950. 
Consequently, the US would have to rely more on its negotiating capability to persuade other great 
powers while losing its sole decision-maker status. Therefore, first G-5, then G7, became an 
important instrument for bringing the western powers together in informal and secret discussions.217 
 
4. The US, New Reserves and the SDR 
Along with the independence of many Third World states came their request to establish a new 
international economic order so as to obtain more development funding from the international 
financial institutions under liberal conditions. Their efforts turned out to be profitable in the 1960s 
and the 1970s. The emergence of these new funds further decreased the US influence in the IMF 
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because, compared with the past, it was harder to control all these new funds to favor its strategic 
aims. The establishment of the new reserves can be considered in nature as the enlargement of the 
openness of the Fund. On the one hand, its advent contributes to the relative decline of American 
power. For instance, America lost many instruments of material incentives to influence other states’ 
attitudes in the decision-making process. The developing countries and their alliances turned out to 
be more independent and pursued their own political and economic objectives. On the other hand, 
the decrease in quotas and voting power also hurt the US status. The quota distribution rule is the 
fundamental organizing principle of the Fund; thus, any change will certainly lead to organizational 
reforms within the Fund. 
 
4.1 The Emergence of New Funds (1960s-1985) 
Since the mid-1960s, a number of new facilities have been created so as to facilitate 
development mainly in the less developed countries. Some of these recognize the special situation of 
Third World countries and thus facilitate their access to the Fund’s resources. By 1980, the Fund had 
established three permanent facilities and some affiliated facilities that provided additional funds for 
less developed member states: the Compensatory Finance Facility (1963), the Buffer Stock 
Financing Facility (1968) (the limits to which were trimmed back after the quota increase), the 
Extended Fund Facility (1974), the Oil Facilities (1974-6), the Supplementary Financing Facility 
(1979-82), and a Trust Fund (1978) for low-income developing countries financed by its gold 
sales.218  
 
The Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF) was established in 1963. It provides access to the 
Fund’s resources without the usual restrictions, and beyond normal limits.219 Its objective is to meet 
short-term export fluctuations beyond the control of the member states. For instance, since 1979, due 
to shortfalls in travel receipts or workers’ remittances, and since 1981, due to the excess in the cost 
of cereal imports, the uncontrollable situation repeated itself several times. In each case, balance of 
payments deterioration is measured as a deviation from a five-year trend. Until 1984, the maximum 
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that could be borrowed was 100 percent of quota under either the export shortfall facility or the 
excess in cereal import cost facility, subject to a joint limit of 125 percent in total. Drawings under 
the CFF are payable between three to five years afterwards. They do not reduce the ability of 
members to borrow under facilities discussed earlier since those are designed to deal with 
longer-term balance of payments problems. The CFF drawings also carry less conditionality though, 
once they exceed 50 percent of quota, members are required to satisfy the Fund that they are taking 
appropriate steps to rectify their balance of payments problems. 
 
The Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) was established in 1969 to provide 
assistance to members in connection with their contributions to international buffer stocks of 
primary products, and operates within the context of approved international commodity agreements 
(ICAs). The BSFF was the Fund's contribution to the international community's efforts to stabilize 
commodity prices that were seen at the time as excessively volatile, with damaging consequences for 
the stability of export earnings of developing countries heavily dependent on commodity exports. 
The BSFF provides support in the context of those ICAs whose objective is the stabilization of 
international prices through market intervention through the use of buffer stocks, and that satisfy 
certain participation requirements adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council that 
require, in particular, that they be open to participation of both consuming and producing countries, 
and that they do not maintain artificially high prices through long-term restrictions in supply.220 
In 1974, the IMF introduced the Extended Facility that provides members with longer-term 
funding for supply-oriented programs designed to meet balance of payments problems.221 Funds can 
be drawn in phases over three years and repaid between four and a half to ten years afterwards. 
Conditionality is similar to that in upper credit tanches of the regular lending facility, but covers a 
broader range of policies reflecting the fact that programs are longer and geared more toward 
production. The maximum that could originally be borrowed under this facility was 140 percent of 
quota subject to a combined total borrowing under this and the credit tranches of 165 percent of the 
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member’s quota.  
Even though the above facilities had been created and applied toward the end of the 1970s, it 
was apparent that what could be borrowed from the Fund under these facilities was much too limited 
relative to the size of the balance of payment deficits that members were experiencing. Accordingly, 
in addition to these three permanent facilities, a number of temporary facilities, some of them 
exclusively related to developing countries, were also organized within the IMF.222 The most 
important of these is the Trust Fund. At the IMF’s meeting in Jamaica in 1976, agreement was 
reached to sell one-sixth of the IMF’s gold holdings and to use the proceeds to create a special fund 
for less developed countries. In addition to loans from the Trust Fund, the LDCs also received direct 
disbursements of $362.6 million, equal to 27.7 percent of the profits from the sale of IMF gold. The 
Trust Fund was the first example of something resembling global taxation. 
Furthermore, additional facilities were introduced and financed by borrowing from surplus 
countries. Between 1979 and 1982 the Supplementary Financing Facility provided additional credit 
to members whose needs exceeded what was available in the credit tranch and extended facilities. It 
has since been replaced by the Enlarged Access Policy that works in an almost identical fashion and 
is also financed by borrowing. Drawings under either are fixed in proportion to funds being made 
available under the regular or extended facilities. For example, if a member is drawing on the 
Extended facility, then funds are made available from these facilities in the ratio of 1:1 until the 
combined use of upper credit tranches and Extended Facility reaches 140 percent of quota (202.5 
percent under a standby arrangement). 
By late 1982, it became apparent that the Fund’s resources were rapidly becoming inadequate to 
meet the huge increase in Third World demands being placed upon them. Clear evidence of this 
could be seen in a sharp deterioration, in excess of SDR 11 billion, in the Fund’s own liquidity in 
1982/1983. A large increase in quotas would go some way toward providing less fortunate, poorer 
Third World countries with greater access to badly needed imports and, in the process, expand world 
trade. Many Third World countries and sympathizers believed that the best way to expand Fund 
resources was to significantly raise quotas. Expanding the Fund’s ordinary resources in this way 
would permit members to borrow much more cheaply than they could by drawing on resources that 
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the Fund had borrowed under special arrangements. The American government, in particular, was 
opposed to such a move. Being reluctant to support expansionist financing of this magnitude, it 
preferred instead to see a greater emphasis on “adjustment” and avoidance of measures that would 
dilute conditionality. It was not particularly sympathetic to arguments about the declining relative 
importance of IMF quotas, being content to see an expanded role for privately generated liquidity, 
especially when the bulk of it involved the dollar. Originally, it seemed to reject all but very small 
quota increases, but eventually, under pressure from both European members of the Fund, who 
tended to take an intermediate position, and from the US banking community, which was grappling 
with what appeared to be an imminent threat of default by Mexico, it relented. In February 1983, the 
Interim Committee agreed to a 47.5 percent increase, to SDR 90 billion, in aggregate quotas. 
In order to prevent increases in quotas under the 1983 Eighth General Review of Quotas from 
enabling individual countries to have greater access to both unconditional IMF financing and to IMF 
financing in general, the US sought to limit borrowing under the Enlarged Access Policy to 102 
percent of quota in any one year with a declining proportion in subsequent years. Third World 
countries fought to maintain the 150-450 percent arrangement so that quota increases would give 
them an increase in borrowing ability proportionate to their increase in quota, while other 
industrialized capitalist countries took a middle position arguing for a limit of 135 percent of quota 
that would give borrowers an average increase of 22.5 percent in access to resources. Eventually, and 
despite Third World opposition, it was agreed that the a 102 percent maximum over three years (and 
a cumulative limit of 408 percent) would apply in most cases, effectively reducing the borrowing 
ability of 108 of the 146 IMF members to below what they could borrow under old quotas and old 
limits. Since the increased quota allocation was not a proportionate one across the board, Third 
World countries had in any case ended up with a lower share of total quotas than previously. The net 
result of these two developments was that “low-income” countries, for instance, had had their annual 
borrowing ability reduced from a theoretical maximum of SDR 6.5 billion to SDR 5.8 billion or by 
11 percent.223 
However, the debt crisis since 1982 forced the United States to develop “new road maps.”224 In 
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order to reduce the burden of the heavily indebted countries, particularly its client states, the US and 
other creditor countries insisted on debt renegotiation and rescheduling. As a result, the IMF created 
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) in 1987. The creation of a Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) in 1993 to respond to the 
economic crises of Central Europe, the Baltic Countries, and the former Soviet Union provides more 
loans to those countries. The constant shaping and reshaping of the Fund’s loan policies since the 
mid-1980s has benefited the developing countries by allowing them to enjoy increased leverage in 
the bargaining process.225 
 
4.2 The Rise and Fall of SDRs (1970-2000) 
The initiatives for a new reserve system originated outside the United States, although the 
debate only began to be serious once the United States became convinced of the need for reform. 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had lectured US President Kennedy very shortly after his 
election on how a “united free world was more likely to be achieved through joint monetary and 
economic policies” than through political or military alliances. He believed the prevailing monetary 
system, in which the United States “had all the marbles,” to be fundamentally unfair.226 In 1962, the 
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, set out a scheme for a “multiple currency 
account,” in which countries would acquire the currency of another country or countries that were 
temporarily in surplus and as a result establish claims on the account. Later a scheme similar to that 
of the British came from the veteran Greek Central Bank President Xenophon Zolotas, but did not 
encounter a substantially more enthusiastic reception. 227 In 1963, Edward Bernstein, the former 
Director of the Fund’s Research Department, proposed a more adequately balanced composite 
reserve unit consisting of the 11 currencies of the GAB (General Agreements to Borrow) countries. 
The IMF took up the debate and produced a study in 1964 that suggested that the need for 
international liquidity could not be met simply by adding more gold or foreign reserve assets. 228 
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During late the 1960s and early 1970s, considerable debate took place over an appropriate way 
of distributing SDRs, with developing countries favoring the establishment of a “link” between the 
SDR allocation and the provision of foreign aid. 229 In May 1966, the Group of Thirty-One 
Developing Countries insisted that “monetary management and cooperation should be truly 
international and …all countries, which are prepared to share in both the benefits and obligations of 
such new monetary arrangements as may be devised, should be eligible to participate in the creation 
of new reserve assets.”230 In a similar vein, on the IMF’s Executive Board, the representatives of 
developing countries insisted that “all countries, not only the economically big ones,” should be 
involved in the discussion of reform.231 
Under such circumstances, the IMF arranged joint meetings between the G-10 deputies and the 
Fund’s Executive Board as a forum for the discussion of reserve creation in 1966. At the very 
beginning of the meeting, the discussion about the name of the new reserves—composite reserve 
unit, suggested a clear challenge to the position of the US dollar and might offend American 
sensibilities. Germany and France produced a vigorous criticism of the US position as openly 
dominating. French politicians focused on the reserve issue and insisted on the preeminent role of 
gold as a means of countering the American challenge. French Finance Minister Valery Giscard 
D’Estaing announced at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in 1964: “the World 
Monetary system must be set in concentric circles: the first one being gold, and then, the second, if 
necessary, recourse to deliberate and concerted creation of either reserve assets or credit facilities. 
The inner circle is gold. Experience in recent years has shown us that, aside from any theoretical 
preference, gold remains the essential basis of the world’s payments system.”232 In July 1967, after 
heated discussions and debate, the word “reserve” was dropped from the discussion of the composite 
reserve unit and the concept was rephrased as a “special drawing right” or SDR. 
With regard to the opinions of the Group of 77, instead of allocating resources through 
international financial organizations such as the IMF, a direct distribution of money was preferred. 
Developed states, especially the United States and Germany, rejected a link between development 
aid and the creation of new reserve assets, meanwhile the United States and the United Kingdom 
                                                        
229 Graham Bird, IMF Lending to Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence, New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 82. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p. 166. 
232 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p. 166. 
preferred to shape the new reserve in such a way that it would be readily accepted in place of gold. 
Another representative thought came from France that was eager to retain gold as the heart of the 
international monetary system and strongly preferred that the new unit be more like credit than like 
money. The final result of the bargaining among these countries was boiled down to a compromise. 
Firstly, the essence of the SDR was defined as a blend of both a reserve asset and a credit, and 
secondly, the distribution of SDRs should be according to IMF quotas. The LDCs had wanted 28 
percent of the initial allocations, which was considerably higher than the amount they would have 
received based on their share of world trade (9%) or world GNP (14%). Thus, while the LDCs did 
not get a clear link between development financing and the creation of new international liquidity, 
they were able to share in the resources provided by the creation of the SDR.233 
After the specific features of the SDR had been decided on, the difficult question of what voting 
power would be required for implementing the plan and for any decision to create more SDRs 
thereafter had to be answered. The majority of 85 percent of the total voting power of the Board of 
Governors was agreed on.234 
However, the SDR department is, in essence, funded almost entirely by the United States. Over 
the last ten years, American lending has averaged $4.1 billion, virtually matching developing country 
borrowing of $3.8 billion. Over the last three years, (from 2002 to 2004) American loans have risen 
to more than $5 billion, exceeding developing country borrowing by $1.4 billion. The other 
industrialized countries as a group are actually net borrowers from the SDR Department in the 
amount of approximately $4 billion. The only other significant supplier of funds is Japan, which 
contributes financing of approximately $1.3 billion.235 
The US agreed to establish SDRs mainly to relieve the pressure imposed by the fixed rate for 
the dollar. However, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the United States needn’t bear 
the pressure for gold-dollar transactions, and the SDR became less important and lost American 
support. The proportion of SDRs in world reserve, since the 1980s, continuously dropped such that 
by the end of 2000 it only accounted for 1.175% of the whole, which means that at this time the SDR 
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plays a very limited role as a reserve asset: its main function is to serve as the unit of account of the 
IMF and some other international organizations. However, the share of SDRs seems to be 
incompatible with its so-called international reserve assets.236 To pursue the point further, some 
American scholars even insist that US should reduce support for the SDR further. In their eyes, “the 
developing countries receive SDRs, exchange them for US dollars and spend the proceeds. The US, 
that has no use for SDRs, simply accumulates an ever-growing stockpile of costly pieces of 
paper.”237 
 
Figure 2, Share of SDRs in World Reserves, 1970–2000238 
 
 
5. The US, the BWS, Conditionality, and IMF Lending 
After examining the Quotas, and Personnel and New Reserves, this case explores the 
operating rules of the Fund in detail. The Bretton Woods System (BWS) served as the fundamental 
monetary institution; however, it collapsed in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the IMF continues to play a 
critical role in the international financial system for international monetary stability through its 
lending to countries with a deficit in foreign exchange. The BWS has been the token of American 
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hegemony; the change of conditionality, and US impact on the lending process reflected the 
evolution of American hegemony. 
 
5.1 The US and the Bretton Woods System 
The Bretton Woods meeting was the first conference to establish a permanent international 
institutional and a legal framework for ensuring cooperation between states, requiring commitments 
by states to limit their sovereignty for the sake of cooperation and to observe specified rules in 
economic intercourse.239 It is firmly believed that only after the end of World War II when an all-out 
mobilization of resources had been called for that the countries around the world, after having 
suffered from an unprecedented disaster, came to hold a common belief in overall economic 
objectives, which contributed to the realization of a supranational cooperation. By the same token, 
more than any other postwar international organizations, the International Monetary Fund was 
viewed by successive American administrations as a linchpin of the international economic order.240 
While we go beyond the fundamental consensus of this international project and explore more 
deeply the essence of the Bretton Woods system, it is almost undoubted that instead of simply 
serving a legitimating function, it was mainly the creation of America, and represents the American 
institutional interest on the World economic arena. Therefore, the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods 
System (BWS) has spontaneously been reckoned as the symbol of the ups and downs of the 
American hegemony.  
At the very beginning of the establishment of the Bretton Woods System, the core of it was 
composed of two international institutions. The first institution was the international monetary 
system based on fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates, an officially maintained gold price of $35 an 
ounce, for which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was, in reality, given formal responsibility. 
The United States used its economic resources and political influence to assure the early success of 
that monetary system. The second one is the Dollar-Standard international monetary system 
established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. The IMF actually was employed by the United 
States to govern this system. The Dollar-Standard institution brought tremendous income to the 
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United States, and thus benefited hegemonic maintenance, e.g., during the Vietnam War, the 
inflationary burden was transferred to other states and the U.S. could enlarge the circulation of 
dollars without worrying about its domestic economic situation. 
Although the Bretton Woods System originally depended on the concepts of universality, 
equality, and progressive liberalization,241 it sometimes turned out to be the opposite because of the 
United States’ hegemony. More specifically, the USSR did not become a member of IMF until 1992 
when it had actually been replaced by Russia, which greatly reduced the universal character of the 
IMF and handed the United States almost uncontrollable power. Moreover, as is well known, 
although the Bretton Woods System had been based on the principle of the equality of currencies, in 
practice some currencies came to be much more important in the international system than others. 
With regard to liberalization, vested interests in many of the participating countries, particularly 
those of United States, soon came into being to deal with specific issues. The United States adopted 
a more and more dollar-centered view of the world that was more compatible with a different 
intellectual tradition than that which had led to Bretton Woods.242 With its enormous economic 
power, which accounted for almost half of the world’s industrial production in 1945, it ensured that 
its point of view influenced the operation of the whole system. The United Kingdom desperately 
clung to its belief that the pound sterling should serve as an international reserve currency and, as a 
consequence, became an obstacle to international liberalization. In addition, concerning the situation 
of France, which felt unhappy with the increasingly American-dominated postwar developments, it 
was declared ineligible to use the resources of the IMF because it was operating multiple exchange 
rates in contravention of the Articles of Agreement.243 
One of the striking features of the postwar world was a rediscovery of national interest that 
resulted a decreased willingness to tolerate a system of externally imposed rules. To some extent, it 
was such special conditions that allowed a state, which has both the willingness and the power, to 
extend its influence to the widest range. Just like Armand Van Dormael stated, the consensus at 
Bretton Woods was overshadowed, already at the conference itself, by an aggressive and assertive 
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manipulation of the proceedings in the direction of the US national interest.244 Moreover, evidence 
existed in the report of the conversation between the two principal U.S. figures concerning the 
location of the Fund headquarters. Morgenthau told White, “now the advantage is ours here, and I 
personally think we should take it.” White replied, “if the advantage was theirs, they would take 
it.”245 During the conference, the incessant struggle for checking the assertion of national interest 
was witnessed as well while idealism didn’t result in realistic behavior. In the rules versus discretion 
balance, the weight had already shifted significantly to discretion, and consequently greater scope 
for the realities of power politics. 
Because of the trade deficits with Europe and Japan, and mainly the direct involvement in the 
Vietnam War beginning in 1965, the US economy and national power became relatively feeble in the 
maintenance of the BWS. In early 1968, the longstanding arrangement in which gold was bought 
and sold in one market for all transactions (private as well as official) collapsed. Two separate 
markets were established for gold transactions, one for official transactions at $35 an ounce and one 
for private transactions at a price to be determined in the free markets. Subsequently, there was a 
gradual rise in the free market price that was many times the official price. The shortage in its gold 
reserve led to the abandonment of the fixed rate system by the United States during the Nixon 
Administration in the early 1970s because the system no longer suited American interests. The 
United States itself had balance of payments deficits that were exceedingly large in relation to the 
size of its official gold holdings. Two pillars of the Articles of Agreement—the fixed exchanging 
rates system and the gold convertibility of the dollar—crumbled. Consequently, in August 1971, the 
classical Bretton Woods system came to an end. The par value system was killed by mutual 
disagreements and recriminations about who should adjust—in other words, because of the absence 
of a truly effective mechanism for multilateral surveillance.246 As Harold James put it, there are 
mainly three reasons for the collapse: first, on the most general level, because of insufficient 
flexibility in the system. Exchange rates had hardened, a discussion of alteration had become 
impossible outside of the dramatic circumstances of a major crisis, and other sorts of adjustments 
(for instance, in fiscal policy) were too politically contentious. Second, the immediate disturbance 
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that destroyed the system had a particular cause, the monetary expansion of the United States in the 
late 1960s associated with the Viet Nam War, and a very loose approach to monetary policy in the 
face of an exchange crisis in 1971. Third, the trigger that demonstrated the incompatibility of 
different national policy stances within the system was provided by the larger flows of capital.247 
Generally speaking, an international system requires compromise from the states, sometimes 
even a transfer of their sovereignty, to stabilize the international cooperation environment. As noted 
above, after the end of World War II, when most of the countries reached a consensus that “revival” 
and “development” were the critical tasks, naturally, negotiations went smoothly as expected. With 
the passage of time, during the 1970s, when the exterior environment gradually tended to be 
peaceful and stable, states became increasingly committed to domestic growth with less tolerance for 
concessions. On the other hand, the technological forces that were driving economic growth in the 
developed countries, for instance the United States, required internationalization of the goods 
markets as well as the capital market. Therefore, the crisis of the Bretton Woods system can be 
reckoned as a particular and very dramatic instance of the clash of national economic regulation with 
the logic of internationalism. Under the circumstances that existed in 1971, the disruption of the 
system followed very obviously and directly from the policies of the United States.  
The course of events followed a predictable logic. Once the United States decided to use the 
system for the sake of power politics, other members would legitimately object, the markets would 
realize the unsustainability of the divergent national positions, and begin to prepare for a collapse of 
the parity structure. It would then only be a matter of time before the country that had tried to 
manipulate the rules realized that it could not continue that operation forever; and once that 
happened, it would be prepared to act more broadly to attack the system as a whole, as no longer 
suiting or serving its interests.248 
In sum, the original vision of Bretton Woods had included a substantial and long-term control 
of capital movements across national frontiers. By the end of the 1960s, such regulation was 
unthinkable to the major of the players in international finance. Critics pointed out how the operation 
of the international monetary system in the 1950s and the 1960s had allowed the United States to 
pile up assets throughout the world. In a discussion of the repercussions of the Nixon shock, one 
                                                        
247 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p. 205. 
248 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p. 207. 
Executive Director of the IMF referred to the $166 billion in US assets throughout the world as 
“greater than the total amount of the Marshall Plan and US foreign aid combined.”249 Capital 
movements had become not only one of the features of the international market, but also came to be 
widely regarded as one of the tools of power politics.250  
As a matter of fact, the IMF has been the core component of the Bretton Woods System, and 
after 1971 it inherited the legacy of this institution. The collapse of the BWS reflected the relative 
decline of American hegemony, and accordingly, the purpose and function of the IMF varied in some 
respects. The United States and the dollar could not command a predominant role as before in the 
IMF and the world economy. Nevertheless, the United States and the dollar respectively have 
continued to be the main actor and basic element of the floating monetary system. Therefore, the 
American role has changed from being the greatest impact to being a great one. After twenty years of 
relative decline, the American economy revived and renewed its greatest impact on the IMF through 
other means without rebuilding this system.  
 
5.2 The US and Conditionality Change  
When a country borrows from the IMF, its government makes commitments regarding 
economic and financial policies—a requirement known as conditionality. Through conditionality, the 
U.S. and other western developed states can legitimately require domestic political and economic 
reforms to support their strategic goals. The conditionality change, to some extent, could reflect the 
change in the U.S. role in the Fund. The relative decline of the hegemon has led to looser 
conditionality because with the prominent economic growth in Europe, financing from the European 
markets through private banks became more and more important to the deficit countries, and the role 
of the IMF in financing current account deficits became peripheral for all but the poorest developing 
countries or those without access to private markets. 251 
The United States has persistently advocated restrictive conditionality. Although in practice, 
loans to the developing countries sometimes could be extended for longer periods and some 
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conditionality terms have been relaxed under special conditions, ultimately speaking, they can just 
win some marginal battles when confronting the United States as the other player. On the other hand, 
the Fund remains firmly committed to the norm that it can negotiate policy conditions with 
borrowing countries instead of making an arbitrary demand. The question of conditionality has 
persisted since the founding of the Fund. During the Bretton Woods negotiations, the British took the 
position that the Fund should respond passively to the requests initiated by central banks, only 
making a judgment about whether a country would actually be able to repay. Although the United 
States pressed for conditionality, no explicit provision was included in the Articles of Agreement. 
Over time, however, the United States, which was the major source of IMF resources, prevailed. The 
IMF’s executive board accepted conditionality in 1952. Binding conditions were introduced in 1958. 
The Articles of Agreement were formally amended in 1969. The basic norm that emerged was that 
members would have free access to their first credit tranche (equal to 25 percent of their quota), but 
that borrowing from higher credit tranches would be subject to increasingly stringent conditions with 
regard to national economic policy and performance. Among the newer Fund facilities, borrowing 
from the Extended Facility and the Supplementary Finance Facility was subject to high 
conditionality. By the late 1970s, increased borrowing had pressed countries into the higher credit 
tranches, compelling them to negotiate standby agreements.252 
Jacques de Larosiere, who became managing director of the Fund in 1978, states in a number 
of speeches that the Fund would have to make loans for longer periods and that conditionality 
requirements would have to be reasonably liberal. He averred, “we have to cope with their problems 
and consider them with a little more than just sympathy. We have to try and do something.”253 These 
changes in policy were accompanied by alterations in the behavior of the IMF. For the period 
1979-1981, there was a significant increase in the percentage of multiyear loans. Also, a higher 
proportion of loans were approved without requiring prior devaluation, a distasteful condition for 
perspective borrowers, which is frequently provided for in standby agreements. Access to Fund 
resources in the credit tranches was normally provided through a stand-by arrangement, which is a 
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kind of important conditionality and strongly supported by the United States. The normal period for 
a stand-by arrangement could range from 12 to 18 months. The stand-by arrangement could be 
extend beyond this range, up to a maximum of three years.254 This arrangement still supports 
American power in the IMF. 
Even though there were some concrete changes in policy and behavior, it is far from enough to 
herald a long-term trend toward greater liberty. After June 1981, the Fund tightened conditionality. 
The changes corresponded with changes in American policy. The Reagan administration strongly 
opposed liberalizing conditionality though conceded the necessity for additional resources in the 
form of a quota increase. Under Secretary of the Treasury Beryl Sprinkel stated that, “we want to 
push the IMF’s conditionality back to where it was.”255 The US efforts proved successful after it 
lived through the relative decline of hegemony and during the Asian Crisis period, the US strongly 
supported the Fund to adopt radically liberal measures for the states in dangerous situations. Because 
Section Five will discuss the influence of US policy during the economic crises in detail, only the 
return to conditionality after the mid-1980s is discussed here. 
 
5.3 The US and IMF Lending Process 
In Addition to the conditionality associated with lending, the negotiating process can also 
influence the outcome of a IMF lending decision. In the determination of parameters for country 
programs—size of drawing and conditions attached to the various tranches—approval by the United 
States was critical, and in the first decade of the IMF, negotiations between the United States and 
countries seeking assistance sometimes excluded the Fund staff. As Southard describes, “in the 
1950s the US voice in the Fund was decisive—indeed a task of the US executive Director was to 
keep that voice muted so as not to frustrate Board and Management/staff activity. The practical 
question in those years, in any prospective large use of Fund resources, was whether the United 
States would agree—and the answer was usually obtained by direct inquiry.”256 The most famous 
example of the US position in the Fund was the negotiations between the United States and Britain. 
American negotiators believed that the British request for $ 750 million was insufficient, and thus 
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agreed to a $ 1.3 billion drawing by Britain. This clearly reflected the central US role in setting the 
terms and amounts of financing available through the IMF.257 
After the relative decline of US quotas and voting power, the US had to bargain and negotiate 
for its preference. A loan agreement between the IMF and a country is usually negotiated through 
four phrases: initiation, internal preparation, negotiation, and review of a letter of intent. The 
negotiation phase is the most crucial. In the negotiation process, the IMF’s internal ratification 
politics are important. The relationship between the executive board and the managing director is 
particularly significant. The American Delegation makes frequent direct contacts with the 
management, staff, and the offices of Executive Directors within the Fund, either individually or in 
groups. The US Treasury also uses bilateral relations, the G-7 framework, to garner support for 
positions in the IMF.  
Early work by Stiles did find evidence that not all borrowers were treated equally and that large 
and important countries received favorable treatment in terms of the design of conditionality.258 
Thacker finds that ideological proximity to the United States exerted a positive effect on the 
probability of receiving IMF loans and that such political factors enhanced the ability of models to 
explain IMF lending.259 A similar effect of the US is found by Barro and Lee who argue that the 
effect does not extend to other industrial countries.260 Although measured in a different way, the 
“US factor” is confirmed by Stone in his analysis of IMF lending to transition economies during the 
1990s. He also found that other industrial countries do not exert a similar influence.261 
On the other hand, the Third World has enhanced its negotiating capability in the IMF. An 
example of the increasing influence of the Third World within the International Monetary Fund was 
the creation of the Committee of Twenty in mid-1972. This group was charged with studying basic 
reforms in the international monetary system. It was composed of governors of the Fund. Nine of its 
members came from the Third World. Prior to the creation of the Committee of Twenty, discussions 
had been carried out by the Committee of Ten, whose members were drawn exclusively from 
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industrialized countries.262 
The emergence of competing blocs further eliminated the influence of the US in the Fund. For 
instance, America could not bloc all the large Fund standbys that it was dissatisfied with. The Indian 
economy had been dominated by state-owned enterprises and excluded private economic power. Its 
economic policy was also nationalistic and tended strongly to provide protection to its homemade 
industrial products. The US had been advocating private enterprise, a free market, and international 
free trade as the principles of the IMF’s conditionality. However, in 1981, the Fund approved a $5.8 
billion standby under a three-year Extended Fund Facility for India, the largest given to that date, 
and larger than drawings by industrialized countries such as Great Britain and Italy. The Reagan 
administration, in refusing to vote in favor of the loan at the IMF executive board meeting in 1981, 
cited the lack of strict conditionality as one reason for disapproval.263 The U.S. executive director 
abstained on the final vote when it became apparent that there would not be enough votes to block 
the loan.264 Subsequently, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
in 1990, the US perception of India changed. American policy makers showed growing interest in 
economic and security cooperation with India. As a result, unlike the 1981 loan negotiation, the 
United States showed willingness to cooperate with the efforts of the IMF and other industrialized 
countries in bailing India out of its balance of payments crisis. This change in US policy meant that 
any IMF loan negotiation with the Indian government would not meet with opposition from the most 
important member. Needless to say, the US willingness to cooperate contributed to a widening of the 
IMF’s successful loans.265 
Additionally, there is also evidence that sympathetic governments of countries considered to be 
of strategic importance to the United States have, on occasion, received favored treatment from 
multilateral institutions. Thus, the IMF showed remarkable flexibility in renewing its assistance to 
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the Sudan in the years 1981 to 1985 in the face of repeated contraventions of the terms of its 
agreements. This was in response to pressure from the US government that even went so far as to 
divert its bilateral aid to the repayment of Sudan’s arrears to the IMF so as to permit the Fund to 
continue to enter into negotiations and agreements with the Sudan.266 
In addition, when South Africa drew on IMF assistance in 1982, at the same time, it 
experienced a sharp fall in export volume and prices due to the global recession and again mounted 
political opposition to the apartheid policies that undermined the confidence of foreign private 
investors. The decision to grant loans from the IMF was very controversial; so controversial that an 
Executive Board meeting was leaked to the anti-apartheid movement, giving outsiders a unique 
insight into the internal debate and the eventual informal voting pattern among Executive Directors. 
It appears that despite opposition from no less than 68 countries, assistance was finally approved by 
countries holding 51.9% of total IMF votes. The US, in particular, was strongly in favor, arguing that 
assistance was justified on financial grounds and on the basis of need.267 Yet several of the 
Executive Directors, representing mainly Third World countries, argued that the request should have 
been denied on purely technical grounds. The need for assistance was questioned in the light of 
South Africa’s huge gold reserve and its capacity at that time to borrow in the private capital market, 
given its credit worthiness and its very low (7.9%) debt servicing ratio.268  
Many analysts observed the revival of the US influence on IMF lending through the informal 
channel including material incentives or soft power attraction. For instance, Calomiris talked about 
the political factors in the recent lending process. “Ecuador has been suffering a deepening fiscal 
crisis for several years caused by the combination of an unresolved internal policy struggle, adverse 
economic shocks to its terms of trade, and a poorly regulated banking system… As yet, there is no 
consensus for reform in Ecuador, and there is no reason to believe that reforms will be produced by a 
few hundreds of millions of IMF dollars. Why in the world is the IMF sending money to Ecuador? 
Some observes claim that IMF aid to Ecuador is best understood as a means of sending political 
payola to the Ecuadorian government at a time when the United States wishes to ensure continuing 
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use of its military bases there monitoring drug traffic.” Another example is Pakistan. “A 
knowledgeable insider informs me that the U.S. government has told Pakistan that its access to IMF 
subsidized lending depends on its willingness to sign a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. According to 
this person, unless Pakistan agrees, the U.S. will block its IMF program.”269 The following Section 6 
elaborates on the US impact on the IMF’s reaction to the East Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
6. The US, IMF and East Asian Financial Crisis 
The IMF is not objective in the application of its own criteria. Double standards have been 
applied to similar situations. Examples show that certain countries, because of their geographical 
situation, international weight or political orientation, receive more lenient treatment than others.270 
The policy of the U.S. in the Asian Financial Crisis greatly influenced the Fund’s attitude to the 
sufferer. The logic is very simple: the money usually comes from the United States. According to the 
Fund’s website, the IMF can only use the currencies of financially strong economies to finance 
lending. The IMF Executive Board selects these currencies every three months. Most are issued by 
industrial countries, but the list also has included currencies of developing countries such as 
Botswana, China, and India. The IMF holdings of these currencies, together with its own SDR 
holdings, make up its usable resources. The amount the IMF has readily available for new 
(non-concessional) lending is indicated by its one-year forward commitment capacity. This is 
determined by its usable resources, plus projected loan repayments over the subsequent twelve 
months, less the resources that have already been committed under existing arrangements, less a 
precautionary balance. As of August 31, 2005, the Fund’s one-year forward commitment capacity 
was $137 billion.271 While facing some great crisis, the Fund’s capacity is too limited to deal with 
the situation and dependent on aid from great powers, especially the United States. The US impact 
on the IMF’s diagnosis and remedies for the East Asian Crisis that erupted in 1997 is examined here.  
The IMF was widely seen in East Asia as having performed poorly in the financial crises of 
1997 and 1998. Many of the arguments raised about the IMF performance before and during the East 
Asian financial crisis are criticisms of US policy and power and how they were exercised. The 
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criticism involved many aspects. For instance, it initially interpreted the crisis incorrectly, and it 
forced countries to adopt macroeconomic and structural policies that did not support confidence and 
recovery. Rather than being credited as a key independent player, it was seen as US-run and 
dominated, ideological and inflexible, and obsessed with protecting its own bureaucratic interests. 
Asian countries were upset at the time by the United States’ apparent two-faced position on hedge 
funds. On the one hand, the United States vigorously denied that the New York-based macro hedge 
funds and proprietary trading desks of international investment banks and securities firms played a 
particular destabilizing role in the Asian currency and equity markets in 1997 and 1998, in spite of 
the size and concentration of those positions and evidence of market manipulation. However, on the 
other hand, it organized a bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) because of the 
concern that unwinding that hedge fund’s positions could have a negative impact on US financial 
prices, markets, and institutions in September 1998. Some in the region also felt this to be implicitly 
racist or at least anti-Asian; the 1998 IMF study on hedge funds was also viewed widely in the 
region as a whitewash of the issues (a sentiment which is most strongly felt in Malaysia and 
Thailand).272 
 
6.1 The US, IMF and South Korea in the East Asian Financial Crisis 
In Park’s eye, “adding complexity to South Korea’s domestic battle with restructuring was the 
intervention by such external players as the US and the IMF. Playing the roles of umpires, supporters 
and sometimes arm twisters, they influenced Seoul’s decision-making during the financial crisis.”273 
South Korea has been an important ally of the US for its strategic position in the international 
security sphere. During the 1990s, it enjoyed one of its best relationships since the Korean War 
because of three developments at that time. According to Douglass Paal, firstly, the crisis coincided 
with the election of an opposition leader, President Kim Dae-jung, who was prepared to take on 
Korea’s problems frontally, unburdened by responsibility for the practices that brought the crisis 
about. Secondly, Kim brought a fresh and well-timed conciliatory approach to North Korea that 
allowed Seoul and Washington to align their policies more effectively than had been the case under 
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the previous Kim Young-sam administration. However, the paramount reason might be the US 
posture after the Korean financial crisis. When Americans became aware of the changes taking place 
in Seoul, they took swift and effective action to help Seoul out, acting as a friend. Second, 274 this 
fact could be clearly understood through the comparison of the three emergency lending agreements 
with Thailand in August 1997, Indonesia in November 1997, and Korea in December 1997. These 
three programs established an unprecedented sum of international financial support: $ 17 billion for 
Thailand, $ 35 billion for Indonesia, and $57 billion for Korea. The ROK (Republic of Korea) got far 
more aid from the IMF. 275 
Of course, the condition for the lending was very inclined to the US opinion. For instance, these 
three states were asked to conduct a program of drastic financial sector restructuring, which was 
based on immediate closure or suspension of several financial institutions and significant 
intensification of financial sector supervision in various forms. Other programs include “good 
governance” and “structural” measures aimed at increasing the transparency and competitiveness of 
the economic system such as accelerated trade reform, demonopolization and privatization.276 
However, until December 24, 1997, with Korea being on the brink of default, the US government 
decided to press foreign commercial banks to roll over their short-term credits to the ROK on an 
enforced basis, rather than wait for market confidence to be restored. The IMF, with the backing of 
the United States, insisted on the comprehensive debt rollover as a condition for further 
disbursements under the IMF lending package. Actually, the disbursements were accelerated as part 
of the new arrangement. Rather than using a loan package in combination with economic reforms to 
restore market confidence, the new arrangement meant a non-market postponement of debts falling 
due, albeit ratified by market participants in a collective undertaking.277 In 1999, the Korean 
economy recovered from the financial crisis. Its foreign exchange reserves returned to healthy levels, 
economic activity grew more than 5%, and its currency’s value had been strengthened.  
 
6.2 The US, IMF and Thailand in the East Asian Financial Crisis 
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Thailand was severely hurt by the East Asian Financial Crisis. Thailand was forced to accept 
the IMF bailout in August 1997 when its foreign exchange reserves were exhausted in defense of its 
fixed exchange rate regime (a regime that had been praised by the IMF just six months earlier). After 
the collapse of Thailand’s economy, it received about $170 billion from the international society. On 
August 20, 1997, the IMF’s Executive Board approved financial support for Thailand of up to SDR 
2.9 billion, or about US$4 billion, over a 34-month period. At that Conference, at which the IMF 
presided, Japan promised to give $40 billion to Thailand, and China $20 billion. However, the 
military alliance of Thailand and the United States didn’t provide any bilateral financing support 
during the crisis. Furthermore, the amount of IMF aid to Thailand was much less than that to South 
Korea, though things in Thailand were much worse. The same restrictive conditionality was imposed 
on its structural reforms and huge cuts in government spending (precisely the opposite set of policies 
now being implemented by the US in order to forestall its own economic crisis). 278 
Some observers believed that the treatment of Thailand had something to do with Thailand’s 
foreign policy, which provoked the Unite States. The US appealed to ASEAN member states to 
reject Burma’s entry into the organization on account of its human rights performance. However, the 
Thailand government insisted on support Burma’s entry. By the year’s end, Thailand’s foreign 
relations had become inextricably linked with solving the financial crisis. In the year ahead, it would 
be difficult, but essential, to meet the requirements of the IMF agreement while avoiding conflicts 
with national interests. 279 Certainly, Thailand felt betrayed by the United States. Thailand allowed 
itself to be a base of operations for the United States in the war against communism in Vietnam, but 
the United Stated did not offer bilateral financing support during the crisis. Indeed the US Treasury 
was perceived by some in Thailand to be bent on exposing weaknesses in that country even if that 
meant inducing a crisis for a traditional ally. Thais resented the apparent ready willingness of the 
United States to help “bail out” South Korea, which is of clear strategic importance to the United 
Sates, but not Thailand. 280 As Thailand’s final repayment to the IMF makes clear, the economic 
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damage may be over, but the legacy of mistrust and bitterness lives on. “Standing in front of a giant 
Thai flag on national television, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra vowed that Thailand would 
never again fall prey to world capitalism or require IMF help after proudly announcing the final 
repayment.”281 
 
6.3 The US, the IMF, and the Philippines in the East Asian Financial Crisis 
The Philippines has been a colony of the United States in modern history, but it has lost its 
strategic interest and fell to the periphery after World War II. Edberto M. Villegas studied the 
relationship of the Philippine economy, the IMF, and American multinationals that failed to provide 
large amounts of investment capital, transferred little technology, and made few contributions to 
decreasing the unemployment rates. For instance, the oil companies colluded with the oil 
corporations of the Philippine government to obtain huge profits, while the Filipinos had to endure 
high oil-product prices that increased 1,286 percent from 1971 to 1980. Villegas asserted that the 
Philippines had been a “mere appendage to the American economy,” and international economic 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were loyal in promoting policies in the Philippines 
that favored to the interest of the US multinationals. 282 For example, the IMF promoted the 
reorganization of the Philippine financial system so as to facilitate the access of US capitalists to 
Philippine capital. Another example was the 1974 Labor Code that was against the interest of the 
wage earners. Some other scholars also agreed with Villegas’ opinions. There was almost a 
consensus that the external links, which bound the Philippines to the rich nations of the world, had 
consistently worked to the disadvantage of the Philippines. The IMF has been identified in many 
works as major agents of imperialist domination. It was also argued that the IMF and the WB had 
progressively assumed control of the Philippine economy to further the interests of the metropolitan 
capitalist nations, notably the United States.283 
After the economic crisis extended to the Philippines, the IMF and the US government 
recognized the impendency of stabilizing the foreign exchange market in East Asia. An observer 
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commented on the IMF emergency loans to the Philippines as follows, “the IMF board approved an 
emergency loan request from Manila to help its central bank shore up the value of the Philippine 
currency, the peso, which was allowed to float on July 11 and has since lost about 12 percent of its 
value. …Though the emergency loan is small in comparison with the unprecedented $17.8 billion 
the fund lent Mexico in February 1995, the instability of the Southeast Asian economies has been 
worrisome to international institutions like the IMF and to the U.S. government.”284 Therefore, the 
IMF financing provided to the Philippines was mainly based on the recognition of the impendency 
of the economic crisis rather than the state’s importance. Fortunately, the Philippines was hurt much 
less than other East Asian states such as Thailand or South Korea. Stanley Fischer, First Deputy 
Director of the IMF, claimed in 1999 that the special performance of the Philippines should be 
attributed to the IMF program at the beginning of the crisis and the IMF increased financing for the 
country. However, an analyst insisted, “if we consider that the country has been in a crisis since it 
began following a neoliberal program in 1962, it’s clear that the global crisis has, for the Philippines, 
been simply a continuation of business as usual.”285 That is to say, the recovery of the Philippine 
economy should not be attributed to either US or IMF emergence aid, but to the repetitious crises in 
this miserable country. In comparison to other South East Asian states, the aid to the Philippines was 
also much less. 
 
6.4 The US, the IMF, and Malaysia in the East Asian Financial Crisis 
Malaysia has been a very special example for our research because its government steadfastly 
refused assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Its government worried that the IMF 
would impose restrictive loan conditionality such as economic transparency and efficiency that 
seemed likely to colonize Malaysian sovereignty. The UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization), which has been the dominant party in Malaysia, insisted that it was the ideological 
pillar of Malay political supremacy and maintained the “special rights” of the Malays. Thus, it was 
decided that ex-premier Mahathir had to avoid taking any of the IMF’s bitter medicine. Most Malay 
corporations were used to depending on government subsidies, but the conditionality of the IMF 
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would be based on American capitalistic liberal and open principles. The IMF would have insisted 
that major government contracts be issued on the basis of an open tender system, not on the current 
negotiated basis that allowed the government to award contracts to those close to it, mostly 
UMNO-related companies and individuals. 286 
The Malaysia-US relationship in 1997 was very bad because of strong Anti-Americanism. 
Mahathir told the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries in July that they 
should not depend on any foreign power, making reference to the US betrayal of Southern Vietnam 
during the Vietnam War, which made US officials very upset and were even more mortified when 
Mahathir called for a review of the UN Declaration on Human Rights. US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright took a hard-line approach and warned that Washington would oppose any 
attempt to change the 1948 declaration. Washington was also irritated by Mahathir’s official visit to 
Cuba. Then there emerged a statement by Mahathir alleging that the currency crisis was part of a 
Jewish plot to destabilize Muslim nations. This led directly to a strongly worded resolution 
submitted in the US House of Representatives attacking the Malaysian leader for making 
“inflammatory anti-American and anti-Semitic statements” and calling on him to apologize or 
resign.287 Mahathir repeatedly told the world that if the international financial institutions had found 
a way to restrain speculators, he would not have advocated imposing currency controls. However, 
IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer claimed the Asian problems were caused by policy 
errors and bad governance on the part of the regional governments, not by speculators or the IMF.288 
 Generally speaking, the sense after the crisis that the United States was an unreliable partner in 
matters to do with international finance spilled over automatically into disillusion with the IMF. The 
region felt disappointed that it could not exercise its voice with the Fund and pursue favorable 
projects concerning the problems of the Asian states. The US usually cares about Latin America, and 
Europe has been a supporter of Eastern Europe and North Africa. Japan also feels excluded from the 
US-Europe “agreement” that the Managing Director of the Fund should be European and the First 
Deputy Managing Director an American. Japan’s nomination of its former Ministry of Finance 
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Vice-Minister for International Finance, Dr Eisuke Sakakibara, as a candidate for Managing Director 
in 1999 was an assertion of its discontent.289 The East Asian Financial Crisis explicitly reflected the 
domination of the US and its values in international finance. 
 
Conclusion: The Changing U.S. Role in the IMF 
Considering all of the above, the changing role of the US in the IMF can be clearly traced. The 
evolution of the quotas and voting powers fundamentally reflected the changing role of the US in the 
Fund. With the redistribution of economic power, the US could not solely decide critical affairs of 
the Fund, but had to resort to bargaining and negotiation for support. The US still had a substantial 
impact on the Fund from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s through the special majority clause. The 
relatively closed openness and the huge power of the US ensured that America could prevent the 
passage of its unfavorable proposals. The revival of American hegemony in the 1990s enhanced its 
influence within the Fund. For instance, the globalization of US thought and values penetrated into 
the thinking methods of the IMF staff. Generally speaking, since the mid 1960s, the United States 
has been bargaining intensively for favorable outcomes by using hard power or soft power rather 
than obtaining them automatically as in the 1950s. 
The US’s predominant role was played during the foundation of the Bretton Wood system, 
which reached its greatest power and position in the international arena after World War II. On the 
other hand, in sharp contrast to its overwhelming impact on the world international monetary system, 
the final collapse of the Bretton Wood system at the end of the 1970s would evidently be the best 
example illustrating its relatively declining power and influence. After the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, the IMF underwent numerous great, substantial or trivial, amendments, which reflect 
the changing role of the United States. At the same time, the transforming relationship of the 
European countries with the United States, from loyal and steadfast followers to wavering and 
hesitating counterparts, together with the rise of the Third World during the 1980s, placed pressure 
on the previously readily enforced policies and decisions of the United States.  
Referring to some specific instances, the emergence of the SDR, a new reserve form, at the very 
beginning, seems to be the straightforward representation of the incredibility of US dollars from the 
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point of view of the other countries. Although the US seemed to be reluctant to witness the creation 
of a newly created international reserve asset in competition with the US dollar, it did compromise 
with other countries considering its own economic situation and the reactions from most of the 
member states, especially France. Consequently, through the Second Amendment of the Articles of 
Agreement during the 1980s, the SDR was formally accepted as an international reserve asset. 
Simultaneously, it bears noting that with the recovery of the United States from the crisis, and it 
being obvious that the US didn’t expect the replacement of the SDR by the US dollar, US not only 
opposed the proposal advocating linking the SDR to aid to the LDCs, but was strongly against 
increasing the quantity of the SDRs. As of 2000, the SDR was merely 1.175% of the global reserve, 
which is absolutely incommensurate with its position as one of the international reserve assets. The 
rise and fall of the SDR vividly depicted the commensurate ups and downs of the United States 
during those several decades.  
The coming into existence of the new reserve fund from the 1960s to 1970, mainly aiming at 
ameliorating the condition of the payment deficit in the Less Developing Countries, again implies 
the improvement of the unfairness of the IMF, which could be described as “No Money, no votes, no 
loans” generalized through the past record of the IMF decision-making process. While having deeply 
probed into some cases of the IMF lending process, the trace of United States influence is almost 
universal and penetrating, from the loans to its allies to foes, from Asian countries to African 
countries, from the normal condition to the crisis point. The United States’ voice was heard and 
noticed at all times, and would be considered before a final agreement was realized. The United 
States radiates its energy not only through a formal path, such as by using its voting power, but also 
through informal channels, such as the designation of the Executive Manager or making great efforts 
to enhance American knowledge in the organization by employing more experts systematically 
trained in the United States. Thus, when examining the variation in the international monetary 
system, even the collapse of the Bretton Wood System, we cannot deny that the American factor 
actually did not phase out, but merely moved to its next form. Only by comprehending the essence 
can we better understand the IMF operation, and thus carry out the proper policy. 
 
